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ARTICLES
THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION: PRIVATIZING




Before 1995, only a handful of arbitrations involved claims under
investment treaties. During the last five years, however, the number
of cases has exploded. There are now over sixty known arbitrations
involving investment treaties, and these claims typically involve
amounts ranging from U.S. $120 million to "billions and billions" of
dollars.! The consequence of this growth is that decisions about public
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Prior to
writing this Article, the author's private practice focused exclusively on international
arbitration at Allen & Overy's International Arbitration Group in London, and at
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering's International Group in Washington, D.C. The author
also received a U.S.-U.K. Fulbright Grant to research international arbitration. The
author wishes to thank Professor David D. Caron, Professor David A. Gantz, Profes-
sor Andrea K. Bjorklund, Dr. Loukas Mistelis, and Mr. Doak Bishop, as well as the
faculties at the University of Minnesota Law School, the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln College of Law, and Drake University Law School for their valuable com-
ments and suggestions during the process of drafting this Article. The author is par-
ticularly grateful to Mary Rumsey and the law library at the University of Minnesota
Law School for their invaluable research support during the drafting of this Article.
1. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Big Arbitrations, Focus Eur., Summer 2003, at 22
available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/bigarbitrations.html. This
Article details a series of cases involving sovereign states that are or have been sued
for breaches of investment treaties. These cases include the following: (1) the "Czech
TV Debacle" where the Czech Republic was sued for over U.S. $500 million; (2) the
"Argentine Currency Crisis Claims" where the Republic of Argentina was sued for
"billions of dollars"; (3) the "Lebanese Mobile Phone Fight" where U.S. $1.05 billion
was disputed in a case involving the Republic of Lebanon, (4) the "Czech-Slovak
Bank Battle" where the Slovak Republic was sued for U.S. $1 billion in damages; (5)
the "Japanese-Czech Banking Battle" where a U.S. $1 billion claim was made against
the Czech Republic; (6) the "Port Services Disputes" where claims are being brought
claiming that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan owes approximately U.S. $350 million
and the Republic of Philippines owes U.S. $120 million; (7) the "Building Bridges in
Pakistan" where a claim for U.S. $450 million was made against the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan; (8) the "Turkish Power Plant Joint Venture" where the Republic of Tur-
key is being sued for U.S. $300 million; (9) the "Argentine Water Dispute" alleging
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issues with economic and political consequences are resolved in pri-
vate before different sets of individuals who can and do come to con-
flicting decisions on the same points of law2-and no single body has
the capacity to resolve these inconsistencies.
In the past twelve years, countries ("Sovereigns") have entered into
approximately 1500 new Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs")3 and
the Republic of Argentina owes U.S. $300 million; (10) the "Egyptian Textile Busi-
ness Dispute" where the Arab Republic of Egypt is being sued for U.S. $250 million;
and (11) the "Oil Contract Bidding Dispute" where a U.S. $200 million claim was
brought against the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Id.; see also Jack J. Coe, Jr.,
Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected
Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1381, 1400-01 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Coe, Taking Stock] (describing the extensive amount of damages claimed under
NAFTA despite the slim chances of recovery). These cases only involve claims
brought under bilateral investment treaties. They do not involve claims pursued un-
der multilateral agreements. See. e.g., European Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ECTI, available at
http://www.encharter.org/upload/l/TreatyBook-en.pdf; North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 612 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1994) [hereinafter NAFTA], available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp. At the time of the writing of this Ar-
ticle, at least five cases were filed under the ECT, with at least one finding against a
sovereign state. See Luke E. Peterson, Swedish Firm Wins Energy Charter Treaty Case
Against Republic of Latvia, Invest-SD: Investment L. & Pol'y Wkly. News Bull., Dec.
19, 2003, at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment-investsd-decl9_2003.pdf (de-
scribing the ECT award rendered against Latvia); Luke E. Peterson, UK-Based Firm
Pursues Energy Charter Treaty Claim Against Kyrgyzstan, Invest-SD: Investment L.
& Pol'y Wkly. News Bull., July 2, 2004 (on file with author) (explaining that a new
claim filed against Kyrgyzstan is the fifth known case to surface under the ECT); see
also Ari Afilalo, Constitutionalization Through the Back Door: A European Perspec-
tive on NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1, 5 (2001) (indicat-
ing that in Methanex v. United States, a case brought under NAFTA, a private investor
is seeking close to U.S. $1 billion in damages from the U.S. government).
2. See Matthew Saunders, Bilateral Investment Treaties Oil the Wheels of Com-
merce: An Increase in BITs in Recent Years Is Helping to Encourage and Protect In-
ternational Business, IBA in the News, June 23, 2004, at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&o
rgld=1746&topicld=26635&docId=l:214719388&start=24.html. Saunders explains
that investment treaty arbitrations "operate in the arena of public international law
and interpret [investment treaties] through the application of public international law
principles and conventions, commonly less amenable to clear definition than is the
case in the arena of private law." Id. This situation "often results in less certainty as
to outcome in [investment treaty] claims than might often be the case before a domes-
tic court or a contract based international arbitration." Id.; see infra notes 434-37 and
accompanying text (noting that investment treaty awards do not have precedential
value).
3. These BITs (or, individually, a "BIT") are individually negotiated treaties be-
tween two sovereign states (each a "Sovereign"). See generally U.N. Conference on
Trade and Dev. ("UNCTAD"), Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998) [hereinafter UNCTAD,
BITs in the Mid-1990s]; Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment
Treaties (1995).
LEGITIMACY CRISIS
around five multilateral investment treaties4 in order to attract foreign
investment by granting broad investment rights to foreign investors
and creating flexibility in the resolution of investment disputes. The
existence of this broad network of interrelated rights means that,
when difficulties arise-as they inevitably do-there is a patchwork of
mechanisms to resolve the investment disputes.
Some public international law rights have been articulated for the
first time in investment treaties-such as the right to "fair and equita-
ble treatment" and a Sovereign's obligation to "observe its commit-
ments." Tribunals have applied these standards differently and made
divergent findings on liability. Rather than creating certainty for for-
eign investors and Sovereigns, the process of resolving investment
disputes through arbitration is creating uncertainty about the meaning
of those rights and public international law.5
As investment arbitration is still in its infancy but in the middle of
its first "growing pains," it is appropriate to help the jurisprudence
develop, acknowledge the difficulties in the current framework, and
find ways to minimize the looming legitimacy crisis. In this manner,
investment arbitration will not be thrown out with the proverbial
bathwater and international arbitration will be firmly on track to
promote international justice.
Part I of this Article describes the historical and legal framework of
investment treaties. Against this background, Part II of this Article
examines the rise of investment treaty arbitration. In Part III, this Ar-
ticle discusses the present remedies available to address inconsistent
decisions. Part IV describes three major sets of inconsistent decisions
that have caused uncertainty about the meaning of rights in invest-
ment treaties. Part V of this Article reviews the literature, considers
indicators of legitimacy, and offers a new framework for analyzing
4. There are also a number of multilateral investment treaties containing rights
and obligations similar to BITs. Examples of such treaties include NAFTA and the
ECT. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. This has recently become a topic of discussion. See, e.g., British Inst. of Int'l &
Comparative Law, Appeals and Challenges to Investment Treaty Awards: Is It Time
for an International Appellate System?, at
http://www.biicl.org/edetail.asp?eventid=419&menuid=18 (May 7, 2004); see also Mi-
chael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, Focus Eur., Summer 2004
[hereinafter Goldhaber, Wanted], at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourt04.html. It will also be
discussed at the Institute for Transnational Arbitration and the American Society of
International Law's Spring Conference, as well as at the Seventh Hague Joint Confer-
ence on Contemporary Issues of International Law on International Institutional Re-
form in June-July 2005. See ITA-ASIL, Spring Conference, Arbitration and the In-
volvement of Non-Parties: Transparency, Intervention and Appeal, at
http://asil.intracommunities.org/calendar?view-mode=DisplayYearViewAction&sessi
onid=41b74e656c867853_93318&DisplayYearViewAction=on&date=2005-07-09
(last visited Jan. 22, 2005); ASIL, Seventh Hague Joint Conference on Contemporary
Issues of International Law, International Institutional Reform, at
http://www.asil.org/events/7thHagueConference.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
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previous suggestions for reform. Part VI argues that present efforts
for promoting legitimacy in investment treaty arbitration are insuffi-
cient and recommends the implementation of both preventative and
corrective measures. This Article recommends increasing academic
commentary and analysis of investment treaty rights and enhancing
transparency of the arbitration process in order to prevent inconsis-
tencies from occurring. This Article also proposes corrective reforms
to remedy inconsistent decisions. Rather than having a treaty-by-
treaty approach that might otherwise be suggested by the literature
and the obligations of the U.S. government,6 this Article proposes the
establishment of an independent, permanent appellate body with the
authority to review awards rendered under a variety of investment
treaties. In this manner, legitimacy, transparency, determinacy, and
coherence can be reintroduced into the entire network of investment
treaty disputes, and the concerns of citizens, investors, and sovereigns
alike can be addressed.
I. THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES
Foreign investment is a vital tool for economic development and
global prosperity. It allows developing countries to develop local in-
dustries and receive funds from foreign investors to improve the coun-
try's infrastructure. Meanwhile, investors obtain financial returns and
gain a foothold in the markets of the future.7
6. For example, the United States has certain obligations that suggest the crea-
tion and use of an appellate body will be subject to extensive debate. See U.S.-Central
American Free Trade Agreement, June 1, 2004, at annex 10-F [hereinafter Central
American FTA] (stating that "the FTC shall establish a Negotiating Group to develop
an appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals under
the Investment Chapter of the Agreement"), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Cafta/final/10-investment.pdf; United States-Chile Free
Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, ch. 22 [hereinafter Chile FTA], available
at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/chile/hr2738chilesummary.pdf; United
States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing. [hereinafter Singa-
pore FTA], available at
http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/PDF/CMT/FTAUSSFTA-Agreement-Final.pdf; U.S.
Dep't of State, Update of U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, at annex D (Feb.
5, 2004) [hereinafter Amended U.S. Model BIT] (providing that "[w]ithin three years
after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall consider whether to
establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards"), at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/29030.doc; Letter from George Yeo,
Minister for Trade and Industry of Singapore, to Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative (May 6, 2003) (on file with author) (requiring that "[w]ithin 3 years after the
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall consider whether to estab-
lish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered"); see
also Bart Legum, The Introduction of an Appellate Mechanism: The U.S. Trade Act of
2002, in Annulment of ICSID Awards 289, 295 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Bani-
fatemi eds., 2004) (describing the potential bilateral nature of an appellate mecha-
nism).
7. See, e.g., Marian Nash (Leich), Bilateral Investment Treaties United States-
Argentina, 87 Am. J. Int'l L. 433, 433 (1993) (explaining that the U.S.-Argentina BIT,
[Vol. 731524
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As the global economy continues to expand during turbulent eco-
nomic conditions, investors are becoming more sophisticated about
how they plan investments and resolve disputes related to those in-
vestments. Investment treaties play an increasingly prominent role in
the initial decision to invest in a developing nation, the structure of
the investment, and the methods of maximizing commercial benefits if
there are difficulties with the investment.8 This part describes the his-
torical evolution of investment treaties and discusses why the invest-
ment treaty movement has been successful.
A. The Evolution of Investment Treaties
In order to avoid the historical difficulties associated with "gunboat
diplomacy," countries have promulgated treaties to promote foreign
investment and instill confidence in the stability of the investment en-
"which contains an absolute right to international arbitration of investment disputes,
removes U.S. investors from the restrictions of the Calvo Doctrine and... [b]y pro-
viding important protections to investors and creating a more stable and predictable
legal framework for investment, the BIT helps to encourage U.S. investment" (cita-
tion omitted)).
8. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
41 Harv. Int'l L.J. 469, 469, 489, 498 (2000) [hereinafter Vandevelde, The Economics]
(stating that "BITs appear to have positively affected investment flows" and conclud-
ing that the "evidence is that BITs have been at least marginally successful in increas-
ing investment flows"); see also UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 3, at
122 (noting that despite the three-year time gap between the signing of a BIT and
foreign investment, investors increasingly regard BITs as a normal feature of the insti-
tutional structure); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic
Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L.
501, 523-24 (1998) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization] (explaining
that BITs stabilize favorable investment clients and thus reduce investment risks); in-
fra note 469 (describing political risk insurance that investors can use to minimize in-
vestment risk). Research from the World Bank also suggests that BITs can margin-
ally impact investors' decisions to invest in foreign countries. See Joel C. Beauvais,
Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles & Lingering Doubts,
10 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 245, 253 (2002) (explaining that "[t]he BIT revolution has been
accompanied by a major shift in capital-importing countries' regarding foreign direct
investment" and "an explosion in capital imports to developing countries"); Mary
Hallward-Driemeier, World Bank, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI?
Only a Bit... and They Could Bite (2003) (Working Paper No. 3121), at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/29143-wps3121.pdf. As more investors have won in-
vestment treaty arbitrations, businesses have begun actively considering treaty rights
when structuring their investments so as to take full advantage of potentially available
international rights. See infra note 46. But see K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treat-
ment Standards, 4 Int'l Tax & Bus. L. 105, 111 (1986) (noting that the U.S. Model BIT
was not promulgated "with an intent to catalyze investment decisions" and that the
drafters of the Model BIT were unaware of any link between BITs and investment
flows); Patricia M. Robin, The BIT Won't Bite: The American Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. 931, 942-43 (1984) (describing the lack of evi-
dence substantiating a relationship between BITs and capital flows).
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vironment.9 This movement began with Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, 10 but soon moved beyond this as these
treaties were limited commitments that did not have a forum for re-
solving disputes. 1 There were soon efforts to enact multilateral in-
vestment treaties, which would grant investors and sovereigns a series
of rights and obligations in the hopes of fostering foreign direct in-
vestment. Given the difficulties in promulgating sweeping reforms on
a multilateral basis, these initiatives were largely unsuccessful.
12
9. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and
Practice 7-22 (1992) (describing the evolution of foreign policy from the use of mili-
tary force to treaties of friendship, navigation, and commerce, and finally to bilateral
investment treaties); Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute
Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 BYU L. Rev.
527, 529-31 (describing the shift from "gunboat diplomacy" to investment treaties);
see also Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formu-
lation of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 327, 329-33 (1994)
(discussing the evolution of bilateral investment treaties); Jeswald Salacuse, BIT by
BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign In-
vestment in Developing Countries, 24 Int'l Law. 655, 656-58 (1990) (discussing the evo-
lution of bilateral commercial treaties, bilateral investment treaties, and treaties of
friendship, commerce and navigation); Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Bilateral Trea-
ties for International Investment 5-8 (1977) [hereinafter Bilateral Treaties] (Pub No.
303; describing the progress of bilateral investment treaties).
10. E.I. Nwogugu, The Legal Problems of Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries 119-22 (1965) (describing the historical shift from protecting investments to
treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation).
11. See, e.g., Gudgeon, supra note 8, at 108; see also David R. Adair, Investors'
Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment Treaties, 6 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L.
195, 196-98 (1999) (describing the evolution of treaties); David A. Gantz, Potential
Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA's
Chapter II, 33 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 651, 719-20 (2001) [hereinafter Gantz, Poten-
tial Conflicts]; Todd S. Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and the GA TT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 541, 570-76 (1994) (describing the United States' shift from treaties of
friendship, commerce and navigation to BITs).
12. M. Sornarajah, International Law on Foreign Investment 231-37 (1994); see
also UNCTAD, Fair And Equitable Treatment at 11-12, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/1l (Vol. III), U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.15 (1999) (noting that the
Havana Charter of 1948 did not enter into force), at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//psiteiitdllv3.en.pdf; UNCTAD, Lessons from the
MAI, U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/ITT/Misc.22, U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.26 (1999)
(describing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
("OECD") decision to discontinue negotiations on the multilateral investment
agreement), at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//psiteiitm22.en.pdf; Adair, supra note
11, at 209-219 (describing the 1995 draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment
("MAI") promulgated by the OECD); David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA In-
vestment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States-Chile Free Trade Agree-
ment, 19 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 679, 696 (2004) [hereinafter Gantz, The Evolution] (not-
ing that the failed MAI would have had BIT-type language applicable to disputes
among major developed countries); Directorate for Fin. and Enterprise Affairs,
OECD, Relationships Between International Investment Agreements (2004) [herein-
after OECD] (Pub. No. 2004/1; explaining that the Havana Charter failed to provide a
comprehensive, multilateral set of investment rules), at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/43/31784519.pdf; OECD, Multilateral Agreement on
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Thereafter, various countries turned to bilateral treaties to secure
rights for international investors and encourage efforts to promote
stable investment climates.13 Sovereigns quickly learned that invest-
ment treaties can be a major tool for "enhanc[ing] the type of asset
protection that facilitates wealth-creating cross-border capital flows,
bringing net gains for both host state and foreign investor[s]. '" 4 The
existence and negotiation of BITs has had a great influence on the
formulation of international public policy, 15 and these treaties are now
a touchstone of international relations.16 While many of these invest-
ment treaties were initially between capital exporting and capital im-
porting countries, at present, many investment treaties have been con-
cluded between developed countries, and developing nations have
Investment: Documentation from the Negotiations, at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/toc.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
13. See Anahid M. Ugurlayan, Armenia: Privatization and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in a Climate of Political and Economic Instability, 23 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.
Rev. 427, 447-48 (2001) (noting that a goal of the U.S.-Armenia BIT was to promote
and facilitate private investment and minimize risk). See generally Salacuse, supra
note 9, at 660-61 (explaining that BITs have promoted foreign investment while creat-
ing clear international rules and effective enforcement mechanisms to protect and
promote investment); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Pro-
gram of the United States, 21 Cornell Int'l L.J. 201 (1988); Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 Mich. J. Int'l L. 621 (1993).
14. Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbi-
tration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 Yale J. Int'l L. 365, 366 (2003).
15. Adeoye Akinsanya, International Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in
the Third World, 36 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 58 (1987); Gerald Aksen, The Case for Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties, in Private Investors Abroad-Problems and Solutions in In-
ternational Business in 1981, at 357 (Martha L. Landewehr ed., 1981); Aron Broches,
Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties and Arbitration of Investment Disputes, in The
Art of Arbitration, Liber Amicorum Pieter Sanders 63 (Jan C. Shultsz & Albert Jan
Van den Berg eds., 1982).
16. Although it is difficult to determine the precise number of BITs in effect be-
cause the numbers are always increasing, at present there are over 2100 BITs. See
UNCTAD, Investment Entrustments Online: About, at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page 644.aspx (last updated June 9, 2004)
(stating that the "number of BITs has increased dramatically.., to a total of 2.181 by
2002"); see also Jessica S. Wiltse, An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism in The Free
Trade Area of the Americas: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 51 Buff. L. Rev.
1145, 1153 (2003). In a frequently cited 1984 Comment on BITs, one commentator
posited that participation occurred in three stages. The first stage involved Germany
and Switzerland signing agreements with a variety of less developed countries in the
early 1960s. The second stage occurred throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s when
France, the United Kingdom, the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, the Nether-
lands, and Norway involved themselves in the program. The final stage began in the
late 1970s and continued into the early 1980s when Japan and the United States be-
came increasingly involved. See Robin, supra note 8, at 941-42; see also Bilateral Trea-
ties, supra note 9, at 9-11 (describing why Sovereigns are interested in concluding in-
vestment treaties); Andrew J. Shapren, NAFTA Chapter 11: A Step Forward in
International Trade Law or a Step Backward for Democracy?, 17 Temp. Int'l &
Comp. L.J 323, 327-28 (2003) (describing the United States's embarkation on the bi-
lateral investment treaty program in the 1980s).
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also signed investment treaties among themselves. 17 As investments
continue to flow between developed and developing countries, in-
vestment treaties can no longer be seen purely from the point of view
of industrialized nations."8
The number of BITs has exploded in recent years.19 In the 1990s
alone, investment treaties were negotiated at a rate of one every other
day.2" Several multilateral investment treaties were also enacted.2' At
the same time as the number of bilateral investment treaties quintu-
pled,22 foreign direct investment has also experienced a fivefold in-
crease.23 Unsurprisingly, given the success of bilateral treaties, even
17. See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 9, 1980,
Sing.-Sri., 1202 U.N.T.S. 333, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/srilanka-singapore.pdf; Bilateral
Treaties, supra note 9, at 4 (noting that there are at least eleven BITs between devel-
oped countries);.
18. Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Invest-
ment Protection, in 269 Recueil Des Cours 255, 299 (1997); see also UNCTAD, Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, at 1, 8, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000)
[hereinafter UNCTAD BITs] (explaining that initially "BITs were concluded be-
tween a developed and a developing country" but that this pattern changed in the
1990s when "the dividing line for BIT partners between capital exporting and capital
importing countries no longer holds true and, in many instances, countries approach
BITs with the dual purpose of protecting their outward investments to, while attract-
ing inward investment from, the other BIT partner"), at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf.
19. See Eloise Obadia, ICSID, Investment Treaties and Arbitration: Current and
Emerging Issues, ICSID News, Fall 2001, at 4 (explaining that "there has been an ex-
traordinary proliferation of ... BITs" over the last decade), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n-18-2-4.htm.
20. Vandevelde The Economics, supra note 8, at 469.
21. These treaties include NAFI'A, the Agreement of the Members of the Asso-
ciation of South East Asian Nations for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
(the "ASEAN Agreement"), the Cartagena Free Trade Agreement, the Colonia In-
vestment Protocol of the Common Market of the Southern Cone, the Buenos Aires
Investment Protocol of Mercosur, and the ECT. Antonio R. Parra, Provisions on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Invest-
ment L.J 287, 291-92 (1997) [hereinafter Parra, Provisions ]; see Antonio R. Parra,
ICSID and the Rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Will ICSID Be the Leading Arbi-
tration Institution in the Early 21st Century?, 97 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 41, 43 (2000)
[hereinafter Parra, ICSID].
22. See UNCTAD BITs, supra note 18, at iii (explaining that the 1990s saw a rise
in the number of treaties "from 385 at the end of the 1980s to 1857 at the end of the
1990s"); see also Parra, ICSID, supra note 21, at 41-42 (calculating that 65 BITs were
concluded by the end of the 1960s, another 86 signed during the 1970s, and another
211 in the 1980s, before the 1990s "veritable explosion in the number of BITs" esti-
mated between 960 to 1300 new BITs).
23. Valpy FitzGerald, International Investment Treaties and Developing Coun-
tries (Inst. of Dev. Studies), at http://www.ids.ac.uk/tradebriefings/ti9.pdf (last visited
Feb. 3, 2005) (Trade & Investment Background Briefing No. 9) ; see also Sacerdoti,
supra note 18, at 261 (describing the massive increase in foreign direct investment in
the past decade).
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broader regional investment agreements, such as the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas, are now under consideration.24
B. What Makes Investment Treaties So Special?
The proliferation of investment treaties is due in part to the rights
in the treaties themselves. Investment treaties have two fundamental
innovations, which represent a departure from previous international
agreements.25 First, they grant investors a series of specific substan-
tive rights, which help contribute to the stable investment climate of
an investment. 26 Second, they offer investors direct remedies to ad-
dress violations of those substantive rights. 27 The first of these will be
addressed in this part, and the impact of direct right of access will be
discussed further in Part I.
The provisions of investment treaties are remarkably similar.28
While there are variations in the specific substantive rights and obliga-
tions that result from treaty-specific negotiations, there are several
trends in the rights that Sovereigns choose to provide.29 In general,
Sovereigns agree to protect the investments of investors from the
other Sovereign in their own territory. They do this by delineating the
specific substantive standards that govern the host state's treatment of
an investment.30 In essence, the treaties indicate what rights are
24. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas ("FTAA") is currently being ne-
gotiated and is due to be finalized in 2005. See generally Gantz, The Evolution, supra
note 12; FTAA, Antecedents of the FTAA Process, at http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/View-e.asp (last visited Jan. 22,2005).
25. See generally Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 3; Vandevelde, supra note 9.
26. See Robin, supra note 8, at 943 (describing how BITs help secure overseas in-
vestments and stabilize the overall investment climate).
27. See Gantz, The Evolution, supra note 12, at 683 (explaining that, in the context
of NAFTA, the dispute resolution provision sets mandatory standards for the treat-
ment of foreign investments and investors and also provides for binding arbitration
disputes related to those standards).
28. Vandevelde, The Economics, supra note 8, at 471.
29. This trend may be due in part to the large number of investment treaties based
on Model BITs. Many countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland have similar model BITs that are used when
negotiating trade and investment agreements. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Updated
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Feb. 5, 2004), at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/29030.doc; Dolzer & Stevens, supra
note 3, at 167-254 (providing the text of model BITs from Austria, Denmark, Ger-
many, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States).
30. European BITs, for example, typically require a host government to provide
fair and equitable treatment to investments, permit the free transfer of the foreign
company's earnings (unless there is an extraordinary trade deficit), and permit expro-
priation only when there is a public purpose and appropriate compensation. Robin,
supra note 8, at 942; see also infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (describing the
substantive rights provided in a variety of different investment treaties).
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granted to investments, the types of investments that are covered, and
when the coverage begins and ends.31
There are different permutations of the substantive rights granted
to investors.32 A typical investment treaty generally provides investors
with a combination of up to seven different substantive rights.33 First,
investors are often guaranteed the payment of adequate compensa-
tion in the event an investment is expropriated.34 Second, Sovereigns
are prohibited from enacting currency controls so as to promote the
free flow of capital. 5 Third, Sovereigns are required not to discrimi-
31. Many investment treaties have a sunset provision that permit them to expire
after 10 years upon notification of termination, but also have an option to renew. See
generally Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment
Under International Law 109 (1997); Lucy Reed et al., Guide to ICSID Arbitration
61-62 (2004).
32. See Reed et al., supra note 31, at 40. Reed explains that investment treaties
"are the product of negotiation between two sovereign States, and the exact scope
and content of [investment treaties] vary considerably-even among those signed by a
single country. The variances reflect the States' different investment approaches and
respective bargaining positions." Id.
33. See generally Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 3; see also Parra, Provisions, supra
note 21, at 288-89; Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Recent Trends Relating to Entry of Foreign
Direct Investment, 9 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Investment L.J. 47, 56 (1994); Vandevelde,
Invesment Liberalization, supra note 8, at 506-07, 522.
34. The Argentina-Jamaica BIT provides that neither country
shall take any measure of nationalization or expropriation or any other
measure having the same effect against investments in its territory belonging
to investors of the other [country], unless the measures are taken in the pub-
lic interest, on a non-discriminatory basis and under due process of law. The
measures shall be accompanied by provisions for the payment of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation.
Agreement Between the Government of Jamaica and the Government of the Argen-
tine Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Feb. 8,
1994, Jam.-Arg., art. 4(1), at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docsIbits/argentina-jamaica.pdf. Similarly, the
Bosnia and Herzegovina-Sweden BIT provides that investments "shall not be nation-
alised, expropriated or subjected to requisition or to measures having effect equiva-
lent to nationalisation or expropriation ... except for a public purpose related to the
internal needs and under due process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis and
against prompt, adequate and effective compensation." Agreement on the Promotion
and Protection of Investments Between Sweden and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oct.
31, 2000, Swed.-Bosn. & Herz., art. 4(1), at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/sweden-bosnia.pdf. In addition, the
Cambodia-Croatia BIT provides that countries
shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or indirectly an investment in its
territory of an investor of another [country] or take any measure or
measures having equivalent effect ... except: (a) for a purpose which is in
the public interest, (b) on a non-discriminatory basis, (c) in accordance with
due process of law, and (d) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate
and effective compensation... [which] shall be paid without delay.
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Govern-
ment of the Kingdom of Cambodia on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, May 18, 2001, Croat.-Cambodia, art. 5 [hereinafter Cambodia-Croatia
BIT], at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/croatia-.cambodia.pdf.
35. Article V(1) of the U.S.-Uzbekistan BIT provides that both countries
shall permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely
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nate on the basis of nationality; this typically means investors cannot
be treated worse than the Sovereign's own citizens or other foreign-
ers.36 Fourth, Sovereigns promise to treat investments fairly and equi-
tably.37 Fifth, Sovereigns promise to provide full protection and secu-
and without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include: (a)
contribution to capital; (b) profits, dividends, capital gains, and proceeds
from the sale of all or any part of the investment or from the partial or com-
plete liquidation of the investment; (c) interest, royalty payments, manage-
ment fees, and technical assistance and other fees; (d) payments made under
a contract, including a loan agreement; and (e) compensation [for expropria-
tion and losses due to armed conflict], and payments arising out of an in-
vestment dispute.
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, Dec. 16, 1994, U.S.-Uzb., S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-25 (1995),
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us-uzbekistan.pdf. The
Finland-Kuwait BIT provides that each Sovereign
affirms that its legislation concerning foreign currencies is based upon the
principle of free movement of capital and that the transfer of payments in
connection with an investment is free. Transfers shall include in particular,
though not exclusively: (a) the principle and additional amounts to maintain
or increase the investment; (b) the returns; (c) repayment of loans; (d) royal-
ties and fees ... ; (e) the proceeds from the liquidation or the sale of whole
or any part of the investment; (f) unspent earnings and other remunera-
tion... ; (g) amounts spent for the management and maintenance of an in-
vestment and a variety of other compensations related to violations of the
BIT.
Agreement Between the Republic of Finland and the State of Kuwait for the Protec-
tion and Promotion of Investments, Mar. 10, 1996, Fin.-Kuwait, art. 7, at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/finlandkoweit-eng.fn.pdf.
36. Article 3 of the Denmark-Lithuania BIT provides that neither country "shall
in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory" and that nei-
ther country shall subject investors or investments "to treatment less favourable than
that which it accords to its own [investments or returns and] investors or to investors
of any third State." Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments (with exchange of notes), Mar. 30, 1992, Den.-Lith., art 3(1-3), 1787
U.N.T.S. 245, 247, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/denmark-lithuania.pdf. Article 2(2)
of the China-Sweden BIT provides that investments "shall not be subject to treatment
less favourable than that accorded to investments by investors of third States."
Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 29, 1982, Swed.-P.R.C., at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china-sweden.pdf. Article 3(1) of
the Germany-Kenya BIT provides that foreign investments shall not be accorded
"treatment less favourable than [the Sovereign] accords to investments of its own na-
tion or companies or to investments of nationals or companies of any third State."
Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Kenya Con-
cerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, May 3, 1996,
F.R.G.-Kenya, at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany-kenya.pdf.
37. The specific formulation of this right will depend on the specific treaty at is-
sue. Article 1105(1) of NAFTA provides that "[e]ach Party shall accord to invest-
ments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." NAFTA, su-
pra note 1, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639-40. Article II(3)(a) of the U.S.-Estonia BIT
provides that "[i]nvestment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treat-
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rity to an investment. 38 Sixth, sovereigns guarantee that investments
will not be treated less favorably than the minimum standard required
by customary international law. 39 Finally, Sovereigns sometimes agree
to honor commitments they have made regarding an investment.4 °
ment." Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Estonia for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Pro-
tection of Investment, Feb. 16, 1997, U.S.-Est., art. II(3)(a) [hereinafter U.S.-Estonia
BIT], at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us-estonia.pdf. Similarly,
the Poland-Egypt BIT provides that each country "shall ensure fair and equitable
treatment within its territory of the investments of the investors of the other" country.
Agreement Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and The Republic of Poland for the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, July 1, 1995, Egypt-Pol., art.
3(2) [hereinafter Poland-Egypt BIT], at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt-poland.pdf.
38. Article II(3)(a) of the U.S.-Estonia BIT provides that investments "shall enjoy
full protection and security." U.S.-Estonia BIT, supra note 37. The Australia-
Uruguay BIT similarly provides that each party "accord within its territory protection
and security to investments and shall not impair the management, maintenance, use,
enjoyment or disposal of investments." Agreement Between Australia and Uruguay
on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sept. 3, 2001, Austl.-Uru., art. 3(3),
at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/australia-uruguay.pdf. In slight
contrast, article 2(2) of the Malaysia-United Arab Emirates BIT provides that "in-
vestments shall at all times enjoy full protection and security, in a manner consistent
with international law." Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the
Government of Malaysia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Oct. 11,
1991, U.A.E.-Malay., art. 2(2) [hereinafter Malaysia-UAE BIT], at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/malaysia-uae.pdf.
39. Express reference to international law standards is not always present in in-
vestment treaties; however, some treaties do apply the minimum standards of interna-
tional law. Sacerdoti, supra note 18, at 347. Another example of the application of
international law standards is found in article 3(5) of the Netherlands-Czech Republic
BIT, which provides that the countries will treat investments at least as well as re-
quired by "obligations under international law existing at present or established here-
after." Agreement on Encouragement of Reciprocal Protection of Investments Be-
tween the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,
Neth.-Czech Rep.-Slovk., art. 3(5) [hereinafter Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT], at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech-netherlands.pdf (last visited
Jan. 22, 2005). The U.S.-Argentina BIT provides that the foreign investments "shall
in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law." Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg.,
art. II(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. 128 [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT], available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina-us.pdf. The Canada-
Poland BIT provides that investments "shall at all times be accorded fair and equita-
ble treatment in accordance with principles of international law." Agreement Be-
tween the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Poland for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Nov. 14, 1991, Can.-Pol.,
art. 111(1), available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada-poland.pdf.
40. These agreements are known as "umbrella clauses." Not all countries have
"umbrella-clauses." Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 3, at 81-82. Article 11.2(c) of the
U.S.-Jamaica BIT provides that "each Party shall observe any obligation it may have
entered into with regard to investments." Treaty Between the United States of Amer-
ica and Jamaica Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of In-
vestment, Feb. 4, 1994. U.S.-Jam., Protocol, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-35 (1994), avail-
able at http:/www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/usjamaica.pdf. Likewise, the
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While some of these rights are a confirmation of obligations Sover-
eigns owe under customary international law, others are new.
Most treaties delineate which investors and investments are entitled
to receive substantive protections. Establishing entitlement to protec-
tion is an important threshold issue as it permits investors to obtain
protection and bargaining leverage of investment treaties. The stan-
dards that must be met are typically broad,4 and to secure the benefits
of an investment treaty, there must be a qualifying person or entity
(the ratione personae requirement), 42 a qualifying subject matter (the
Netherlands-Philippines BIT provides that each country "shall observe any obligation
arising from a particular commitment it may have entered into with regard to a spe-
cific investment of nationals of the other Contracting Party." Agreement Between the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of the Philippines for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, (n.d.), Neth.-Phil., art. 3(3), at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands-philippines.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 22, 2005). Similarly, the Malaysia-UAE BIT provides that each party "shall
observe any obligation it may have entered into in the domuments [sic] of approval of
investments or the approved investment contracts by investors." Malaysia-UAE BIT,
supra note 38, art. 13(3). The Mauritius-UK BIT also provides that each country
"shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments of
nationals or companies of the other" country. Agreement Between the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of Mauritius, May 20, 1986, U.K. & N. Ir.-Mauritius, art. 2(2), at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk-mauritius.pdf.
41. See Todd Weiler, The Ethyl Arbitration: First of Its Kind and a Harbinger of
Things to Come, 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 187, 188 (2000) (describing the "incredibly
wide-ranging application" of the definitions of investor and investment in NAFTA).
42. Ratione personae is generally understood to mean the person or entity covered
by a particular treaty. See Black's Law Dictionary 1263 (6thed. 1990) (defining ratione
personae as "[b]y reason of the person concerned; from the character of the person");
see also UNCTAD, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2.4
Requirements of Ratione Personae, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/EDMMisc.232/Add.3
(2003) (outlining the requirements for being considered a ratione personae under the
ICSID Convention; these requirements tend to be similar to those of investment trea-
ties), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add3-en.pdf. The term
"investor" is broadly defined; its application is rarely disputed. See Radil Emilio
Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Investment Disputes Under
ICSID: The Latin American Experience, 8 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 501, 506 (2002) (ex-
plaining that each investment treaty provides its own definition of "nationals, indi-
viduals, or juridical persons" who are entitled to benefit from "rights and obligations
created or recognized by the treaty"; and noting that BITs generally define a foreign
investor broadly). But see Todd Weiler, NAFTA Chapter 11 Jurisprudence: Coming
Along Nicely, 9 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 245,269 (2002-2003) [hereinafter Weiler, Com-
ing Along] (remarking that, unlike many bilateral investment treaties, NAFTA pro-
vides a specific protocol to determine who is an investor and what is an investment).
Classification as an "investor" is most contentious when the investor's nationality is in
question. For example, in a case decided a few months ago, the definition of an inves-
tor was particularly contentious where a Ukrainian company owning 99% of the
shares and comprising two-thirds of the management of a Lithuanian company sued
for a violation under the Ukraine-Lithuanian BIT. Tokios Tokel6s v. Ukraine, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/18 $ 21 (2004), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/tokios-decision.pdf. In Tokeles, the tribunal
held that the investor, though the company was controlled and owned by Ukraine na-
tionals, was still a Lithuanian investor within the meaning of the Ukraine-Lithuania
BIT. The majority explained that the investment treaty set the bar of corporate na-
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ratione materiae requirement)43 and a dispute within a qualifying time
frame (the ratione temporis requirement)." The impact of these three
"standing" requirements is that-depending entirely upon how the in-
tionality low, permitting nationals of one state to incorporate in the other, and to sub-
sequently reinvest in their home territory as "foreign" investors. Id. TT 14, 18, 28, 30-
32, 38, 41-43, 71, 86; Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, Final Award on Jurisdiction,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/7 (2004) (dismissing a case brought under an in-
vestment treaty wherein a national of Canadian and Italian background could not
demonstrate that he was an Italian national and therefore permitted to benefit from
the UAE-Italy BIT), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Soufraki.pdf. But
see Champion Trading Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Case No. ARB/02/9, discussed
in Philippe Pinsolle, Jurisdictional Review of ICSID Awards, 5 J. World Investment &
Trade 613, 615-16 (2004) (discussing unpublished award where arbitrators found ju-
risdiction over some companies but not natural persons who were the shareholders
because of a failure to meet the nationality requirement). In a vigorous dissent, Pro-
fessor Prosper Weil (who was also the president of the tribunal) warned that this type
of a decision could lead to the misuse of the ICSID system. See Tokios Tokel6s v.
Ukraine, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Prosper Veil, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/18 T$ 1, 20-22 (2004) thereinafter Tokel6s Dissent], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/tokios-dissenting-opinion.pdf. In a unique step,
Professor Weil has since resigned as president of the tribunal. Luke E. Peterson,
Chairman of Tribunal Resigns After Dissenting in Investment Arbitration, Invest-SD:
Investment Law & Pol'y Wkly. News Bull., July 2, 2004 (on file with author).
43. Ratione materiae generally refers to those requirements that ensure an invest-
ment is covered by a particular treaty. See Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 42, at
1262 (defining the term as "[b]y reason of the matter involved; in consequence of, or
from the nature of, the subject-matter"); see also UNCTAD, International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2.5 Requirements of Ratione Materiae (2003)
(outlining requirements for ratione materiae under the ICSID Convention, which has
been interpreted in a manner relatively similar to requirements for investment trea-
ties, even though the term "investment" is not specifically defined in the ICSID Con-
vention), at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add4-en.pdf. Investment trea-
ties tend to broadly define "investment." See Vinuesa, supra note 42, at 506; Weiler,
Coming Along, supra note 42, at 269 (describing the broad definition of investments).
For example, as articulated in the Model BIT for Great Britain, a typical BIT provi-
sion regarding investments might provide the following:
For the purposes of this agreement: (a) "investment" means every kind of
asset and in particular, though not exclusively, includes: (i) movable and
immovable property and any other property rights such as mortgages, liens
or pledges; (ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any
other form of participation in a company; (iii) claims to money or to any per-
formance under contract having a financial value; (iv) intellectual property
rights, goodwill, technical processes and know-how; (v) business concessions
conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to search for, cul-
tivate, extract or exploit natural resources.
Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 3, at 229; see also id. at 187-88, 219-20 (describing an
equally broad definition of investment in German and Swiss Model BITs).
44. This essentially requires that the dispute arose when both parties were legally
entitled to have access to the system concerned. For example, in Mondev Interna-
tional Ltd. v. United States, a tribunal held the claim was invalid under NAFTA be-
cause the alleged breach of the treaty occurred before NAFTA was in force. Mondev
International Ltd. v. United States 57-70, at www.naftalaw.org (last visited Jan. 22,
2005); see also ECT, supra note 1, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 613 (explaining that "existing" as
well as new investments are covered by the BIT); U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 39,
art. XIV (providing that the BIT applies to investments "existing at the time of entry
into force" as well as "investments made or acquired thereafter").
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vestment is structured4 5 and the rules of the relevant investment
treaty-investments that relate to more than one country might per-
mit investors to benefit from more than one investment treaty simul-
taneously. For example, a U.S. citizen making an investment in the
Czech Republic through a Dutch company may receive rights under
both the U.S.-Czech Republic BIT and the Netherlands-Czech Re-
public BIT. This possibility creates an incentive for investors to struc-
ture investments that provide them with legitimate expectations of
benefiting from rights under at least one investment treaty, if not mul-
tiple treaties.46 When the same set of facts permits arbitrations under
different treaties, this enhances the potential for inconsistent deci-
sions.
II. THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
With the proliferation of investment treaties, investors have more
treaties that they can use to sue Sovereigns. This part considers the
evolution of investment arbitration, the benefits to giving investors a
direct cause of action against Sovereigns, the current state in invest-
ment arbitration, and the actual process of initiating investment treaty
arbitration against a Sovereign.
45. See Saunders, supra note 2 (explaining that "BITs can, if their role is properly
understood and investments are suitably structured, provide an invaluable measure of
protection to investors often exceeding in its utility the sort of protections available
before domestic courts or contract based arbitration tribunals").
46. In the future, investors are likely to actively consider how to structure their
investments in manners which improve the commercial position. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely the job of lawyers to advocate effectively for their clients and use all available
options to improve their client's position. See, e.g., Philip Dunham & George K. Fos-
ter, Current Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Focus Eur., June 2004, at A6
(arguing investors "should always consider whether or not an applicable treaty is in
force when contemplating new ventures or seeking redress"), available at
http://www.coudert.com/publications/articles/040515 5-ForeignArbitration-fe.pdf;
Allen & Overy, The Rise of Investment Treaty Arbitration (n.d.) (suggesting inves-
tors "structur[e] transactions so that [they] can take advantage of as many investment
treaty rights as possible"), at
http://www.allenovery.com/asp/infocus.asp?pagelD=3837 (last visited Jan. 22, 2005);
see also Julian D.M. Lew et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration
769 (2003) (noting that "investments made by a subsidiary of a global corporation will
now fall under at least one BIT"). In one case, a local company reincorporated itself
in a foreign company before reinvesting in its home country through the foreign com-
pany; the local investors effectively became "foreign" in the eyes of the BIT. There
was no evidence that investors intentionally created and/or used its new corporate na-
tionality to benefit improperly from the BIT. Tokelds, supra note 42, T 56 (noting that
there was no attempt to conceal the investor's national identity and the Lithuanian
company was not created for the purpose of gaining access to ICSID arbitration un-
der the BIT); Tokelds Dissent, supra note 42, 21 (same).
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A. The Evolution Towards Investment Arbitration
Since at least 1794, arbitration has been used as a mechanism for
fostering foreign investment and providing a neutral forum to resolve
international disputes.47 Although there have been bumps and bruises
as international arbitration has evolved48 into an independent disci-
pline with impartial and expert decision makers, arbitration is now the
preeminent method for resolving complex international disputes4 9 and
imminently preferable to other options, such as the use of force or in-
formal solutions (such as closed-door diplomatic negotiations)."
Arbitration of investment disputes was not once as widely used as it
is now." This was primarily because individual investors had no
standing and no direct cause of action against a Sovereign for a viola-
tion of international law that adversely affected their investment. 2
Rather, investors were forced to lobby their home country to espouse
a claim on their behalf at the International Court of Justice (the
"ICJ"), which resulted in only episodic investment disputes 3 and even
47. See generally Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 366-67.
48. See Kenneth S. Carlston, The Process of International Arbitration 259-64
(1946).
49. See generally Joanne K. Lelewer, International Commercial Arbitration As a
Model for Resolving Treaty Disputes, 21 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 379 (1989). See also
Susan D. Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis
and Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 1-2 (2000)
(explaining that arbitration is the preferred dispute resolution mechanism for interna-
tional disagreements). Arbitration was historically perceived as promoting respect for
the rule of law. This respect is necessary for investment stability, and is particularly
relevant when investors are concerned about facing investment dispute resolution
conducted by a foreign sovereign. This concern is exacerbated when the defendant is
the Sovereign. Delocalized arbitration, by contrast, offers a neutral forum where im-
partial tribunals with specialist expertise could make determinations pertaining to in-
vestments in a way that would bolster investor confidence and foster greater certainty.
Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 369-70.
50. Lelewer, supra note 49, at 379; see also Sacerdoti, supra note 18, at 413 (noting
that "the overt use of force has been banished in the last decades" but explaining that
"friendly solutions have often required years if not decades").
51. There is evidence that investment treaty arbitration was successful from its
infancy in the early 1980s. See, e.g., Bilateral Treaties, supra note 9, at 10-11 (describ-
ing three cases where invoking a BIT successfully resolved the dispute); Gudgeon,
supra note 8, at 130; Robin, supra note 8, at 943 n.89 (referring to the ICC's claims
that BITs afforded effective protection for overseas investments). But see Lelewer,
supra note 49, at 399 (noting that "insufficient use has been made of arbitration as a
mechanism for the enforcement of treaties in public international law"); Sacerdoti,
supra note 18, at 453 (stating in 1997 that "one must stress that the number of arbitra-
tions held under BITs and in accordance to their disputes settlement clauses has been
irrelevant. Moreover, only in very few ICSID cases until now was jurisdiction based
on a BIT clause").
52. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1946, art. 34(1), 59
Stat. 1055, 8 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (noting that "[o]nly state[s] may
be parties in cases before the [International] Court [of Justice]").
53. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 677-90 (6th ed. 2003)
(describing the organization and jurisdictional authority of the ICJ); John Collier &
Vaughn Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes, in International Law 132-69 (1999) (noting
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smaller numbers of successful claims. 4 In the happy event that a Sov-
ereign espoused its investor's case,55 and the ICJ did find a violation of
international law, there were two drawbacks. First, an aggrieved in-
vestor would not necessarily receive the compensation for the Sover-
eign's illegal conduct. Second, the only enforcement tool available to
the ICJ is the enactment of a Security Council Resolution, 6 which is
not commercially useful where an investor seeks financial compensa-
tion. 7
With these limitations, the remaining alternative for aggrieved in-
vestors was to initiate litigation before national courts.58 This option
was not attractive to investors who, presuming they could establish a
colorable cause of action, found themselves in the Sovereign's court
litigating against the Sovereign.
In an effort to address these concerns, investment treaties made two
fundamental shifts for the resolution of investment-based disputes.
First, the treaties gave investors a direct cause of action against a Sov-
ereign for damages 9.5  This means investors are no longer at the mercy
the limited availability of ICJ jurisdiction); J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Set-
tlement 112-23, 139-44 (2d ed. 1991) (explaining the jurisdiction and authority of the
ICJ).
54. Jones, supra note 9, at 529.
55. Prior to the evolution of investment treaties, investors were required to go be-
fore the ICJ. This process required the investor to
go to its host government, its home government, and say "Please bring my
claim before the International Court of Justice." The state might choose to
do that, or it might not choose to do that; the decision was purely political.
The prospect was that an investor who suffered significant economic harm
had its redress contingent upon the political will and political calculation of
its own government.
Daniel M. Price, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein
or Safety Valve?, 26 Can.-U.S. L.J. 107, 112 (2001) [hereinafter Price, NAFTA].
56. See Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Conse-
quences, 38 Tex. Int'l L.J. 405, 416 (2003) (remarking that ICJ cases do not always se-
cure compliance and that the ICJ relies "by conscious design on the most political of
bodies, the Security Council, for [its] effectiveness"); see also UNCTAD, Dispute Set-
tlement, General Topics, 1.2 International Court of Justice 23, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.19 (2003) (explaining that an ICJ judgment "is bind-
ing upon the parties in accordance with Article 2 and Article 94(1) of the United Na-
tions Charter"), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232addl9-en.pdf.
If a party fails to comply with the judgment, the opposing party can apply to the
United Nations Security Council which will either "make recommendations" or "de-
cide upon measures" to give effect to the judgment. Id.
57. See Vandevelde, supra note 9, at 162 (noting that ICJ judgments are generally
only enforceable through the U.N. Security Council and stating that "[a] judgment by
the ICJ, in effect, could be worthless").
58. See Sacerdoti, supra note 18, at 413-14 (noting that local courts, although
competent to decide disputes involving investments, are rarely satisfactory to the for-
eign investor).
59. This alleviates difficulties faced by investors when their sovereign country
does not find it politically expedient to bring their case before the ICJ. The freedom
granted by investment treaties might, for example, have freed the Belgium investors
in Barcelona Traction from having to petition Canada to hear their claims regarding
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of international politics and governmental bureaucracy when deciding
to initiate dispute resolution, and can avoid their litigation being swal-
lowed by the larger foreign relations dialogue.6" Second, without the
need for a separate contract with a dispute resolution mechanism, in-
vestment treaties gave investors a choice of neutral settings for resolv-
ing their grievances.6
Overall, these shifts have created a private cause of action against
Sovereigns, which permits investors to act like "private attorney gen-
erals," and places the enforcement of public international law rights in
the hands of private individuals and corporations. These shifts were a
major innovation. They created a mechanism to bolster investors'
confidence that they will receive a "fair shake" when resolving dis-
putes with Sovereigns,6" thus reducing the risks associated with in-
vestment and, arguably, increasing the incentive to investment abroad.
B. The Rise of Investment Arbitration
Given that the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID") and investment treaties have been available to
investors since the 1960s, it is somewhat surprising that the number of
claims under investment treaties has accelerated only in the last few
years.63 Perhaps arbitration is now coming of age because of the
growth in foreign investment during the last decade, the network of
investment treaties, and the need for a neutral setting.64
Filings at ICSID -one of the potential institutions to which one can
submit investment treaty arbitrations-have increased from a level of
approximately one per year in the 1980s to one or two per month in
2001.65 Practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic agree that the world
expropriation, and having the ICJ make an adverse ruling on jurisdiction due to the
investors' nationality. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Sec-
ond Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
60. Daniel M. Price, Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 Hast-
ings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev 421, 427 (2000) [hereinafter Price, Some Observations].
61. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining how no direct contract is
needed between the investor and Sovereign, but rather the offer to arbitrate is a uni-
lateral offer that the investor accepts by initiating arbitration).
62. The desire for neutrality and fairness was one of the reasons the United States
insisted that NAFTA contain arbitration provisions protecting foreign investment.
Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 371.
63. Although more than 120 cases have been submitted to ICSID, the vast major-
ity were submitted in the past five years. See Saunders, supra note 2. ICSID only ac-
counts for a portion of investment treaty cases; it is only one of a variety of methods
used to settle investment treaty disputes.
64. See Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1399-1400 (explaining that, under
NAFTA, investment arbitrations have been influenced by the flow of investments).
65. Luke Peterson, Change Investment Litigation, Bit by BIT, Bridges Between
Trade and Sustainable Development, May 2001, at 11 [hereinafter Peterson, Change
Investment ] (quoting William D. Rogers, Address at the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank Conference, (Oct. 26- 27, 2000)), at
http://www.ictsd.orglEnglish/BRIDGES5-4.pdf. During the first six months of 2003,
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is experiencing an exponential explosion of claims brought under a
variety of investment treaties.66  Particularly within the last year,"
there has been a dramatic increase in the number of investment treaty
arbitrations." Counsel with ICSID confirm the explosion in the num-
ber of investment treaty cases and have indicated that this trend is
likely to continue.6 9
C. What Is Investment Treaty Arbitration?
Investment treaties provide a unique dispute resolution mechanism
that investors can invoke to seek redress for treaty violations. Rather
than having to resolve a dispute with a Sovereign through the cumber-
ICSID registered fifteen new arbitration proceedings and twenty-six arbitration pro-
ceedings during the 2003 fiscal year. Stephen Jagusch & Matthew Gearing, Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in Arbitration World:
Jurisdictional Comparison 58-59 (J. William Rowley, Q.C. ed., 2004).
66. William D. Rogers, senior trade and arbitration partner at Arnold & Porter,
predicted "a flood of litigation under the BITs." Peterson, Change Investment, supra
note 65, at 5. Investment arbitration practitioners confirm this increase in investment
arbitrations, including Lucy Reed, a leading investment arbitration partner at Fresh-
fields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP in New York. Telephone Interview with Lucy Reed,
Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (July 28, 2004) [hereinafter Reed In-
terview]; see also Telephone Interview with Juliet Blanch, Partner, Norton Rose
(Aug. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Blanch Interview] (noting that there has been a "massive
rise" in the number of investment treaty claims as more lawyers begin to understand
and utilize the rights available under the investment treaty network); Telephone In-
terview with Stephen Jagusch, Partner, Allen & Overy (July 27, 2004) [hereinafter
Jagusch Interview] (noting the "exponential growth" in the number of investment
treaty arbitrations during the last five years as investors and their lawyers have recog-
nized their rights); Telephone Interview with Philippe Pinsolle, Partner, Shearman &
Sterling LLP (July 27, 2004) [hereinafter Pinsolle Interview] (describing the increase
in investment treaty arbitration during the last five years as investors "realise the in-
vestment treaty network").
67. See Dunham & Foster, supra note 46.
68. See Gonzalo Flores, Energy and International Law: Development, Litigation,
and Regulation, 36 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1, 8-9 (2001) (noting that ICSID has experienced an
"unprecedented increase in its caseload": out of the thirty pending cases of 2001,
twenty-three were brought under investment treaties, one under an investment law,
and only six under the arbitration provisions of an investment contract). The in-
creased use of institutions such as ICSID reflects the growing acceptance of arbitra-
tion as a viable means of settling disputes between foreign investors and Sovereigns.
Andr6s R. Sureda, ICSID: An Overview, 13 World Arb. & Mediation Rep. 166, 169
(2002).
69. See Obadia, supra note 19; see also ICSID, About ICSID, at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (indicating
that the number of cases submitted to ICSID has significantly increased in recent
years). But see Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 366 (explaining that following
NAFTA and the subsequent wave of cases, there was increased awareness regarding
the downsides of arbitration, including the possibility that vital economic and political
matters might be decided in private by tribunals consisting largely of foreigners);
Luke Eric Peterson, All Paths Lead out of Rome: Divergent Paths of Dispute Set-
tlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties 3-4 (2002) [hereinafter Peterson, All Paths]
(noting an NGO that announced there are "ample grounds for criticizing" the status
of investment treaty arbitrations and private resolution of highly sensitive regulatory
and policy issues), at www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment-nautilus.pdf.
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some ICJ process or the Sovereign's court,7 investors can proceed di-
rectly71 to arbitration. Investors do not lightly sue governments72 as
they are aware that Sovereigns will staunchly defend their corner; and,
as a result, when initiating arbitration, investors undertake a major fi-
nancial risk with the possibility of minimal recovery.73 As a practical
matter, investors typically bring claims after non-legal routes such as
commercial discussions have been unsuccessful.74
70. Sovereigns are often unwilling to entrust their disputes to the courts of an-
other nation, while foreign investors often have little faith in the courts of their host
country. This is particularly relevant in the case of sensitive infrastructure projects:
Investors may be legitimately concerned that they would not be able to protect their
investments should the need arise. See generally Thomas W. W51de, Investment Arbi-
tration Under the Energy Charter Treaty-From Dispute Settlement to Treaty Imple-
mentation, 12 Arb. Int'l 429 (1996).
71. There are, however, often "cooling" periods which are applicable. For exam-
ple, many investment treaties require investors to wait three to six months after the
investor notifies a Sovereign of a dispute before an arbitrator can submit the request
for arbitration. See German Model BIT, art. 11(2), in Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 3,
at 194 (providing for a six month waiting period); Great Britain Model BIT, art. 8(2),
in Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 3, at 234 (noting the three month waiting period
found in the British Model BIT); see also Swiss Model BIT, art. 9(2), in Dolzer & Ste-
vens, supra note 3, at 225 (noting the BIT requires twelve months to pass from the
time notice of the dispute is given to the Sovereign before recourse may be sought in
arbitration); Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International
Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 Va. J. Int'l L. 1,
36 n.191 (1989) (describing waiting periods in U.S.-Morocco BIT); Keith Molkner, A
Comparison of the Legal Regimes for Foreign Investment in Russia, Kazakstan, and
Kyrgyzstan, 11 Int'l Tax & Bus. L. 71, 100 (1993) (describing various waiting periods).
Some investors, however, have been able to "jump the gun" and initiate arbitration
before the expiration of the waiting period. See Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final
Award, IT 187-91 (2001) (UNCITRAL) [hereinafter London Award] (noting that
although the claimant waited only 17 days before filing the request for arbitration, the
failure to abide by the cooling period did not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction),
available at http://www.cetv-net.com/iFiles/1439-lauder-cr-eng.pdf; Ethyl Corp. v.
Canada 74-88 (1998) (UNCITRAL), 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999) (acknowledging that
while the claimant only waited nine days after the disputed legislation went into effect
before filing its request for arbitration, its claim would not be barred for failure to
abide by the procedural rules set out in the investment treaty); see also Maffezini v.
Kingdom of Spain, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/7
(2000) (holding that the claimant could decrease the "cooling off period" from six to
three months due to another treaty's most favored nation provision), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/emilioDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.
72. Ian A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 223,
228-29 (2001).
73. Claimants filing under NAFTA have recovered substantially less than the
amounts originally sought. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1. For example, in Pope &
Talbott v. Canada, the tribunal only awarded U.S. $461,566 although the investor
sought U.S. $507 million. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Damages Award, 191 (2002), at
http://www.naftalaw.org.
74. Laird, supra note 72, at 229. Juliet Blanch, the Global Head of Norton Rose's
International Arbitration Group, explains that in her experience, investors are ini-
tially reluctant to initiate arbitration against a Sovereign. Rather, investors try to re-
solve disputes by negotiations and only if that route completely fails will they com-
mence arbitration. Blanch Interview, supra note 66; see also Jagusch Interview, supra
note 66 (explaining that investment arbitration has traditionally been the last resort
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Investment treaties generally offer investors a choice of where they
can bring their disputes, often including the Sovereign's own national
courts or arbitration.75 Some treaties give investors a very narrow set
of choices,76 but the trend is to provide investors with a range of op-
tions (such as tribunals organized under ICSID, the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce ("SCC") and/or the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Rules).77 Not surprisingly, given
for corporations following years of nonperformance by Sovereigns). But see Pinsolle
Interview, supra note 66 (noting that large companies initiate arbitration as a last re-
sort, but suggesting that this may not always be the case when the investor is an indi-
vidual). NGOs espouse a slightly different view, however. See Howard Mann, Private
Rights, Public Problems: A Guide to NAFTA's Controversial Chapter on Investment
Rights 28 (2001) (suggesting that investors have turned investment treaties from
"shields" into "swords"), available at
http://www.iisd.org/publications/publication.asp?pno=270; Howard Mann & Konrad
von Moltke, Protecting Investor Rights and the Public Good: Assessing NAFTA's
Chapter 11, at 12-13 (2003) [hereinafter Mann & von Moltke, Protecting Invetsor
Rights], at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment ilsd-background-en.pdf (same);
Peterson, supra note 65 (same).
75. Parra, Provisions, supra note 21, at 288. The investor's options will vary based
on the rights enumerated in the applicable treaty. For instance, some treaties provide
investors with a full range of options when seeking recourse, including the national
courts, ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, arbitration before the
ICSID, the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), or the Stockholm Cham-
ber of Commerce ("SCC"). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the ICC and SCC have
very light investment arbitration caseloads. See Peterson, All Paths, supra note 69, at
32 n.8 (noting that approximately one percent of the ICC's 500 cases are investment
treaty claims, and the SCC believes it has had a maximum of three such cases).
76. Certain investment treaties have limited mechanisms for resolving disputes.
See Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, Oct. 12, 1989, P.R.C.-Ghana, art. 10 (providing the following: the quantum
phase of certain investment disputes is subject to ad hoc arbitration; the SCC is the
default appointing authority; and, although no specific procedural rules are estab-
lished, the tribunal can use either the SCC or ICSID rules "as guidance"), at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/chinaghana.pdf; Treaty Concerning
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, July 22, 1985, U.S.-
Morocco, art. VI, Protocol, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-18 (providing the ICSID with ex-
clusive jurisdiction over investment disputes), available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/does/bits/us-marocco.pdf; Treaty Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Dec. 13, 1983, U.S.-
Haiti, art. VII (permitting only the ICC to resolve investment disputes), at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/does/bits/us-haiti.pdf; Agreement for the Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments, July 22, 1975, Gr. Brit.-Sing., art. 8, 1018
U.N.T.S. 175 (providing ICSID with exclusive jurisdiction over investment disputes),
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk-singapor.pdf; But see
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Nov. 27, 1981, Somal.-F.R.G., art. 10 (allowing state-to-state arbitration but prohibit-
ing investor-state arbitration in Somalia's only BIT), at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany-somalia.pdf.
77. There are a variety of treaties that let investors pick from a variety of dispute
resolution options. See Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments, Aug. 8, 1995, Belr.-Turk., art. VII, reprinted in 6 Int'l Ctr. for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes, Investment Treaties, (explaining an investor's arbi-
tration options, including ICSID, ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, ICC arbitration,
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their concerns about getting a "fair shake," investors generally arbi-
trate disputes on a confidential basis before a panel of arbitrators.78
When there is an investment dispute, investors evaluate the dispute
resolution provision of a relevant treaty and determine if they have
standing to initiate the treaty's dispute resolution mechanism. While
the scope and content of these provisions differ, the provisions in the
investment treaty are generally understood to constitute a unilateral
and the courts of Belarus or Turkey having jurisdiction); Agreement for the Recipro-
cal Promotion and Protection of Investments, July 1, 1995, Egypt-Pol., art. 8(4) (al-
lowing investor-state disputes to be settled by SCC arbitration, ICC arbitration, ad
hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, or ICSID arbitration), at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt-poland.pdf; Treaty Concerning
Business and Economic Relations, Mar. 21, 1990, U.S.-Pol., art. IX [hereinafter U.S.-
Poland BIT] (giving investors the choice of arbitrating at ICSID, through the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules, through ad hoc UNCITRAL based arbitration, or using the
rules of "any arbitral institution" that both parties agree to), at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US-poland.pdf; Agreement on the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mar. 20, 1990, Italy-Bangl., art. 9, reprinted
in 3 Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Investment Treaties (providing
that investment disputes can be resolved in the national courts, through ICSID arbi-
tration, or through ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration).
78. See, e.g., Mark Friedman & Gaetan Verhoosel, Arbitrating over BIT Claims,
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at 15 (describing BIT treaty claims and suggesting that in-
vestors often view BIT arbitrators as more fair than foreign courts). While none of
the practitioners interviewed for this Article were aware of investors proceeding with
investment treaty disputes before national courts, Juliet Blanch at Norton Rose has
noted that some investment claims go to national courts, but this usually occurs when
investors are unaware that they have an option to bring their claims against a Sover-
eign in a forum other than the Sovereign's own national courts. See Blanch Interview,
supra note 66. Investment treaty awards are largely confidential, and the vast major-
ity of these cases are resolved by panels under the ICSID framework. There are also
a significant number of decisions made by ad hoc tribunals operating under the
UNCITRAL Rules. See Jagusch Interview, supra note 66 (estimating that half of in-
vestment treaty cases are submitted to ICSID and that, of the remaining half, as many
as two-thirds are submitted to UNCITRAL arbitration); Pinsolle Interview, supra
note 66 (estimating that approximately two-thirds of investment cases are arbitrated
at ICSID, identifying two ICC investment arbitrations, and noting that the remainder
are either UNCITRAL or SCC arbitrations); Reed Interview, supra note 66 (stating
that the consensus is that most investment disputes are filed with ICSID and noting
no one likely knows the precise number of UNCITRAL cases); see also Royal Inst. of
Int'l Affairs, International Environmental Disputes: International Forums for Non-
Compliance and Dispute Settlement in Environmental Related Cases 9 (2001) (stat-
ing that "ICSID arbitration is one of the main mechanisms for the settlement of in-
vestment disputes under four recent multilateral trade and investment treaties"), at
http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/sdp/envdisputes.pdf; Thomas L. Brewer, Interna-
tional Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Evolving Regime for Foreign
Direct Investment, 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 633, 655-56 (1995) (explaining that one of
the reasons ICSID is important is that "most bilateral investment treaties designate it
as the prospective arbitration center for disputes, refer to it as an appointing author-
ity, or indicate that its rules would be applicable in ad hoc arbitrations"); Malcolm D.
Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of Developing
Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 Harv. Int'l L.J. 103, 118 (1992) (noting
that "the frequency with which ICSID arbitration clauses are included in investment
laws and treaties.. . illustrates ICSID's growing stature among investors and host
countries").
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offer by the Sovereign to settle disputes by arbitration, which the in-
vestor accepts by initiating arbitration under the treaty.79 The dispute
process generally follows a relatively standard set of procedures, in-
cluding: (1) submitting a notice of dispute to the Sovereign, (2) com-
plying with the applicable waiting period, (3) electing where to resolve
the dispute, and (4) taking the chosen procedure forward in accor-
dance with the chosen mechanisms articulated in the investment
treaty.80
The next step in the process is appointment of the arbitral tribunal,
which typically permits each party to appoint one arbitrator and re-
quires the chair to be selected jointly by the two party-appointees, of-
ten with the help of an institution.81 It is standard for both party-
appointed arbitrators and chairs to be well-known and respected fig-
ures in the areas of international public, economic, and investment
law.8 2 The remainder of the procedure (including the process of pro-
cedural meetings, memorials and replies, interim relief, evidence
gathering, hearings, awards, and annulment or set aside)83 depends
79. See Lew et al., supra note 46, at 764, 768; Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without
Privity, 10 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Investment L.J. 232 (1995); see also Coe, Taking
Stock, supra note 1, at 1393 (explaining that NAFTA contains a "continuing offer to a
class of potential claimants to arbitrate claims fitting within subject matter and tem-
poral parameters enunciated in NAFTA's text"); Sacerdoti, supra note 18, at 418 (de-
scribing how a Sovereign's consent to ICSID arbitration "may be expressed in a law
on foreign investments or in a multilateral or bilateral treaty, such as a BIT, made
with a contracting State of which the investor is a national").
80. See, e.g., Parra, Provisions, supra note 21, at 303-12; Appleton & Assocs.,
NAFTA: The NAFTA Investor-State Process, at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/3dProcess.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
81. ICSID, Additional Facility Arbitration Rules arts. 6, 9 [hereinafter ICSID
Additional Facility Rules], at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm; Int'l
Court of Arbitration, Rules of Arbitration arts. 9-10 (effective Jan. 1, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter ICC Rules], at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/appointing-authority/all-topics.asp#rules; SCC,
Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce art. 16
(1999) [hereinafter SCC Rules], at
http://www.chamber.se/arbitration/english/rules/scc rules.html; UNCITRAL, Arbitra-
tion Rules arts. 6-8, 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules.htm; see also Sacerdoti, su-
pra note 18, at 429.
82. See infra notes 371-75 and accompanying text (describing the credentials and
background of investment arbitrators).
83. Each investment agreement specifies the institution to be used in case of a
dispute. Each institution has a wide variety of rules, applied during the general dis-
pute resolution process. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 81, arts. 6, 9;
ICSID, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules: Rules of Procedure for the Insti-
tution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings [hereinafter ICSID Rules], at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partD.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005); ICC
Rules, supra note 81, arts. 9-10; SCC Rules, supra note 81, art. 16; UNCITRAL
Rules, supra note 81, arts. 6-8, 15 I.L.M. at 704-05. For example, an investor who se-
lects ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules is bound by the rules articulated
in the individual investment treaty, the UNCITRAL Rules, and the law of the place
of arbitration (generally determined by the arbitrators or the applicable institution).
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upon the rules of the arbitration mechanism that the investor
elected, 4 and the arguments of the parties." Typically, parties ex-
change memorials setting out their case, evidence is exchanged, the
parties make further submissions, both the evidence and law is de-
bated during an oral hearing, and, thereafter, the tribunal issues an
award.
As investment arbitration is based upon a model of commercial ar-
bitration where there are strong presumptions of confidentiality, 6
even though a Sovereign is involved, the dispute resolution process is
not transparent. 7 This means, unless one is a party (an investor or a
84. See Jones, supra note 9, at 535 (describing the general process of a NAFTA
investment treaty arbitration).
85. For example, if a Sovereign raises a jurisdictional objection, there may be a
separate phase of the arbitration to address the issue of jurisdiction after which the
dispute can proceed to the merits phase if appropriate. In contrast, some arbitrations
combine both the merits and the jurisdictional phase. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Rules,
supra note 81, art. 21 (2), 15 I.L.M. at 709-10 (noting that "the arbitral tribunal should
rule on a plea concerning its jurisdiction as a preliminary question" but permitting the
tribunal to "proceed with the arbitration and rule on such a plea in their final
award"); see also Amended U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, art. 28(4)(b) (requiring the
tribunal to suspend proceedings on the merits if preliminary objections are filed).
86. See generally Olivier Oakley-White, Confidentiality Revisited: Is International
Arbitration Losing One of Its Major Benefits?, 6 Int'l Arb. L. Rev. 29 (2003).
87. There are a variety of critiques regarding the lack of transparency in the arbi-
tration process: a variety of law review comments as well as NGOs have expressed
numerous concerns about the procedural aspects of the arbitration process. See Ctr.
for Int'l Envtl. Law, Synthesis of Major Concerns (Nov. 2003) (outlining CIEL's con-
cerns regarding transparency), at
http://www.ciel.org/Tae/FTAAMiamiNovl303.html; Howard Mann & Konrad von
Moltke, NAFTA's Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing the Impacts of the
Investor-State Process on the Environment 3 (1999) Ihereinafter Mann & von
Moltke, NAFTA's Chapter 11] (expressing concern about the lack of transparency
and inability to appeal decisions), at
http://www.iisd.org/publications/publication.asp?pno=408; Mann & von Moltke, Pro-
tecting Investor Rights , supra note 74, at 18-22 (outlining a variety of concerns re-
garding the transparency of the investor-state dispute resolution process); Pub. Citi-
zen's Global Trade Watch, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting
Democracy (Sept. 2001) (expressing concern over the closed-door process of dispute
resolution and the lack of publicly available documents), at
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7076; Shapren, supra note 16, at
329-30 (suggesting that arbitration "is a closed and unaccountable" process, minimal
documentation about cases is available, there is no provision for amicus participation,
and no standard appeals process); Julia Ferguson, Note, California's MTBE Contami-
nated Water: An Illustration of the Need for an Environmental Interpretive Note on
Article 1110 of NAFTA, 11 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 499, 505, 515 (2000) (de-
scribing the investor-state process as non-transparent and secretive). But see Lucien J.
Dhooge, The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment: The Les-
sons of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, 10 Minn. J. Global Trade
209, 265-66, 278, 287-88 (2001) (critiquing the lack of transparency). While there are
difficulties associated with transparency, some view these fears as slightly exagger-
ated. See infra notes 91, 92, 451 and accompanying text (describing the increasing
transparency of the decision-making process and the variety of methods for holding
decision makers accountable); see also naftalaw.org, Homepage, at
http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) (making pleadings, orders, awards,
2005] LEGITIMACY CRISIS 1545
Sovereign), there is minimal access to the pleadings and evidence,
there is little opportunity for amici curiae participation, and often the
decisions themselves are confidential and not made available to the
public.8" Given the public nature of the rights at issue, parties are dis-
seminating more awards and, in limited instances, tribunals permit
third parties to participate in the dispute process.89 The United States
and Canada, in contrast to other countries, have also taken the rare
step of incorporating transparency obligations into recent trade
agreements and model investment treaties. 90
III. CURRENT OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING INCONSISTENT DECISIONS
Inconsistent decisions generally arise under three typical scenarios.
First, different tribunals can come to different conclusions about the
same standard in the same treaty. This might, for example, involve
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") tribunals
coming to different conclusions about the meaning of the same
and other documentation in NAFTA cases publicly available). Nevertheless, particu-
larly as the need for confidentiality in private commercial disputes does not necessar-
ily apply in investment arbitration, the choice of a private decision-making body for
public issues is an area for further consideration.
88. The level of confidentiality will be determined both by the applicable arbitra-
tion rules as well as the arbitration law at the place of arbitration. As a result, there is
a broad spectrum of potential confidentiality obligations. Compare Esso/BHP v.
Plowman, 128 A.L.R. 391 (holding that arbitrations in Australia are not confidential
unless the parties so specify), with Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard "Trogir," 2 All E.R.
136 (1998) (determining that England has an implied duty of confidentiality). See also
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 48(5), 4 I.L.M. 532, 540 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID
Convention] (preventing publication of an award without the parties' consent); ICSID
Rules, supra note 83, arts. 6, 48(4) (requiring arbitrators to sign a form promising to
keep all information confidential and preventing ICSID from publishing awards with-
out party consent); SCC Rules, supra note 83, arts. 9, 20(3) (requiring the SCC Insti-
tute to maintain the confidentiality of the dispute and the arbitral tribunal to keep the
proceedings confidential); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 81, art. 32(5), 15 I.L.M. at
713 (providing that, although there is no express requirement for general arbitration
confidentiality, that the consent of the parties be obtained prior to award amount dis-
closure).
89. For example, in Methanex, arbitrators made transcripts of the hearing on the
merits available to the public. Methanex v. United States, Transcripts for Merits
Hearing (2004), at http://www.naftalaw.org. In Methanex and UPS, third parties have
been granted the right to file amici curiae briefs. United Parcel Serv. v. Canada, Deci-
sion of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae,
9l 61-73 (2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org; Methanex v. United States, Decision of
the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae", 31-
53 (2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
90. See Singapore FTA, supra note 6, art. 15.20 (requiring certain documents to be
made publicly available and requiring hearings to be open to the public); Canada's
Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (2004), arts. 34-35,
at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf;
Amended U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, art. 29 (same); see also Barton Legum,
Trends and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, 19 Arb. Int'l 143, 144-46 (2003)
(describing the shift from confidentiality to transparency in investment arbitration).
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NAFTA article. Second, different tribunals organized under different
treaties can come to different conclusions about disputes involving the
same facts, related parties, and similar investment rights. These types
of cases will typically involve investments that have been structured to
take advantage of multiple investment treaties so that, when a dispute
arises, claims can be brought by related corporate entities under dif-
ferent treaties. Finally, different tribunals organized under different
investment treaties will consider disputes involving a similar commer-
cial situation and similar investment rights, but will come to opposite
conclusions. The increase in the number of investment arbitrations
and the tactical structuring of investments to create claims under mul-
tiple investment treaties increases the likelihood of inconsistent deci-
sions.
Under the current framework, the options for addressing these in-
consistent decisions are limited. There is no coherent system for ad-
dressing inconsistencies across the investment treaty network and, as
demonstrated by the discussion of the relevant cases in Part IV, there
is no uniform mechanism to correct inconsistent decisions. A patch-
work of mechanisms was inherited from international commercial ar-
bitration, but these neither permit review of the merits nor correction
of legal errors. Instead, there are narrow options to review awards to
address procedural deficiencies.
These narrow options range from requesting a modification of an
award under applicable rules to attacking the award in national courts
on a limited number of grounds. In the first instance, a dissatisfied
party can ask either the tribunal or an arbitral institution to review
and modify an award. The rules applicable to the arbitration strictly
circumscribe what type of conduct might justify modification, and only
minor clerical errors tend to be corrected. 9 As a result, this option is
not often used and is unlikely to result in a review of the merits or a
substantive change to the award.
The most utilized option in investment arbitration for attempting to
remedy inconsistent decisions is to attack the award after it is made.92
Specifically, parties that have received inconsistent arbitral awards
91. See ICSID Rules, supra note 83, art. 49 (providing parties forty-five days to
request a rectification of a clerical or arithmetical error or a decision on a question
which the tribunal failed to address, provided the parties meet a variety of conditions,
including the payment of a fee); ICC Rules, supra note 81, art. 29(1) (noting the tri-
bunal may correct clerical, computational, or typographical errors within thirty days);
SCC Rules, supra note 83, art. 37 (permitting the correction of awards for "miscalcu-
lation" and "clerical errors"); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 81, art. 36, 15 I.L.M. at
715 (permitting a party thirty days to request a correction of clerical, typographical, or
computational mistakes). But see ICC Rules, supra note 81, art. 27 (requiring that the
award be scrutinized by the ICC Court).
92. Noah Rubins, Judicial Review of Investment Arbitration Awards, in NAFTA
Investment Law & Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects 354
(Todd Weiler ed., 2004) [hereinafter Rubins, Judicial Review]; see also Franck, supra
note 49, at 15 (explaining when vacatur of an arbitration award may be appropriate).
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have options to either: (1) annul the award or (2) try to vacate an
award at the seat of the arbitration and/or contest enforcement at the
place where enforcement is sought. But which option is available de-
pends wholly upon whether an award is rendered under the ICSID
Convention93 or under a different system (for example an ad hoc arbi-
tration conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules).94
A. Attacking Inconsistent Awards Rendered Under the ICSID
Convention
In order to have an ICSID Convention arbitration, both the inves-
tor's country and the Sovereign must be signatories of the ICSID
Convention and there must be a qualifying dispute.95 For these ICSID
Convention arbitrations, a losing party can only attack an award un-
der the ICSID Convention. ICSID permits parties to seek annulment
of an award through an ad hoc committee of three arbitrators who are
appointed entirely by ICSID.96 An annulment proceeding is not an
appeal of the legal merits,97 rather, the ad hoc committee examines the
procedural propriety of the award. Annulment under the ICSID
Convention is quite limited. The five available grounds are: (1) the
original arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted, (2) the arbitral
tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers, (3) a tribunal member was
corrupt, (4) there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure, or (5) the award does not state the reasons upon which it
was based.98 A tribunal's mistake of law or fact cannot justify the an-
nulment of an award as neither of these are enumerated grounds.99
When ICSID arbitration was first being tested, there was a ten-
dency to construe the limited bases of review broadly in order to re-
examine the substantive merits of the case. Subsequent ad hoc com-
93. ICSID Convention, supra note 88, art. 52, 4 I.L.M. at 541.
94. In a "pure" ICSID arbitration (where the Sovereign and the state of which the
investor is a national are both signatories to the ICSID Convention), the ICSID Con-
vention applies to enforcement of ICSID awards. However, where only one of the
parties to the arbitration is a signatory to the ICSID Convention, there are generally
two options: (1) ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, or (2) the ICSID
Additional Facility that is supervised by ICSID but outside the ICSID treaty frame-
work for enforcement purposes. See, e.g., Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 374-75.
95. In order to have an ICSID Convention award, both the investor's country and
the Sovereign must be signatories of the ICSID Convention, the dispute must qualify
for ICSID jurisdiction under article 25 of the ICSID Convention, the dispute must be
registered at ICSID, and the dispute must proceed further to the ICSID Arbitration
Rules. See generally Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary
(2001).
96. ICSID Convention, supra note 88, art. 52, 4 I.L.M. at 541.
97. Schreuer, supra note 95, at 891-94.
98. ICSID Convention, supra note 88, art. 52(1), 4 I.L.M. at 541; Schreuer, supra
note 95, at 881-1075; see also Pinsolle, supra note 42 (discussing the "manifest disre-
gard" standard).
99. Malcolm D. Rowat, supra note 78, at 116.
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mittees, however, confirmed the limited nature of review."" If a
committee finds one of the five enumerated defects, it has the author-
ity to annul the award completely or in part." Once an annulment
proceeding is completed, there are no further opportunities to chal-
lenge inconsistent ICSID awards, and they are fully enforceable as
court judgments.0" Ultimately, because legal errors cannot be cor-
rected in ICSID awards, the possibility of inconsistent awards is an ac-
cepted realty at ICSID, and the correctness of decisions has been sac-
rificed for the sake of finality.0 3
B. Attacking Inconsistent Awards Not Rendered Under the ICSID
Convention
Several significant investment treaty arbitrations have occurred at
ICSID under their Additional Facility Rules, under the auspices of
another prominent institution, such as the ICC, and in ad hoc arbitra-
tion conducted under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules."M While
most investment arbitrations take place under the auspices of
ICSID, °5 there are a variety of legal,'0 6 commercial,' 7 and tactical'
100. Schreuer, supra note 95, at 901-03; see also Rubins, Judicial Review, supra note
92, at 360 n.4 (suggesting that in light of two recent annulment cases, Wena Hotels v.
Arab Republic of Egypt and Aguas de Aconquijija & Vivendi v. Argentina, there is a
much more narrow and conservative approach to ICSID annulment).
101. ICSID Convention, supra note 88, art. 52(3), 4 I.L.M. at 541.
102. Similar to a final judgment in the Sovereign's Court, arbitration awards are
immediately enforceable under the ICSID Convention as if they were a final judg-
ment of the Sovereign's courts. ICSID Convention, supra note 88, art. 54, 4 I.L.M. at
541-42; see also Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 36
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1313, 1320 (2003) (noting that ICSID awards are enforced in
the same manner as local judgments); Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law and Pri-
vate Foreign Investment, 4 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 259, 273 (1997) (explaining that
signatories to the ICSID Convention must provide "domestic legislation for the direct
enforceability of ICSID awards just as if they were the judgments of foreign courts").
103. See Schreuer, supra note 95, at 893-94 (explaining that there are two poten-
tially conflicting principles at work in the annulment process-"substantive correct-
ness" and finality-and that ICSID annulment rules were designed to balance these
concerns by providing emergency relief for egregious violations of select basic princi-
ples.
104. Rubins, Judicial Review, supra note 92, at 360-61; see also infra Part IV (dis-
cussing two Czech Republic arbitrations that occurred on an ad hoc basis under
UNCITRAL Rules).
105. See ICSID, ICSID Cases, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm
(last visited Feb. 4, 2005); supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing where in-
vestment treaty cases are commonly brought).
106. There are some instances when arbitration might be impermissible; in particu-
lar, the ICSID Convention is not permitted if both nations are not parties to the
ICSID Convention. This restriction may, however, be evaded if the ICSID Addi-
tional Facility Rules are used, and if one sovereign is party to the ICSID Convention.
See ICSID Convention, supra note 88, art. 25, 4 I.L.M. at 536 (requiring, in order for
the Convention to have jurisdiction that one party be a Contracting State (i.e., a sig-
natory to the ICSID Convention) and that the other party be a national of another
Contracting State); Jake A. Baccari, The Loewen Claim: A Creative Use of NAFTA's
Chapter 11, 34 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 465, 487-88 (2003) (stating that "[i]f only
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reasons that an investor might not initiate investment arbitration un-
der the ICSID Convention.
Attacking non-ICSID Convention awards is different, but not eas-
ier. Unlike under the ICSID Convention, awards rendered under ei-
ther the New York Convention" 9 or the Panama Convention10 do not
the investor or the government is a party to the [ICSID] Convention but not both, the
claim may be brought under the Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID Conven-
tion"); Patrick Del Duca, The Rule of Law: Mexico's Approach to Expropriation Dis-
putes in the Face of Investment Globalization, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 35, 88 n.298 (2003)
(noting ICSID's requirement that both states be parties to the ICSID Convention be-
fore the treaty is applicable, and considering that only the United States is party to
the ICSID Convention of all the NAFTA member states, making the ICSID Conven-
tion inapplicable as between NAFTA members); Gregory W. MacKenzie, ICSID Ar-
bitration As a Strategy for Levelling the Playing Field Between International Non-
Government Organizations and Host States, 19 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 197, 222
(1993) (explaining the requirements for ICSID jurisdiction). Likewise, if the re-
quirements for jurisdiction under article 25 of the ICSID Convention are not met, it
would be desirable to use another arbitration mechanism to resolve the dispute. For
example, if the dispute does not arise directly out of an investment, ICSID does not
have jurisdiction. Amco v. Republic of Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, TT 122-27,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/81/1, 27 I.L.M. 1281, 1310 (1998) (holding tax fraud
counterclaim was not within the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal because it did not
arise directly out of the investment). See generally Schreuer, supra note 95; see also R.
Doak Bishop et al., Strategic Options Available when Catastrophe Strikes the Major
International Energy Project, 36 Tex. Int'l L.J. 635, 654 (2001) (describing ICSID's ju-
risdictional mechanisms); George M. von Mehren et al., Navigating Through Investor-
State Arbitrations-An Overview of Bilateral Investment Treaty Claims, 59 Disp. Re-
sol. J. 69, 75 (2004).
107. There are also commercial reasons that indicate it may be more appropriate to
arbitrate outside ICSID. ICSID Arbitration Rules, for instance, do not provide for
interim relief, important in the context of commercial disputes when time is of the es-
sence. As an alternative, if the investment treaty provides for ad hoc arbitration, one
might prefer to select the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules which provide interim
measures. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 81, art. 26, 15 I.L.M. at 711. Likewise, a
party might wish to choose an entity like the ICC which, in addition to interim relief,
also provides institutional oversight on areas related to review of awards. See ICC
Rules, supra note 81, arts. 23, 27. These choices depend upon the procedural mecha-
nisms provided in the applicable default rules.
108. There are a variety of tactical reasons for choosing to arbitrate outside of
ICSID. For example, considering ICSID's unique right to reject arbitration requests,
if there are concerns about the request's acceptance, one might choose to bypass
ICSID, saving time and money by initially initiating arbitration through an alternative
arbitration mechanism. See ICSID Convention, supra note 88, art. 36, 4 I.L.M. at 538
(permitting ICSID to refuse registration if the dispute is "manifestly outside the juris-
diction" ICSID); see also Peterson, All Paths, supra note 69 (suggesting that the inclu-
sion of a "menu" of arbitral options may permit investors to "rule shop" for rules
most favorable to their interests). Likewise, if one wanted to avoid ICSID oversight,
perhaps because of confidentiality concerns arising out of the fact that registration of
a Notice of Arbitration is available to the public, one might choose a mechanism
other than ICSID arbitration. See ICSID, List of Pending Cases, at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) [herein-
after List of Pending Cases] (listing cases that are currently pending before ICSID).
109. Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Con-
vention], available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv.htm;
see also UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, at
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have an internal annulment procedure. As they are not enforceable
as judgments, enforcement and recognition must be sought from local
courts. 1 This emphasis on national courts-rather than internal an-
nulment procedure-has an impact upon inconsistent awards. It
means that dissatisfied parties have more opportunities than their
ICSID counterparts to forum shop and attack awards. 12 Inconsistent
arbitral awards can be attacked: (1) at the seat of arbitration in a va-
catur application, and (2) at a place where enforcement is sought.11 3
http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/status-e.htm (last modified Apr. 16, 2004) [here-
inafter UNCITRAL NYC Signatories] (listing countries that have ratified the New
York Convention; this list does not include countries such as Bermuda, the Cayman
Islands, Iraq, Taiwan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and the United Arab Emirates). In
order to receive a "New York Convention award" and qualify for enforcement under
the New York Convention, both parties to the dispute must be signatories of the New
York Convention and the award itself must be rendered in a country that is also a sig-
natory to the New York Convention. Domenico Di Pietro & Martin Platte, Enforce-
ment of International Arbitration Awards: The New York Convention of 1958, at 22-
29 (2001).
110. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan.
30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42 [hereinafter Panama Convention], available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-35.htm. The New York and Panama
Conventions are similar. Di Pietro & Platte, supra note 109, at 18. Enforcement un-
der the Panama Convention, however, is limited to "commercial transactions," argua-
bly a more limited requirement than the "defined legal relationship, whether contrac-
tual or not, concerning a matter capable of settlement by arbitration" provision found
in the New York Convention. Panama Convention, supra, art. 1; New York Conven-
tion, supra note 109, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 2519; James J. Woodruff, II, The Use and En-
forcement of Arbitration Agreements in U.S. Courts with a Focus on the Western
Hemisphere, 11 Currents: Int'l Trade L.J. 51 (2002). In contrast to the New York
Convention, which has more than 130 signatories from around the globe, the Panama
Convention has a much smaller reach and has been signed by only nineteen, mostly
South American, countries. See UNCITRAL NYC Signatories, supra note 109 (listing
signatories to the New York Convention); Organization of American States' Secre-
tariat for Legal Affairs ("OAS"), B-35: Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-35.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2005) (listing the signatories of the Panama Convention).
111. Annulment is the only remedy available under the ICSID Convention. En-
forcement of the New York Convention, on the other hand, provides mechanisms for
setting aside or challenging awards at the enforcement stage. ICSID Convention, su-
pra note 88, art. 53, 4 I.L.M. at 541; see also Marc R. Poirer, The NAFTA Chapter 11
Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 Envtl. L. 851, 865
n.61 (2003) (noting the relative difficulty of challenging ICSID awards as compared to
New York Convention Awards).
112. One of the difficulties faced when choosing the arbitration's venue is the local
variations that can arise. Although the place of arbitration affects the law applicable
to any vacatur proceeding, it can also impact the practice of law restrictions, rules
governing third-party intervention and amicus briefs, the availability of appeal, the
speed with which the docket advances, the trust in the integrity of the local judiciary,
the ability to avoid specific judges, rules regarding the cost, and expertise of the local
bench and bar in the law of international investment, treaties, and arbitration. Coe,
Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1444; William W. Park, Illusion and Reality in Interna-
tional Forum Selection, 30 Tex. Int'l L.J. 135, 180-81 (1995) [hereinafter Park, Illusion
and Reality].
113. Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 704-05 (2d ed. 2001);
Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law & Practice of International Commercial Arbi-
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This part considers how to attack arbitration awards in both of these
contexts and the implications for increasing the number of national
courts involved in "rectifying" inconsistent decisions.
1. Attacking Awards at the Place of Arbitration
Inconsistent arbitral awards can be challenged at the place of arbi-
tration. This means the judicial review of an award is governed by the
local arbitration law of the arbitral seat. While the grounds for chal-
lenging awards tend to be narrow, certain trends have emerged for the
review of awards at the seat of arbitration. At one end of the spec-
trum, national laws permit the awards to be reviewed on issues of law.
At the other end of the spectrum, national legislation only permits a
challenge on specific, narrow grounds designed to promote the proce-
dural integrity of the arbitration process.
Some countries permit review of certain aspects of the merits. If an
arbitration has a seat in the United Kingdom,"4 the United States,"5
New Zealand," 6 or Argentina,"' there are opportunities to evaluate
tration 415-89 (3d ed. 1999); see also Park, Illusion and Reality, supra note 112, at 181-
82 (1995) (noting the distinction between challenging awards at the seat of arbitration
and enforcement of awards).
114. In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the 1996 Arbitration Act permits
parties to ask English courts to rule on substantive points of law at issue in the arbi-
tration at two different junctures: section 45 allows a court to determine a prelimi-
nary point of law that substantially affects the rights of the parties at the outset of a
case; section 69 permits courts to rule on issues of law decided by the parties that sub-
stantially affect the parties' rights when the decision is "obviously wrong" or involves
a question of "general public importance" and the award is "at least open to serious
doubt." 1996 English Arbitration Act, in Russell on Arbitration 427, 448, 456-57 (22d
ed. 2003); see id. at 433 (limiting the scope of these provisions to arbitrations in Eng-
land, Wales, and Northern Ireland); Stewart R. Schackleton, Annual Review of Eng-
lish Judicial Decisions on Arbitration-2000, 4 Int'l Arb. L. Rev. 178, 193-94 (2001).
115. The United States permits reviews to include notes on a "manifest disregard
of the law." Such a finding permits courts to strike down decisions in cases where ar-
bitrators understood the law, correctly stated it, and subsequently ignored it. Carter v.
Health Net of Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2004); Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d
78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001); Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir.1991);
see also infra notes 129, 136 and accompanying text (describing the "manifest disre-
gard" standard under U.S. law).
116. Section five of the Second Schedule of the 1996 New Zealand Arbitration Act
permits review for issues of law. Tomas Kennedy-Grant, New Zealand, in Interna-
tional Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, at annex 1-22 (Jan Paulsson ed., 2004)
[hereinafter International Handbook]. Although this arises primarily in the context
of domestic arbitrations, this could be relevant in international arbitration should the
parties agree to such a provision (i.e., in an investment treaty or otherwise). See id.
117. Horacio A. Grigera Na6n, Argentina, in International Handbook, supra note
116, at 28 [hereinafter Argentina] (noting that the Argentine Civil Code permits ap-
peal on both law and facts providing that "the same appeal may be instituted against
an arbitral award as may be instituted against court judgments, as long as such appeal
has not been waived in the agreement to arbitrate"). Appeal on issues of law may
only be available, however, for awards rendered in Argentina involving domestic dis-
putes. Id. There is no indication, however, of what constitutes a "domestic" dispute.
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the legal merits. The trend, however, is not to review the merits but to
circumscribe the scope of judicial review--typically through narrow
standards similar to grounds enumerated in the New York Conven-
tion.'18 In countries such as Switzerland,"9 France, 12 South Africa,
121
and Costa Rica, 22 the grounds for setting aside are based upon proce-
dural integrity. In contrast, other countries, such as South Korea, 23
118. Most countries have enacted very limited grounds for vacating arbitral awards,
and many of these are similar to the grounds for denying enforcement under the New
York Convention. Robert Briner, Switzerland, in International Handbook, supra note
116, at 30-31, 33-36, annex I1 [hereinafter Switzerland] (recognizing that Swiss arbitra-
tion law sets out a series of standards in article 190 justifying vacatur of an arbitral
award that are similar to the New York Convention, and also, provided the parties
have not excluded bases for enforcement under article 190, allows the enforcement
standards of the New York Convention to act as the default); Howard M. Holtzmann
& Donald Francis Donovan, United States, in International Handbook, supra note
116, at 62 [hereinafter United States] (noting that the specific grounds for vacating and
enforcing awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, though not identical, are never-
theless similarly construed by the courts); Tang Houzhi & Wang Shenghchang, Peo-
ple's Republic of China, in International Handbook, supra note 116, at 35, 41, annex II
(noting that, under the 1995 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, the
grounds for setting aside an award and refusing enforcement of an award in article 70
refer to the same substantive standards as in article 260 of the Chinese Civil Proce-
dure Law); Fali S. Nariman, India, in International Handbook, supra note 116, at 41
(noting that set aside and enforcement actions are both governed by standards articu-
lated in the New York Convention).
119. In Switzerland, there are only five grounds upon which an award may be va-
cated: (1) improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal; (2) lack of jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal; (3) when the award goes beyond the issues submitted for considera-
tion or fails to consider an issues it was required to decide; (4) failure to adhere to due
process; or (5) violation of public policy. Switzerland, supra note 118, at 33-36, annex
II, art. 190.
120. Article 1502 of the French Arbitration Law provides standard grounds for set-
ting aside awards, including: (1) an arbitration agreement does not exist, is invalid, or
has expired; (2) the tribunal was irregularly constituted; (3) the arbitrator has not
rendered a decision in accordance with his/her mandate; (4) due process has not been
respected; or (5) the decision is contrary to international public policy. Yves Derains
& E. Goodman-Everard, France, in International Handbook on Commercial Arbitra-
tion 57-60.
121. Section 33 of the South African Arbitration Act of 1965 more narrowly de-
fines reasons for vacating awards. Awards may be set aside for: (1) arbitrator mis-
conduct, (2) a gross irregularity or an excess of power in the arbitration, or (3) an im-
properly obtained award. Patrick M.M. Lane, South Africa, in International
Handbook, supra note 116, at 22, annex 1-11.
122. In Costa Rica, appeals must relate to nullification. The issue of nullification
may arise in the following situations: (1) an award is rendered after the time period
for making it has expired, (2) the claim was inappropriately submitted for arbitration,
(3) due process was violated, (4) the decision was contrary to public policy, or (5) the
tribunal lacked jurisdiction. Costa Rica, in International Handbook, supra note 116, at
annex 1-15-16, arts. 64-67.
123. The grounds for setting aside an arbitration award in South Korea are the fol-
lowing: (1) where the appointment of arbitrators was not conducted in accordance
with the law or the arbitration agreement; (2) a party was incompetent or his repre-
sentative has now been lawfully appointed; (3) an award calls for action prohibited by
Korean law; (4) there was not due process; (5) there was a forced confession; (6) there
was forged evidence or false testimony; (7) a judgment or administrative decision al-
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Indonesia,'124 Israel, 125 and Saudi Arabia, 126 have broader grounds de-
signed to invite more challenges and sometimes permit vacatur for
contradictory reasoning. This presumably means contradictory rea-
soning within a single award, but the statutes do not prohibit review-
ing courts from considering contradictions with other awards.
127
Regardless of the grounds enumerated in national legislation, there
is a residual opportunity to challenge an award. This is true irrespec-
tive of whether a court is interpreting a broad statute'28 or is broadly
interpreting a narrow statute.129 Particularly because investment trea-
ters the basis of the award; or (8) newly discovered evidence materially affects the
award. Soonwoo Lee, Korea, in International Handbook, supra note 116, at 21-22,
Arbitration Law of Korea, art. 13, annex 1-3 to -4.
124. Indonesian arbitration law specifically permits an award to be set aside if it
"contains contradictory decisions." Sudargo Gaetama, Indonesia, in International
Handbook, supra note 116, at annex 1-4, art. 643. There are also a variety of other
grounds justifying vacatur in Indonesia, including: (1) the decision goes beyond the
terms of reference; (2) the arbitrators were without mandate; (3) the arbitrators were
not competent to render an award in the absence of others; (4) the award decides is-
sues not before the tribunal; (5) the tribunal failed to decide issues before it; (6) the
procedural formalities have been "infringed" upon; (7) the award is based on "false"
documents; (8) "decisive" documents are discovered after the award has been ren-
dered; and (9) the award is based upon fraud or deceit. Id.
125. Section 24 of the 1968 Israel Arbitration Law provides that awards can be set
aside when: (1) the arbitration agreement is invalid; (2) the arbitrators were not
properly appointed; (3) the arbitrators acted without authority; (4) a party was not
given an opportunity to state its case; (5) the arbitrator did not determine an issue; (6)
the arbitrators did not give reasons for their decision; (7) the award was not in accor-
dance with the law; (8) the award was made after the period for making it expired; (9)
enforcement would be contrary to public policy; or (10) any of the grounds estab-
lished for setting aside an Israeli court's final judgment. Smadar Ottolenghi, Israel, in
International Handbook, supra note 116, at 21-22, annex 1-5.
126. The requirements in Saudi Arabia are slightly broader, permiting vacatur
when: (1) there is no valid arbitration agreement; (2) an arbitrator was biased; (3)
there was no fair hearing; (4) an arbitrator exceeded his/her authority; (5) the tribu-
nal's composition was not in accordance with the arbitration agreement; (6) the form
and contents of the award do not comply with statutory obligations; and (7) the award
violates public policy. Saudi Arabia, in International Handbook, supra note 116, at 28-
29 [hereinafter Saudi Arabia].
127. See supra note 124 (describing Indonesia's position); see also Argentina, supra
note 117, at 28 (noting that in Argentina, a ground for annulment occurs when an
"award contains contradictory decisions rendering it incongruous"); Angh6los C.
Foustoucos & Stelios Koussoulis, Greece, in International Handbook, supra note 116,
at 32, Greek Code of Civil Procedure, art. 897, annex 11-9 to -10 (permitting annul-
ment where an award "is not incomprehensible or if it contains contradictory provi-
sions").
128. Even where local law might permit a full appeal, Professor Brower suggests
that NAFTA's agreement to final and binding arbitration prevents a judicial review of
the merits of NAFTA awards. Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and
NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 37, 83 (2000) [hereinafter
Brower, Structure]; see also Saudi Arabia, supra note 126, at 28 (noting it is "unclear"
whether Saudi Arabia would include "a review of the merits of the award").
129. In the United States, awards can be set aside for "manifest disregard" of the
law despite the fact that this ground is not enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act.
See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (articulating the "manifest disregard"
dictum followed by subsequent courts), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
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ties do not specify the place of arbitration,' 3° there may be an oppor-
tunity"' for parties to select a place of arbitration that has advanta-
geous vacatur rules or judges who are likely to interpret a statute
broadly."'
2. Attacking Awards at the Enforcement Phase
Initiating a vacatur proceeding is an option to challenge the award
at the place of arbitration. In contrast, there are also indirect oppor-
tunities to attack awards by blocking an award's enforcement; and
these challenges can be made in different courts where successful par-
ties are trying to enforce upon assets.
The standards for blocking enforcement under the New York or
Panama Conventions are relatively similar to those reasons for setting
aside awards-but provide more uniformity as the treaties have been
ratified by many countries and those standards have been imple-
mented in local legislation.' This means, for example, that the New
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also United States,
supra note 118, at 53, 58 (describing the "non-statutory ground of 'manifest disregard'
of the law of evidence" as a basis for vacating an award in the United States); Norman
T. Braslow, Contractual Stipulation for Judicial Review and Discovery in United
States-Japan Arbitration Contracts, 27 Seattle U. L. Rev. 659, 692 (2004) (describing
the manifest disregard doctrine emanating from Wilko v. Swan); Noah Rubins,
"Manifest Disregard of the Law" and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards in the United States,
12 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 363 (2001) (describing the application of "manifest disregard"
in various circuits).
130. In contrast to investment treaties, the ICSID Convention designates Washing-
ton, D.C. as the default place of arbitration. ICSID Convention, supra note 88, arts.
62-63, 4 I.L.M. at 543.
131. Although the parties can, in theory, agree to the place of arbitration, this does
not often happen as a result of competing tactical considerations. Consequently, the
place of arbitration is often determined by the arbitration institute pursuant to the
applicable rules; this should minimize a possible adverse impact caused by "forum
shopping." See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 81, art. 20 (permitting the
tribunal to set the place of arbitration in consultation with ICSID); ICC Rules, supra
note 81, art. 14 (permitting the ICC Court to set the place of arbitration); SCC Rules,
supra note 81, art. 13 (permitting the SCC Institute to set the place of arbitration);
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 81, art. 16, 15 I.L.M. at 708 (allowing the arbitral tri-
bunal to set the place of arbitration).
132. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment Awards: Necessary Evil
or Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed FTAA?, 19 J. Int'l Arb. 185, 187
(2002) [hereinafter Coe, Domestic Court Control]; Rubins, Judicial Review, supra
note 92, at 389-90.
133. As noted earlier, the ICSID Convention's internal annulment procedure
makes the Convention inapplicable to NAFTA disputes as neither Canada nor Mex-
ico are signatories to the ICSID Convention. Consequently, challenges to NAFTA
awards occur within the courts of the place of arbitration, which apply local standards
for vacatur. There have been three vacatur actions under NAFTA (two initiated by
Mexico and one by Canada), and all have occurred in Canadian courts. Enforcement
under NAFTA uses the New York Convention's normal method of enforcing foreign
commercial arbitration awards. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1386 n.8; see also
Coe, Domestic Court Control, supra note 132 (describing enforcement mechanisms of
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York Convention, although adopted in various forms, has created an
overall structure that limits the grounds for attacking arbitral awards.
Specifically, enforcement may be denied only when: (1) the parties
to the arbitration agreement were under some incapacity or the
agreement was otherwise invalid; (2) the losing party was not given
proper notice of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present its case; (3) the award addresses issues beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration; (4) the arbitral procedure was not in ac-
cordance with the parties' agreement or contradicted the law of the
place of arbitration; (5) the award has not become binding on the par-
ties or has been set aside by a court in the country where the award
was made; (6) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of set-
tlement by arbitration; and (7) recognition would be contrary to the
public policy of the country of enforcement.'
Because of the New York Convention's structure, awards cannot be
annulled or appealed. More to the point, none of the enumerated
grounds permits an award to be denied recognition because it is wrong
as a matter of law or inconsistent with other arbitral awards. Never-
theless, as with vacatur, narrow grounds for denying enforcement of
an award do not necessarily prevent a local court from interpreting
the provisions expansively to take a "hard look" at the award in a
manner that might appear to be a review of the legal merits.
3. The Difficulties Arising from National Court Intervention
Given an investor's opportunity to choose the method of resolving
treaty disputes with sovereigns'35 and its ability to apply to many na-
tional courts in efforts to secure enforcement of an award, domestic
arbitral regimes have an increasing influence on the consideration of
NAFTA and describing the perceived potential for disparate results among domestic
courts).
134. New York Convention, supra note 109, art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520. The grounds
for denial of enforcement are similar under the Panama Convention. The Panama
Convention provides that recognition may be refused under the following conditions:
(1) when "the parties to the agreement were subject to some incapacity under the ap-
plicable law or that the agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have
submitted it, or, if such law is not specified, under the law of the State in which the
decision was made"; (2) when "the party against which the arbitral decision has been
made was not duly notified of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
procedure to be followed, or was unable, for any other reason, to present his de-
fense"; (3) the decision "concerns a dispute not envisaged in the agreement between
the parties to submit to arbitration"; (4) the "constitution of the arbitral tribunal or
the arbitration procedure has not been carried out in accordance with the terms of the
agreement signed by the parties"; (5) "the decision is not yet binding on the parties or
has been annulled or suspended"; (6) "the subject of the dispute cannot be settled by
arbitration"; or (7) recognition "of the decision would be contrary to the public pol-
icy." See Panama Convention, supra note 110, art. 5.
135. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (noting how investors can
choose the dispute resolution method and, as a result, may have the opportunity to
forum shop by picking ad hoc arbitration over ICSID Convention arbitration).
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inconsistent arbitral awards. 3' As nations with limited resources are
obligated to make massive cash outlays for violations of investment
treaties, they will become more aggressive in their attacks on unfavor-
able arbitral awards, and push the investor-state struggle back into na-
tional courts. 13 7 In the well-known Metalclad case,138 for example, the
ultimate outcome of the award was in part dictated by the application
of domestic Canadian arbitration law.139 If the reviewing Canadian
court had found that the NAFTA award was not "commercial" within
the meaning of British Columbia's International Commercial Arbitra-
tion Act, the court could have reviewed the award for errors of law
under the domestic arbitration law.140 Instead, it applied the more
136. For example, neither the standards enumerated in the U.S. Federal Arbitra-
tion Act nor the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration (adopted by Canada) gen-
erally permit a reviewing court to inquire into the merits of the case. This would ar-
guably preclude a court from inquiring into the legal basis for decisions, and thus
prevent the correction of inconsistent decisions. Rubins, Judicial Review, supra note
92. But see supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing how U.S. courts review
arbitration awards for "manifest disregard" of the law).
137. This is certainly true for developing nations. With limited national resources
and small gross domestic products, developing nations may be willing to fight even
harder to retain what resources they have. Moreover, investment awards are often
colored by issues of sovereignty and political ideology, and may be accompanied by
domestic political pressure compelling Sovereigns to challenge awards, even if only to
show their constituents that all available methods of recourse have been exhausted.
Rubins, Judicial Review, supra note 92, at 375. The surprising development is that
capital-exporting nations are increasingly willing to avidly fight investment treaty
cases tooth and nail. This holds particularly true in the context of claims made against
Canada and the United States under NAFTA: "[W]hen the shoe is on the other foot
perceptions of fairness may be quite different, and the industrialized countries may
not be enthusiastic about playing by the same rules." Alvarez & Park, supra note 14,
at 367. Regardless of the respondent's status as a capital-importing or capital-
exporting country, the right standards must be applied in the right way so as to avoid
unfair application of an unfair standard.
138. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000) [hereinafter Metalclad Award], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf.
139. As Vancouver was the seat of arbitration, British Columbia's courts had juris-
diction over the Mexican government's vacatur application. See Mexico v. Metalclad
Corp., Reasons for Judgment of the Honorable Mr. Justice Tysoe, 39 B.C.L.R. 389,
393 (2001) [hereinafter Metalclad Judgment], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/metalclad-reasons-for-judgment.pdf.
140. The reviewing court held that the award was "commercial" and, as a result,
reviewed the decisions using the limited grounds for review found in the International
Commercial Arbitration Act, which had limited grounds for review similar to the New
York Convention. See Metalclad Judgment, supra note 139, 39-49 (holding that
the International Commercial Arbitration Act was applicable because the investment
was of a commercial nature and arose out of an investment relationship). Some
commentators suggest that, even in this limited set aside context, the court handled
matters of substantive accuracy. See Charles H. Brower II, Beware the Jabberwock: A
Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 465 (2002) [hereinafter Brower, Be-
ware] (probing further into the analysis of Judge Tysoe); Charles H. Brower II, Inves-
tor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l
L. 43, 43, 68 (2001) (referring to Judge Tysoe's "four elements of heightened re-
view"); Coe, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 1411; Todd Weiler, Metalclad v. Mex-
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deferential review of the International Commercial Arbitration Act,
which was based upon the standards in the UNCITRAL Model Law
that do not favor a review on the merits.
As more courts begin to consider vacatur or a challenge to en-
forcement, an increase in the number of reviewing courts adds the
possibility for further obfuscation of the meaning of international in-
vestment rights. First, there is an increased risk of politicizing the
oversight of arbitral awards. As issues of international and domestic
public policy "loom large" there is a real possibility that national
courts will be tempted to use local law to vitiate an award. 141 Second,
because of the lack of uniformity and the patchwork nature of the
oversight, clever investors will strategically pick forums to favor their
interests.14 1 Since enforcement proceedings may be brought in multi-
ple jurisdictions where there are assets, the possibility of going to dif-
ferent fora encourages dissatisfied parties to forum shop for the best
result and promotes inefficiency.' 43 The practical reality is that practi-
tioners must be willing to consider the issues of national courts to de-
fend their client's interests-whether a court at the seat of arbitration
or where enforcement is sought. While active representation of a cli-
ent's interests should not necessarily undermine the legitimacy of the
system, these active challenges may lead to an increase in diverse in-
terpretations of the same award in different forums. With an increase
in the number of courts where awards can be attacked and the lack of
any centralizing authority, there is a strong possibility that domestic
courts will be unable to harmonize the impact of inconsistent deci-
sions." Should reviewing courts choose to promote incoherent and
indeterminate decisions, the legitimacy of the arbitration system will
be further undermined.
ico: A Play in Three Parts, 2 J. World Invest. 685 (2001) [hereinafter Weiler, A Play],
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Papers/JWI%20Article%2OFinal.pdf. But see
J. Christopher Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 433
(2002) (disputing that Justice Tysoe conducted a "heightened" judicial review).
141. Rubins, Judicial Review, supra note 92, at 361.
142. See, e.g., David A.R. Williams, Challenging Investment Treaty Arbitration
Awards-Issues Concerning the Forum Arising from the Metalclad Case, in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary Questions 452 ( Albert Jan
van den Berg ed., 2002) (suggesting that "[i]f the choice of the claimant investor may
possibly lead to different outcomes then surely that is primarily a matter for the inves-
tor to consider" but failing to consider the impact of inconsistency on Sovereigns).
143. Coe, Domestic Court Control, supra note 132, at 199-200.
144. See id. at 203 (noting that "[d]omestic courts are also ill-equipped to promote
substantive unification because they are not subject to any centralizing authority").
These difficulties are exacerbated when related parties bring multiple treaty claims
pertaining to the same investment and one award is rendered under the ICSID Con-
vention, leaving the others able to apply to a variety of national courts.
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IV. THE INCONSISTENT DECISIONS
In the past five years, there have been a variety of inconsistent deci-
sions in investment treaty arbitration. Inconsistency creates uncer-
tainty and damages the legitimate expectations of investors and Sov-
ereigns. Investors that have structured their investments in a manner
to take advantage of coverage afforded by investment treaties sud-
denly discover they will not receive those benefits. Likewise, Sover-
eigns find themselves in an untenable position of explaining to tax-
payers why they are subject to damage awards for hundreds of
millions of U.S. dollars in one case but not another.
The inconsistent cases generally break down into three categories:
(1) cases involving the same facts, related parties, and similar invest-
ment rights,'45 (2) cases involving similar commercial situations and
similar investment rights,146 and (3) cases involving different parties,
different commercial situations, and the same investment rights.147 Al-
though focusing on all the inconsistencies in publicly-available awards
is beyond the scope of the present Article, it is vital to focus upon
those awards that have spawned the greatest concerns among inves-
tors, Sovereigns, practitioners, NGOs, and academics. This Article
therefore considers the Lauder arbitrations,'48 the SGS arbitrations,149
and a series of cases under NAFIA, all of which have attracted public
attention and concern. In all of these decisions, investment treaty tri-
bunals have come to different-if not completely diametrically op-
posed-conclusions about issues of public international law. Al-
though some commentators suggest that an occasional "wrong"
145. See infra Part IV.A.
146. See infra Part IV.B.
147. See infra Part IV.C.
148. The Lauder cases generated a great deal of commentary. See Peter S. Green,
Czech Republic Pays $355 Million to Media Concern, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2003, at
WI; Peter S. Green, Czech Senate a Safe Haven for Principal in Media War, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 4, 2002, at A8; Peter S. Green, New Arbitration Claim in Battle over
Czech TV Station, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 2003, at W3; Robert Volterra et al., Swedish
Court of Appeal Upholds Conflicting Award in Parallel BIT Arbitration Proceedings,
Mondaq Bus. Briefing, July 17, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57495760.
149. At the time of writing the author is only aware of one piece of academic
commentary considering the SGS cases; this is unsurprising given the recent nature of
the decisions. Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising out of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in Latin America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional
Issues, 59 J. Disp. Resol. 78, 83-84 (2004), available at
http://www.aryme.com/aryme/esp/adr-world-observer/observatorio/titulares-abierto/
2004/200407/20040707.asp. Law firms, however, have already begun to discuss the
implications of SGS cases. See Dunham & Foster, supra note 46; Freshfields, Contrac-
tual Claims in Investor State Arbitration (May 2004), at
http://www.freshfields.com/places/asia/publications/pdfs/8281.pdf; Jeremy Winter,
Baker & McKenzie, Using "Umbrella Clauses" in Investment Treaties As a Basis for
Turning a Breach of Contract Lawsuit into an ICSID Arbitration, (May 2004), at
http://www.bakernet.com/NewsLetters/Article.asp?ArticlelD=3708&EditionlD=426
&URL=%2FNewsLetters%2FNewsletter.asp&NLID=30; see also Goldhaber,
Wanted, supra note 5 (expressing concern about the Lauder and SGS cases).
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decision is a small price to pay for promoting aggregate gain through
investment arbitration,5 ° the magnitude and the increasing frequency
of the inconsistency suggests that this conclusion should be reconsid-
ered.
A. The Lauder Arbitrations
Two arbitral tribunals-one in Stockholm and one in London-
made arbitration history by arriving at two different decisions over
what essentially amounted to the same dispute [hereinafter "the
Lauder cases"]. 51 A Stockholm tribunal held that the Czech Republic
breached a variety of its obligations to the Dutch corporate arm of a
U.S. investor under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT.'52 Ten days
before, on the same set of facts, a London tribunal held that the Czech
Republic only discriminated against the U.S. investor in violation of
the United States-Czech Republic BIT.'53 Jeremy Carver, a partner at
Clifford Chance who represented the Czech Republic, explained that
the result "brings the law into disrepute, it brings arbitration into dis-
repute-the whole thing is highly regrettable.' 154
1. The Factual Background
In 1992, Ronald S. Lauder, an American financier, wanted to create
the first private television station in the Czech Republic-TV Nova.
Mr. Lauder and his investment vehicle, the Central European Devel-
opment Corporation ("CEDC"), 5 1 originally intended to make a di-
150. Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 399.
151. The CME tribunal held there was a treaty violation because the Czech Repub-
lic eviscerated the arrangements on which the investor relied when making its invest-
ment. The Lauder tribunal, on the other hand, held there was no inconsistent conduct
amounting to unfair and inequitable treatment. Although a Swedish court recently
reconsidered the CME decision's legitimacy, neither the court nor the academic lit-
erature thus far provides a satisfactory answer about how or if these cases can be rec-
onciled.
152. See Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 39.
153. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, Oct. 22, 1991, U.S.-Czech Rep. & Slovk. [hereinafter U.S.-Czech Republic
BIT], at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech-us.pdf.
154. Matthew Rushton, Clifford Chance Entangled in Bitter Lauder Arbitrations,
Legal Bus., Oct. 2001, at 108.
155. The original investor was the Central European Development Corporation
GmbH, which was a German company. Czech Republic v. CME Czech Rep. B.V.,
Judgment of the Court of Appeal, Case No. T 8735-01 [hereinafter Svea Court of Ap-
peal Judgment], at http://www.cetv-net.com/iFiles/1439-
english-translationof_the-sveajudgment.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). This com-
pany eventually transferred most of its shares to CME Media Enterprises B.V. which,
in turn, provided its shares to CME Czech Republic B.V. London Award, supra note
71, T 77. It was this entity that was the claimant before the Stockholm tribunal. CME
Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, $T 5-7 (Sept. 13, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Stockholm Award], at http://www.mfcr.cz/static/Arbitraz/en/PartialAward.pdf;
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rect investment in a license-holding television station that would be
run with a local partner, Dr. Vladimir Zelezn .16 While petitioning
the Czech Media Council ("Media Council") for the license, Dr.
Zelezn and his local company, Central European Television 21
("CET 21"), represented that CEDC would be a "direct participant"
in the license and contribute finances and programming to the televi-
sion station.
CET 21 was eventually granted the license.' Mr. Lauder and
CEDC's direct investment did not occur as planned, however.
Rather, after consultation with, direction from, and approval by, the
Czech Media Council," 8 the license was only granted to CET 21159 and
the Media Council required the foreign investment to occur indirectly
through a joint venture company, CNTS.16° CNTS had three partici-
pants: (1) CET 21 who would provide the license, (2) CEDC who
would provide the financing, programming, and know-how, and (3) a
Czech bank who would provide further financing.'61 CNTS would
then unconditionally, unequivocally, and on an exclusive basis have
the right to use, exploit, and maintain the license;162 and, in this man-
ner, Mr. Lauder and his investment vehicle could use a "split" owner-
ship structure to exploit the license and operate TV Nova. 6 3 The Me-
CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Republic, Dissenting Opinion (2001), at
http://www.mfcr.cz/static/Arbitraz/en/DisentingOpinion.pdf.
156. London Award, supra note 71, 48-50.
157. Id. 1[ 64, 70.
158. The Media Council's decision to award the license to CET 21 and its foreign
investor was the subject of severe political criticism. Id. 58.
159. Id. 60, 64.
160. Id. 59, 61, 64, 68, 70, 222; see also Stockholm Award, supra note 155, 9$
429, 435 (explaining CEDC's investment "was monitored, directed and approved by
the Media Council"). As explained by the 1997 Report of the Media Council to the
Czech Parliament, the reason why this model came into existence was the Council's
fears of a majority share of foreign capital in the license holder's Company:
When granting the license to the Company CET 21, for fear that a majority
share of foreign capital in the license holder's Company might impact the in-
dependence of full-format broadcasts, the Council assumed a configuration
that separates the investor from the license holder himself. That is how an
agreement came into existence (upon a series of remarks from the Council)
by which the Company tNTS was established the majority owner of which is
CEDC/CME.
London Award, supra note 71, T 229 (emphasis added); see Stockholm Award, supra
note 155, $ 83; see also id. $1 436, 440 (noting that the decision to grant the license to
CET 21 created massive political uproar and made a direct shareholding in CET 21
"'politically impossible"').
161. London Award, supra note 71, 9 69.
162. Judgment by the SVEA Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Rendered in 2003 in Case
T8735-01, The CME v. Czech Republic Case, in Stockholm Arb. Rep., 2003, at 169
[hereinafter SCC Institute Article] , at
http://www.sccinstitute.com/-upload/shared-files/artiklar/tjeckiska-republiken.pdf.
163. See Stockholm Award, supra note 155, $ 452 (explaining that a split struc-
ture-which required a separation of the license holder and the operator-was the
legal basis for the investment).
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dia Council believed this arrangement would be more acceptable to
the Czech government and public opinion than an arrangement that
gave foreign capital direct ownership.
164
Although TV Nova was expected to break even after four years,
with an attention-grabbing schedule of nude weather forecasts and
Baywatch reruns, the station was profitable during the first year of
operation.1 65 Although most of the profits were expatriated, business
went along smoothly. This happy scenario eventually changed. In
1994, there was further political criticism of the structure of TV
Nova 1 66 and a change in the membership of the Media Council.
167
Eventually, in 1995, the Czech Parliament amended its Media Law in
a manner that affected the nature of Mr. Lauder's investment, includ-
ing a narrower definition of the term "broadcaster." 66
As a result, in 1996, the Media Council reversed its previous posi-
tion as regards the approval of "split" structure between the license
holder and the operator169 and began to make life difficult for CNTS.
In particular, it then commenced administrative proceedings against
CNTS asserting that, as a result of the corporate structure of TV
Nova, CNTS was operating the station without a license and broad-
casting illegally.' The Supreme State Attorney Office also under-
took a criminal investigation regarding TV Nova's authority to broad-
cast.17 1 At that time, Dr. Zelezn9 defended TV Nova's operating
structure and argued that it had been approved by the Media Coun-
cil. 172 Under increasing pressure, however, CNTS modified its corpo-
rate structure and the descriptions of its broadcasting business, al-
though ostensibly CNTS' partners asserted the nature of their
commercial relationship had not changed.'73 After the changes were
164. Id. 11.
165. Rushton, supra note 154, at 108; see also Stockholm Award, supra note 155, J$
14, 458.
166. The Czech Parliament's Committee for Science, Education, Culture, Youth
and Physical Training was one of these critics. London Award, supra note 71, 74.
167. The membership of the Media Council changed during the summer of 1994.
Id. $[ 78.
168. There were two critical changes in the Czech Media Law: (1) article 12(3) of
the 1991 Media Law, which had provided that "[i]n addition to conditions stated in
paragraph 2, the decision to grant a license also includes conditions with the license-
granting body will set for the broadcasting operator," was deleted; and (2) more nar-
rowly defined a "broadcaster" as solely the individual to whom the license was
granted. Id. 79.
169. Stockholm Award, supra note 155, T1 460.
170. London Award, supra note 71, 97.
171. Id. $$ 91, 94.
172. Id. T1 84; Stockholm Award, supra note 155, $1 503, 523.
173. London Award, supra note 71, $$ 89, 104; see also Stockholm Award, supra
note 155, $1 505 (explaining that the shareholders "did not give in on a voluntary ba-
sis" because "it was clear that without the amendment requested by the Council the
broadcasting License would be endangered"); id. 91 513 (noting the threat of adminis-
trative proceedings "was fundamental because a withdrawal of the License in the
same way as interference with CNTS' broadcasting operations would have destroyed
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made, both the criminal and administrative proceedings were sus-
pended. 174
But these superficial changes did not end TV Nova's difficulties. In
1998 and 1999, Dr. Zelezn 1'75 began to acquire programming for CET
21 from sources other than CNTS and Mr. Lauder's profits began to
decrease. Dr. Zelezn, also requested other corporate changes, par-
ticularly related to revenues, and relied upon the Media Council's
previous conduct and potential future actions to justify the changes.
In 1999, Dr. Zelezn9 wrote privately to the Media Council requesting
that it confirm the Council's understanding that CET 21 did not have
an exclusive relationship with CNTS and could order services from
other providers.176 Without disclosing the ex parte request from Dr.
Zelezn , the Media Council issued a March 1999 letter "parroting
nearly verbatim" from Dr. Zelezn 's request and stating that
"'[b]usiness relations between the operator of broadcasting and ser-
vice organizations are built on a nonexclusive basis."'177 Dr. Zelezn9
later used this correspondence as the basis for severing CET 21's deal-
ings with CNTS, 78 and the Media Council did not intervene. 79 After
August 5, 1999, Dr. Zelezn began broadcasting TV Nova using a new
company, which was under his control. 8
2. The Procedural History
Before CET 21 severed its ties with CNTS, on August 2, 1999,
CNTS and Mr. Lauder's company wrote to the Czech Parliament chal-
lenging the Media Council's behavior and suggesting that the Media
Council's actions may have amounted to violations of the U.S.-Czech
Republic BIT.'81 Seventeen days later, Mr. Lauder initiated proceed-
ings against the Czech Republic pursuant to the U.S.-Czech Republic
BIT. Mr. Lauder's investment vehicle, CME, initiated proceedings
the Claimant's investment"). The change in the corporate documents required CNTS
to relinquish its exclusive right to use CET 21's license-which meant CET 21 could
obtain programming from other sources and CNTS would have to compete to receive
the economic benefits associated with the license. See SCC Institute Article, supra
note 162, at 170.
174. London Award, supra note 71, 108, 116, 121; Stockholm Award, supra note
155, 494-95, 501.
175. During the difficulties in the last several years, Dr. Zelezn had substantially
increased his control over CET 21. See London Award, supra note 71, 919 76, 98.
176. Id. T 129.
177. Id. 130; Stockholm Award, supra note 155, 128.
178. See, e.g., London Award, supra note 71, 133 (indicating that CET 21 was en-
tering into contracts with third parties).
179. Stockholm Award, supra note 155, 91 570, 572-74.
180. London Award, supra note 71, 138; Stockholm Award, supra note 155, 91 18;
see also id. 555 (explaining that the letter was "fabricated in collusion between Dr.
Zelezn and the Media Council behind the back of CNTS (TV NOVA) to give CET
21 a tool to undermine the legal foundation of CME's investment").
181. London Award, supra note 71, T 137.
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against the Czech Republic under the Netherlands-Czech Republic
BIT in 2000. Although there was an opportunity to consolidate the
proceedings under both BITs, the Czech Republic objected to the
same tribunal hearing both cases.
182
3. The Two Awards
One of the few common conclusions the two tribunals made was
that Lauder and his Dutch investment vehicle had been the victims of
discrimination. Beyond that point, the two tribunals came to diamet-
rically opposed conclusions on issues related to expropriation, fair and
equitable treatment, full protection and security, and compliance with
minimum obligations under international law.
Both the Dutch-Czech Republic and U.S.-Czech Republic BITs had
similar prohibitions on the arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of
investments. 83 While the London tribunal did find that the Czech
Republic engaged in an arbitrary and discriminatory measure, its
holding was limited to the 1993 time period when Mr. Lauder was
prevented from making a direct investment in CET 21.1' As the basis
for its conclusion, the London tribunal pointed to the 1997 Report of
182. Id. 1% 173,178; Stockholm Award, supra note 155, 1$ 40-41,412.
183. Article II(2)(b) of the U.S.-Czech Republic BIT provided that:
Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory
measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment,
acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments. For purposes of dispute
resolution under Article 3 VI and VII, a measure may be arbitrary and
discriminatory notwithstanding the fact that a Party has had or has exercised
the opportunity to review such measure in the courts or administrative
tribunals of a Party.
U.S.-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 153, art. 1I(2)(b); see London Award, supra
note 71, 216. Article 3(1) of the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT provided that
each country "shall not impair, by unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the op-
eration, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by those in-
vestors." Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 39, art. 3(1); Stockholm
Award, supra note 155, % 24.
184. In coming to this conclusion, the London tribunal considered the plain mean-
ing of the treaty. In particular, the tribunal noted that the treaty requires both an ar-
bitrary and a discriminatory measure. Both aspects must be considered in order to
avoid giving inappropriate meaning to the word "and" and rendering part of the stan-
dard redundant. London Award, supra note 71, % 219. Noting that the U.S.-Czech
Republic BIT does not define the term "arbitrary," the panel relied upon Black's Law
Dictionary's definition of "arbitrary" as "depending on individual discretion...
founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact." Id. 221. The
London tribunal found the conduct arbitrary because it was neither founded on rea-
son or fact- nor was the decision based upon the Czech Republic's Media Law, a law
that expressly accepted applications from companies with foreign equity participation.
Id. 232. The tribunal also analyzed the meaning of national treatment and found
that the treatment must be at least as favorable as to a Czech National as defined in
article 11(1). Id. 220. The tribunal held the measure to be discriminatory because it
treated foreign investments less favorably than domestic investment. The tribunal
noted that, as a result of the political opposition, it is probable that there would have
been no political outcry if Lauder's company had been of Czech origin. Id. 231.
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the Media Council that stated, "[w]hen granting the license to the
Company CET 21, for fear that a majority share of foreign capital in
the license holder's Company might impact the independence of full-
format broadcasts, the Council assumed a configuration that separates
the investor from the license holder himself." '185 This distinction,
based upon the national origin of the investor, was the sole basis of
the London tribunal's finding of discrimination.'86 The London tribu-
nal went on to hold that the later conduct of the Media Council was
not arbitrary and discriminatory within the meaning of the U.S.-Czech
Republic BIT. The panel reasoned that: (1) various conduct by the
Media Council was insufficient to rise to the level of a "measure" '' -
particularly when the conduct "merely expresses the general opinion
of a regulatory body regarding the proper interpretation" of the law;188
(2) the initiation of administrative proceeding was neither arbitrary'89
nor discriminatory 9 ' as it constituted a normal exercise of regulatory
duties of the Media Council; and (3) CME's amendment of its admin-
istrative documents was consensual since Mr. Lauder's company was
aware of its legal position. 91
The Stockholm tribunal took a different view of the facts. Focusing
on the evisceration of the arrangements underlying the investment
and perceived government coercion, the Stockholm tribunal found the
Media Council's conduct in 1996 and 1999 deprived CME of exclusive
rights, and this conduct was unreasonable and thus in violation of the
185. Id. 91 229 (quoting a 1997 report of the Media Council to the Czech Parlia-
ment). Other portions of the report explained the CNTS "model came into existence
[because of] the Council's fears of a majority share of foreign capital in the license-
holder's Company." Stockholm Award, supra note 155, $ 83.
186. London Award, supra note 71, 1 230-33. The tribunal, however, did not
award any damages for the breach of the treaty as the harm alleged was too remote
from the damaged claimed and Mr. Lauder did not show that the acts of CET 21 were
so unexpected that they were actually the cause of the ultimate harm. Id. 91T1 234-35.
187. For example, the tribunal held that the replacement of members of the Media
Council in 1994 "did not amount to an arbitrary and discriminatory measure." Id. 91
240. Likewise, the personal opinion of a member of the Media Council, which may or
may not reflect the Media Council's opinion on the same subject could not amount to
an arbitrary or discriminatory measure. Id. 1[ 246-47. Further, a letter from the Me-
dia Council that explained the opinion of a regulatory body regarding the proper in-
terpretation of the Media Law could not amount to a measure within the meaning of
the treaty and had no independent legal effect. Id. 91 282-84.
188. Id. 9 282.
189. Here, the tribunal explained that there was sufficient evidence that the Media
Council thought or could legitimately think that CNTS was violating the Media Law.
Id. 191 249-54. Because it was a normal exercise of regulatory duties, the exercise of
discretion was not arbitrary. Id. 91 255. Similarly, a letter from a governmental agency
that a commercial actor uses to extricate itself from unfavorable commercial terms
cannot constitute an arbitrary measure, particularly when there were reasonable
grounds for the basis of the letter's conclusion. Id. $11 276-77, 285.
190. Likewise, the Media Council's exercise of authority was not discriminatory
because a variety of other companies that were controlled by Czech entities (and not
a foreign investor) were also subject to similar investigations. Id. 9191 256-58.
191. Id. TT 272-73.
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treaty. But as a violation would require a measure that was both un-
reasonable and discriminatory, the tribunal concluded the Media
Council's conduct "smacks of discrimination against the foreign inves-
tor. "192 There was no analysis of existing case law; and, in contrast to
the London tribunal, no explanation of how the Media Council's vari-
ous regulatory activities amounted to a measure.
The two tribunals came to different decisions as regards the issues
of expropriation. The standards of expropriation set out in the U.S.-
Czech Republic BIT and the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT were
essentially the same.193 The London tribunal held the Czech Republic
"did not take any measure of, or tantamount to, expropriation of [Mr.
Lauder's] property rights.., since there was no direct or indirect in-
terference by the Czech Republic in the use of Mr. Lauder's property
or with the enjoyment of its benefits."'94 The London tribunal noted
that Mr. Lauder's property rights were maintained until the contrac-
tual relationship between CET 21 and CNTS was over-even though
the relationship may have changed over time. They further noted
that, even if Mr. Lauder had been deprived of his property rights, the
Media Council's conduct was not expropriation since it did not benefit
the Czech Republic.'95
In contrast, the Stockholm tribunal found expropriation. The tri-
bunal reasoned that the Media Council coerced CNTS and colluded
with Dr. Zelezn9, via overt acts and omissions, to destroy the com-
mercial value of the investment.'96 Specifically, the Media Council's
reversal of position regarding the appropriate structure of CNTS
eradicated a previously exclusive commercial relationship. The
Stockholm tribunal also determined that the Media Council should
192. Stockholm Award, supra note 155, at $ 612.
193. U.S.-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 153. Article III(1) of the U.S.-Czech
Republic BIT provides that:
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indi-
rectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization (ex-
propriation) except: for a public purpose; in a nondiscriminatory manner;
upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in ac-
cordance with due process of law and the general principles or treatment
provided for in Article 11(2).
Id; London Award, supra note 71, $ 199. Article 5 of the Netherlands-Czech Repub-
lic BIT provides that neither country "shall take any measures depriving, directly or
indirectly, investors of... their investments unless the following conditions are com-
plied with: (a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of
law; (b) the measures are not discriminatory; (c) the measures are accompanied by
just compensation." Stockholm Award, supra note 155, 24.
194. London Award, supra note 71, $ 201.
195. Id. $$ 202-03.
196. The Stockholm tribunal noted that the Media Council was obligated to secure
and defend the 1993 structure of TV Nova after it had attracted foreign investment on
the basis of that structure. Stockholm Award, supra note 155, $1 530. Similarly, the
Media Council's collaboration with Dr. Zelezn was to put pressure on the foreign
investor to destroy the legal basis of the investment. Id. $$ 554-55, 572, 585.
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have withdrawn the March 1999 letter;1 97 and at the very minimum,
the Media Council should not have sat silent while the legal basis for
the investment was deteriorating.19 s These twin factors lead the
Stockholm tribunal to find expropriation because there was no pros-
pect of reviving the exclusive use of the license, which had been the
basis of the original investment. 99
The two tribunals also differed on whether the Czech Republic vio-
lated its obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment, even
though the two investment treaties had similar obligations."z° Noting
that the Media Council had a duty to ensure observance of the Media
Law, the London tribunal explained that it was not inconsistent to en-
force the law absent a specific undertaking, and thus, it would not re-
frain from doing so. 20 1 Since there was no such undertaking and the
Media Council commenced proceedings because of its concerns about
illegal broadcasting, °2 the London tribunal held there was no breach
of the fair and equitable treatment obligation.23 The Stockholm tri-
bunal again came to an opposite result. Explaining that the Media
Council intentionally undermined the investment, the Stockholm tri-
bunal held the Czech Republic violated its obligation to provide fair
and equitable treatment to investors "by evisceration of the arrange-
ments in reliance upon w[hich] the foreign investor was induced to in-
vest.,204
There were also similar protections for investors as regards full pro-
tection and security,2 5 but again, there were opposite conclusions.
The London tribunal held that there was no failure to provide full
protection and security to Mr. Lauder's investment. The London tri-
bunal explained that the Czech Republic's change in the Media Law
was not a danger to Mr. Lauder's investment, 26 and the Czech Repub-
197. Id. 91 600.
198. Id. 572.
199. Id. $T1 607-09.
200. The U.S.-Czech Republic BIT provided that investments "shall at all times be
accorded fair and equitable treatment." U.S.-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 153, art.
II(2)(a); see also London Award, supra note 71, T1 292. The Netherlands-Czech Re-
public BIT provides that each country "shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to
the investments of investors." Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 39, art.
3(1); Stockholm Award, supra note 155, T 24.
201. London Award, supra note 71, $ 296-97.
202. Id. T191 2 9, 301.
203. Id. 91 293.
204. Stockholm Award, supra note 155, $1 611.
205. The U.S.-Czech Republic BIT provided that investments "shall enjoy full pro-
tection and security." U.S.-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 153, art. II(2)(a); London
Award, supra note 71, $ 308. The Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT likewise provided
that each country "shall accord [to the investments of investors of the other state] full
protection and security." Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 39, art. 3(2);
Stockholm Award, supra note 155, 91 24.
206. London Award, supra note 71, 311.
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lic should not be liable to Mr. Lauder for Dr. 2elezn 's efforts to ex-
tricate himself from their commercial relationship. 20
7
Again, the Stockholm tribunal reached a dramatically different re-
sult. Explaining that a Sovereign is obligated to ensure that neither
amendment of laws nor action of administrative bodies results in a
withdrawal or devaluation of an investment, the Stockholm tribunal
concluded that the Czech Republic had not provided full security and
protection. The Stockholm tribunal explained that the Media Coun-
cil's action and inaction in 1996 and 1999 "were targeted to remove
the security and legal protection of the Claimant's investment in the
Czech Republic." ' 8 There was (1) no analysis of the meaning of this
standard and why it applied in the present case, and (2) minimal con-
sideration of existing case law and/or academic literature that might
shed light on the proper analysis and application of the facts.
The last area of major disagreement was the Czech Republic's obli-
gation to comply with principles of international law, which were simi-
lar under both treaties. 29 The London tribunal found that the Czech
Republic had not broken a particular principle of international law.210
In contrast, the Stockholm tribunal listed the variety of treaty
breaches and concluded the Media Council's actions were not com-
patible with principles of international law. The multiple breaches,
therefore, were "together a violation of the principles of international
law assuring the alien and his investment treatment does not fall be-
low the standards of customary international law., 211
4. The Judgment of Sweden's Svea Court of Appeal
Faced with these two inconsistent decisions and the possibility of a
damage award from the Stockholm tribunal in the order of U.S. $500
million,212 the Czech Republic did the only reasonable thing it could-
207. See id. 304. The tribunal noted that there is no obligation to protect foreign
investment against loss of value resulting from the acts of persons whose acts cannot
be attributed to the State. See id. 308 (citing Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 3, at 61).
208. Stockholm Award, supra note 155, 613.
209. The U.S.-Czech Republic BIT provided that investments "shall in no case be
accorded treatment less" than that which conforms to principles of "international
law." U.S.-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 153, art. IT (2) (a); London Award, supra
note 71, 208.
210. Based upon the evidence presented, the London Award held Mr. Lauder did
not show a specific obligation in international law that would be broader than the
other four BIT provisions.
211. Stockholm Award, supra note 155, 614.
212. CME initially claimed damages in the order of U.S. $560,000,000, which was
the value of CNTS, but in the damage phase of the arbitration, CME only requested
an award of U.S. $495,200,000. CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, Final
Award, 31 (2003) (UNCITRAL), at http://www.cetv-net.com/iFiles/1439-
Final AwardQuantum.pdf. The tribunal issued a final award in favor of CME in the




it asked the Swedish courts to vacate the Stockholm Award. Starting
from the general presumption that its review was quite narrow and
arbitration awards should be set aside only in exceptional circum-
stances, the Swedish court refused to set aside the Stockholm
Award.213 The Svea Court of Appeal acknowledged the existence of
the London Award but determined it had no jurisdiction to reconcile
the two decisions." 4 Although it did consider the issue of whether lis
pendens or res judicata should form a basis for setting aside the
Stockholm Award,215 the court explained that because the two awards
involved different parties 216 and were rendered under different trea-
ties entered into by different Sovereigns, it believed application of
those two doctrines was inappropriate.217
The contradictory results of the two Lauder cases suggest that at
least one of the awards (or a part thereof) was wrong. 218 The injustice
of this logical conclusion undermines the legitimacy of investment ar-
bitration, particularly where public international law rights are at
stake and the legitimate expectations of investors and Sovereigns are
mismanaged. Likewise, the limited ability of the Svea Court of Ap-
peal to remedy this situation suggests that it is appropriate to recon-
sider solutions (whether preventative or corrective) to address this
gap and put investment treaty arbitration back on track to providing a
reliable, predictable, and coherent jurisprudence.
B. The SGS Cases
Other inconsistent cases have considered the meaning of the "um-
brella clause" and promises of Sovereigns to honor their "commit-
ments" and observe their "obligations." Umbrella clauses are de-
signed to protect investors' contractual rights against interference
213. Svea Court of Appeal Judgment, supra note 155, at 84-85.
214. Id. at 2. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the existence and outcome of the
London Award. Id. at 6. The Swedish court did not, however, have jurisdiction to set
aside the English award and the decision of the London tribunal could not impact the
reasoning of the Swedish court.
215. The Czech Republic claimed that there were other reasons for setting aside
the Stockholm award, including failure to apply the applicable law and procedural
misconduct of the tribunal in excluding the Czech arbitrator from deliberations. Al-
though these points are beyond the scope of the present Article, the Svea Court of
Appeal was unpersuaded that any of the articulated reasons could form a basis for
setting aside the award.
216. As a matter of Swedish law, and what the court understood to be other legal
systems, the "[i]dentity between a minority shareholder, albeit a controlling one, and
the actual company cannot ... be deemed to exist in a case such as the instant one."
Id. at 98.
217. Id. at 95.
218. The votes from the two arbitrations total as follows: (1) 6-0 in favor of finding
that discrimination occurred in 1993, (2) 4-2 in favor of finding no other form of dis-
crimination occurred, and (3) 4-2 in finding that there was no expropriation, no denial
of fair and equitable treatment, no failure to provide full protection and security, and
no failure to comply with obligations under international law.
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from a breach of contract or an administrative or legislative act.219
The interpretive difficulty is whether the rights within an "umbrella
clause" are sufficient to override an ambiguity in international law
220
and transmute a breach of contract into a treaty violation. In the SGS
cases, one ICSID tribunal held that the "umbrella clause" cannot
transform a failure to pay fees under a concession contract into a
treaty breach, while another ICSID tribunal came to the opposite
conclusion.
1. SGS v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan
SGS Socigtg Gengrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan... was the first international arbitration to consider the mean-
ing and application of the "umbrella clause" in an investment treaty.
The issue confronting the arbitrators was whether an "umbrella
clause" in a treaty transforms a breach of a contract into a breach of a
treaty. The Pakistan tribunal definitively said: "no."
SGS and Pakistan had entered into a contract, whereby SGS pro-
vided certain customs-classification services and Pakistan paid for the
privilege of increased efficiency in its customs collection. This Pre-
shipment Inspection Agreement (the "PSI Agreement") functioned
well for several years, but after disagreements about the adequacy of
the parties' mutual performance, the agreement ended.222
Like many commercial relationships that go awry, a dispute arose
between SGS and Pakistan about allegations of breach of contract
(including Pakistan's failure to make payments) and the validity of
Pakistan's termination of the PSI Agreement. 23 Although the PSI
Agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring disputes to be
resolved in Pakistan, 24 SGS tried to bring its contract claims before
219. Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 3, at 81-82; see also supra note 40 and accompa-
nying text (describing the "umbrella clause" and providing examples of how this right
is enumerated in different investment treaties).
220. As a matter of general international law, it is unclear whether a breach of con-
tract or other regulatory measure is sufficient to constitute a breach of an interna-
tional obligation. Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 3, at 82. Compare F.A. Mann, State
Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 572, 574 (1960) (explaining that a
breach of contract "may have occurred, yet the case is unlikely to give rise to a claim
for 'breach of contract' in international law"), with Robert Y. Jennings, State Con-
tracts in International Law, 37 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 156, 162 (1961) (stating "there is no
reason at all to prevent international law from holding that what is no breach of con-
tract in the proper law is nevertheless deemed to be a breach of contract for the pur-
poses of international law").
221. SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003) [hereinafter
Pakistan Award], available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGS-decision.pdf.
222. Id. $$ 11-12, 16.
223. Id. [1[ 16, 17.
224. Id. $[ 15. Specifically, the arbitration agreement provided that:
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to this Agree-
ment, or breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall as far as it is possible
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the Swiss courts. When SGS was unsuccessful, Pakistan initiated arbi-
tration to resolve the contract claims. Eleven months thereafter, SGS
sent a notice of dispute to Pakistan, which alleged that the wrongful
termination and failure to make payment under the PSI agreement
were violations of the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT. 25 Two days later,
SGS submitted a Request for Arbitration to ICSID claiming that
Pakistan's conduct violated the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT in a variety
of different ways, including a failure "to constantly guarantee the ob-
servance of [its] commitments." '226
Before they could consider the merits of SGS's claims that Pakistan
breached the BIT by breaching the PSI Agreement, the Pakistan tri-
bunal first considered whether SGS was improperly reformulating the
breach of contract claims as an investment treaty claim. The Switzer-
land-Pakistan BIT provided that each Sovereign "shall constantly
guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into with
respect to the investments of the Investors" from the other Sover-
eign.227 SGS argued that this clause had the effect of elevating a sim-
ple breach of contract into a treaty claim under international law,228
and that this was justified because such "umbrella clauses" were in-
cluded in investment treaties to remedy the lack of clarity about
whether breach of contract under domestic law is sufficient to elevate
a claim into a violation of international law.229 Not surprisingly, Paki-
be settled amicably. Failing such amicable settlement, any such dispute shall
be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act of the Terri-
tory as presently in force. The place of arbitration shall be Islamabad, Paki-
stan and the language to be used in the arbitration proceedings shall be the
English language.
Id.
225. Id. 1$ 31, 32; see also Accord Entre la Conf6ddration Suisse et la Rfpublique
Islamique du Pakistan Concernant la Promotion et la Protection R6ciproque des In-
vestissements, July 11, 1995, Switz.-Pak. [hereinafter Switzerland-Pakistan BIT], at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Switzerland-pakistan-fr.pdf.
226. Pakistan Award, supra note 221, 35. The request also made a variety of
other allegations, including that Pakistan failed to promote SGS's investment, failed
to protect SGS's investment, impaired SGS's enjoyment of its investment, failed to
ensure fair and equitable treatment of its investment, and engaged in inappropriate
expropriation. Id.
227. Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, supra note 225, art. 11; see Pakistan Award, supra
note 221, 53 (quoting article 11).
228. This means that each time a Sovereign violates a provision of a contract, the
Sovereign also violates norms of international law and the BIT at the same time. Id.
$J 98-99. In oral argument, SGS's counsel stated that
if I am the government and if I breach a contract, by the same token I will
breach a treaty, so that the useful effect of this is to create [a] mirror effect,
to say that I will elevate in essence, and that's what it does, it may be far-
reaching but that's what it does, to elevate breaches of contract as breaches
of the treaty.
Id. 99.
229. See id. 98 n.108 (describing SGS's reliance on Dolzer & Stevens' book on
bilateral investment treaties and the comments of the former Secretary-General of
ICSID, Ibrahim Shihata).
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stan disagreed and countered that there can be no claim for breach of
the treaty until the dispute "ripens" and there was a determination
that the contract was breached.23°
The Pakistan tribunal concluded that article 11 of the Switzerland-
Pakistan BIT could not transmute SGS's contract claims into BIT
claims. While the tribunal's analysis began with the rather non-
contentious principle that the same set of facts might give rise to dif-
ferent claims under local and international law, the tribunal com-
mented that "the State may breach a treaty without breaching a con-
tract, and vice versa, and this is certainly true of these provisions of
the BIT. ' 231 Construing the text of the BIT in light of its object and
purpose,232 the tribunal concluded there was simply no
convincing basis for accepting [SGS's] contention that Article 11 of
the BIT has the effect of entitling a Contracting Party's Investor,
like SGS, in the face of a valid forum selection clause, to "elevate"
its claims grounded solely in contract with another Contracting
Party, like the PSI Agreement, to claims grounded on the BIT, and
accordingly to bring such contract claims to this tribunal for resolu-
tion and decision.
23 f
The tribunal acknowledged that the "commitments" which were to
be "constantly guarantee[d]" were not limited to contractual com-
mitments.234 Yet the Pakistan tribunal simultaneously expressed con-
cern that an overly broad interpretation of the standard would be sus-
ceptible of "almost indefinite expansion" and would lead to claims
that were "so automatic and unqualified and sweeping in their opera-
tion [and] so burdensome in their potential impact" upon Sover-
eigns.235 Instead of relying upon the text of the treaty, out of its con-
230. Id. 9T 54.
231. Id. 91 147. The tribunal also noted that the treaty claims and contract claims
appeared reasonably distinct in principle. Id. T 148.
232. This is required by the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, U.N. Doc. A/Conf 39/28
(1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention on Treaties].
233. Pakistan Award, supra note 221, TT 164-65.
234. The tribunal suggested that "commitments" was probably broader than pure
contractual matters and might also address statutory, administrative, or other gov-
ernmental obligations. Id. 91 166.
235. Id. 91 166-67. As it apparently believed that a finding to the contrary would
open the floodgates of investment treaty arbitration, the tribunal went to great
lengths to explain the ramification of (what it considered to be) the harmful conse-
quences of SGS's "extraordinarily expansive" position. Id. T1 171. In particular, the
tribunal suggested adopting SGS's position was untenable because: (1) it would in-
corporate a number of government contracts and municipal laws into actionable
"commitments"; (2) it could make other provisions of the BIT superfluous-namely
those requiring promotion of investments and most favored nation treatment (which
would permit SGS to benefit from provisions in the UK-Pakistan BIT); (3) it would
nullify the specifically negotiated dispute settlement mechanism in the PSI Agree-
ment; and (4) given the physical location of the "umbrella clause" in the treaty-
which was in a substantially different location than the rest of the substantive rights-
it would be inappropriate to treat article 11 as a substantive obligation. Id. $T 168-70.
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cerns resulting from the possible "slippery slope" of investment arbi-
trations, the tribunal announced a new rule of investment treaty inter-
pretation: there must be "clear and convincing evidence" of a shared
intent of Sovereigns to transform contract breaches into treaty
claims.236 Expressing an unwillingness to derogate from principles of
international law that a violation of a contract entered into between a
Sovereign and an investor is not by itself a violation of international
law,237 the tribunal held the only "commitments" which were action-
able under the treaty are those attributable to a Sovereign itself as a
legal person under the law of state responsibility. 38 In enunciating
this narrow rule for treaty violations, the Pakistan tribunal gutted the
meaning of the BIT's "umbrella" clause and rendered it a textual
anomaly. Not only had the tribunal announced a new evidentiary rule
for investment treaty arbitration, which was not found in the treaty it-
self, but the tribunal's conclusion meant that the "umbrella clause" it-
self essentially became a nullity even though the two Sovereigns made
the effort specifically to include the provision.
2. SGS v. Republic of the Philippines
The tribunal in SGS Socit6 Gn~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Repub-
lic of the Philippines239 came to a decidedly different result through a
decidedly different analysis.
While the tribunal's reasoning in each of these departments leaves something to be
desired, a full analysis of the decision is beyond the scope of the present article but
would, however, be a fruitful use of future scholarship.
236. Id. 167. Interestingly, the tribunal commented that it was not "pointed to
any other evidence of the putative common intent" of Switzerland and Pakistan on
the parties' intention as regards the "umbrella clause." Id. As the tribunal had not yet
announced its sweeping new rule regarding "putative common intent," the parties
were not on notice that they may have needed to provide evidence as regards the
Sovereign's intentions of agreeing to the "umbrella clause." Moreover, given the con-
fidential nature of the proceedings, Switzerland was not able to participate in the arbi-
tration; yet as a party to the arbitration, Pakistan was able to deny that it ever had an
intention to transform contract breaches into treaty breaches. Id. 173. Later docu-
ments have suggested that Switzerland did not intend the BIT to be construed in the
narrow fashion suggested by the Pakistan tribunal. See ICSID Tribunal's Interpreta-
tion of BIT Article 11 Worries Swiss, 19 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. 3, 3-4 (2004). This
article describes a letter written by Swiss authorities stating that they:
are alarmed about the very narrow interpretation given to the meaning of
Article 11 by the tribunal, which not only runs counter to the intention of
Switzerland when concluding the Treaty but is quite evidently neither sup-
ported by the meaning of similar articles in BITs concluded by other coun-
tries nor by academic comments on such provisions.
Id.
237. Pakistan Award, supra note 221, 167.
238. Id. 166.
239. SGS Socit6 G6ndrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Philippines
Award], available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-final.pdf.
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The facts of the Philippines case are similar to those in the Pakistan
case but more straightforward. SGS contracted with the Philippines
to provide import supervision services (the "CISS Agreement"),
whereby SGS would provide services to improve the customs clear-
ance and control process in the Philippines.24 ' After a change in in-
spection policies resulting from shifts in the GATT-WTO valuation
system, the Philippines failed to renew the CISS Agreement.241 A dis-
pute arose when the Philippines allegedly failed to pay amounts due
under the CISS Agreement.242 Although the CISS Agreement con-
tained an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favor of the Philippines
courts,243 SGS commenced ICSID arbitration on the ground that its
contract claim could be elevated to a treaty claim under the "umbrella
clause" in the Switzerland-Philippines BIT.24
Article X(2) of the Switzerland-Philippines BIT provided that each
Sovereign "shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to
specific investments in its territory by investors of the other" Sover-
eign. 245 Looking at the text of the BIT, the tribunal noted that the use
of the word "shall" implies a substantive right and the term "any obli-
gation" is capable of applying to obligations arising under local law-
such as those arising from a contract. As the tribunal succinctly put it,
article X(2) "would appear to say, and to say clearly, that each [Sov-
ereign] shall observe any legal obligation it has assumed, or will in the
future assume, with regard to specific investments covered by the
BIT. ,246 Rather than expressing concern about derogating from tradi-
tional rules of international law as the Pakistan tribunal had, the Phil-
ippines tribunal found it was "legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its
interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered invest-
ments., 247 Although the Philippines tribunal attempted to distinguish
240. Id. 9[ 1, 19-24. In particular, SGS provided certifications to exporters based
on preshipment inspections it conducted on behalf of the governments of countries
purchasing goods made in the Philippines. Id. 12-13.
241. Id. 14.
242. Id. $$1 35-41.
243. The CISS Agreement provided that "[a]ll actions concerning disputes in con-
nection with the obligations of either party to this Agreement shall be filed at the Re-
gional Trial Courts of Makati or Manila." Id. 91 22.
244. Id. 9$ 2, 65.
245. Accord Entre la Conf6d6ration Suisse et la Rdpublique des Philippines Con-
cernant la Promotion et la Protection R6ciproque des Investissements, Mar. 31, 1997,
Switz.-Phil. [hereinafter Switzerland-Philippines BIT], at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Switzerland-philippines-fr.pdf; see
also Philippines Award, supra note 239, $$ 34, 114 (quoting article X, "Other Com-
mitments," of the Switzerland-Philippines BIT).
246. Philippines Award, supra note 239, 115 (emphasis added).
247. Id. 91 116. But see Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law & Procedure of the Inter-
national Court of Justice 372 (1986) (explaining that as regards grants given to inves-
tors, "there can be no presumption in favour of an intention to grant more rather than
less, and... the presumption must be in favour of the least that is consistent with the
language used" and citing Judge Basdevant's decision in the Minquiers case that said
2005] 1573
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the Pakistan tribunal's decision on the basis that the BIT's text was
"different and rather vaguer, ' ' 48 the Philippines tribunal criticized the
previous decision for a variety of reasons, including: (1) its fear of
"indefinite expansion," (2) its presumption against a broad interpreta-
tion of the treaty, (3) the over-reliance on the physical location of the
umbrella-clause, and (4) the failure to give any clear meaning of the
umbrella clause.249 The tribunal concluded that the umbrella clause
"makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to observe
binding commitments, including contractual commitments, which it
has assumed with regard to specific investments. '" 25  Although the
Philippines award represented a radical departure from the Pakistan
award in both reasoning and result, there was one commonality: nei-
ther tribunal proceeded to the merits of the action. 1
Even though the Philippines tribunal had the opportunity to con-
sider the Pakistan award and discussed the case in its own decision,
reconciling the two awards is challenging-particularly in light of the
Philippines tribunal's rejection of much of the reasoning in the Paki-
stan award. Using a textual approach to consider the rights granted by
the specific treaty, it may be possible to explain the different out-
comes on the basis of the differences in the substantive rights granted
by the "umbrella clauses" of each treaty. Another solution may be
that one of the awards is unsound. The present uncertainty about the
application of the umbrella clause will continue to perplex both Sov-
ereigns, who may be unsure of the scope of legitimate government ac-
tivity, as well as investors, who believe their rights may have been vio-
lated.
C. The NAFTA Cases
There are various issues in NAFTA jurisprudence that reflect in-
consistencies in arbitral decisions. 2  This Article, however, focuses on
treaties "should be interpreted in favour of the grantor, in the sense of restricting the
gift").
248. Philippines Award, supra note 239, 119.
249. Id. IT 121-26.
250. Id. 91 128.
251. Even though the Philippines tribunal held it did have jurisdiction to determine
contractual claims between an investor and a Sovereign, it stayed its jurisdiction. As
SGS failed to allege any colorable BIT claims other than the umbrella clause and the
parties agreed to submit their contractual disputes to the Philippines courts, the Phil-
ippines tribunal decided to let the contractual claims in the Philippines courts pro-
ceed. Id. IT 175-76.
252. Inconsistencies in investment arbitration are not necessarily overt, but the sub-
tleties are by no means less problematic. There is, for example, an area of inconsis-
tency about the need to exhaust local remedies before initiating arbitration. See Wil-
liam S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors Under NAFTA Chapter
11, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 563 (2002); see also Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A ("ELSI") (U.S.v.
Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 42 (July 20) (holding that customary international law requires
foreign investors to exhaust domestic remedies before pursuing an international
1574 [Vol. 73
2005] LEGITIMACY CRISIS 1575
the area that has attracted the most attention and generated the most
concern: the meaning of "fair and equitable treatment" under article
1105. Article 1105 provides that: "Each Party shall accord to invest-
ments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with in-
ternational law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protec-
tion and security. ' 253 The debate in early jurisprudence was whether
this meant that "fair and equitable" was a guarantee of minimum
treatment under international law or whether it was an "additive"
right with independent meaning.254 The answer to this issue is funda-
mental. If "fair and equitable treatment" is an additive right, inves-
tors can bypass an older test for showing a violation of international
law, which provides compensation only in egregious cases. 55 In es-
claim, but noting that this could be waived by treaty); Interhandl Case (Switz. v. U.S.),
1957 I.C.J. 5, 27 (Oct. 24) (same, but not noting that this could be waived by treaty).
Nothing in Chapter 11 of NAFTA expressly indicates whether investors are required
to exhaust local remedies before proceeding to arbitration. The overall structure of
NAFTA suggests that there is no such requirement and, by providing a mechanism to
arbitrate, NAFTA countries are bypassing the traditional rule under customary
international law that they need to exhaust local remedies. Two tribunals have
considered the need to exhaust local remedies, and they both found that exhaustion is
not required. See Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, TJ
71-78 (2002) (noting that article 1121 gives preference to international arbitration and
is a departure from the general rule of customary international law that requires the
exhaustion of local remedies and that an interpretation to the contrary would cause a
tribunal to "be prevented from making a decision simply by delaying local court
proceedings"), at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/feldmanmexico-award-
en.PDF; Metalclad Award, supra note 138 (explaining that because article 1121 of
NAFI'A permits investors to waive their rights to initiate or continue proceedings
before administrative tribunals or courts, Mexico was correct to assert that local
remedies do not need to be exhausted). In contrast, the Loewen tribunal found that
investors must exhaust local remedies before proceeding to make a claim under
NAFTA. Loewen Corp. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
158-63 (2003) (holding that article 1121 "involves no waiver of the duty to pursue
local remedies in its application of a breach to international law"), at
http://www.naftalaw.org. But see Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Dec. 11, 1990, Jam.-Switz., art. 9(4), reprinted in 3
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (noting that if
arbitration is initiated under the investment treaty, a Sovereign "may require the
exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to
arbitration").
253. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105(1), 32 I.L.M. at 639-64.
254. F.A. Mann was one of the major commentators suggesting that "fair and equi-
table treatment" was an additive right in investment treaties. He based this opinion
wholly upon the United Kingdom-Philippines BIT. In his seminal piece, Mann ex-
plained that while "it may be suggested that arbitrary, discriminatory or abusive
treatment is contrary to customary international law, unfair and inequitable treatment
is a much wider conception which may readily include such administrative meas-
ures.., as are not plainly illegal in the accepted sense of international law." F.A.
Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 241, 242-43 (1981). He went on to conclude that fair and equitable treatment
was not merely a restatement of the minimum standard but extends "far beyond the
minimum standard." Id. at 244.
255. See Neer v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (1926) (holding that the
treatment of an alien, in order to constitute international delinquency should amount
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sence, investors recover more easily and Sovereigns find themselves
unexpectedly liable.
The trio of cases under NAFTA, which considered the application
of the same substantive standard within the same investment treaty,
came to radically different decisions about how the standard of "fair
and equitable treatment" should be interpreted and applied. This
early NAFTA jurisprudence spanned the spectrum from decisions
considering fair and equitable treatment as part of international law
standards to decisions finding it was an additive right.
1. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada
S.D. Myers was the second tribunal to consider the scope of "fair
and equitable treatment" and came to a different decision than other
tribunals.256 Focusing on the nexus between fair and equitable treat-
ment and discrimination, the tribunal held that there is a violation of
article 1105 when "an investor has been treated in such an unjust or
arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is unaccept-
able from the international perspective";2 57 and, as discrimination
amounts to such treatment, it violates obligations to fair and equitable
treatment.258
In the S.D. Myers case, Canada needed to pass regulations to be in
compliance with environmental standards under the Basel Conven-
tion.259 When it enacted a facially neutral measure that prohibited the
transportation of PCBs across borders, however, this resulted in de
facto discrimination against U.S. investors. In particular, U.S. inves-
tors who owned a PCB remediation which required shipment of con-
taminated material to the U.S. to destroy the PCBs, were prevented
from conducting waste disposal in Canada.26' Having noted such
statements from Government officials that the "handling of PCBs
should be done in Canada by Canadians, 26' the panel held that the
to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of govern-
mental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impar-
tial person would readily recognize its insufficiency).
256. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Award (2000) (UNCITRAL) [hereinafter S.D.
Myers Award], at http://www.naftalaw.org.
257. Id. 263.
258. Id. 266. But see S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Concurring Opinion of Dr. Brian
Schwartz, 91 224-64 (2000) (UNCITRAL), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
259. The Basel Convention is a treaty dealing with the international traffic in PCBs
and other hazardous wastes. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649
(1989), available at http://www.basel.int/text/con-e-rev.pdf.
260. S.D. Myers Award, supra note 256, I 91,105-06.
261. Specifically, the government minister said, "[it is still the position of the gov-
ernment that the handling of PCBs should be done in Canada by Canadians." Id. 9I
116; see also id. 185 (quoting the government minister who said "handling of PCBs




investor was denied fair and equitable treatment under NAFTA be-
cause the measure was discriminatory and designed to target one U.S.
company.262
The tribunal's analysis of article 1105 is the most intriguing aspect
of its decision. Starting with the text of article 1105(1), the tribunal
concluded that the phrase "fair and equitable" could not be read in
isolation but, rather, must be read in conjunction with the introduc-
tory phrase "treatment in accordance with international law." '263 The
tribunal acknowledged the legitimate need of governments to regulate
matters within their own borders, but it concluded that international
law ultimately must determine whether the regulation is sufficiently
egregious to amount to a violation of article 1105.26 Given the protec-
tionist and discriminatory intent, the favoring of nationals over nonna-
tionals and the prevention of S.D. Myer's planned business activity,
the S.D. Myers tribunal concluded that the discrimination in that case
was sufficient to cause a violation of article 1105.265
2. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States
Metalclad2 66 had the distinction of being the first arbitration where a
NAFTA investor made a successful claim under article 1105, but had
a different approach than S.D. Myers.267 While much has been written
about the Metalclad decision,268 the core of the case revolves around
the holding that "Metalclad's investment was not accorded fair and
equitable treatment in accordance with international law. ' 269 When
making its initial decision to invest in Mexico, Metalclad consulted
with Mexican federal and state authorities about the type of permits
required to construct and operate a hazardous waste facility.270 Rely-
ing on those representations, Metalclad made the investment; but
later, local municipal officials said Metalclad did not have the appro-
262. See id. TT 255-56, 266, 268.
263. Id. IT 258, 262.
264. Id. T 263-64.
265. Id. T T 162, 193, 266, 268. The tribunal did, however, leave open the possibility
that a breach of a rule of international law "may not be decisive in determining"
whether an investor has been denied fair and equitable treatment under article 1105.
Id. T 264.
266. Metalclad Judgment, supra note 139.
267. Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of International
Economic Law, 36 Can. Bus. L.J. 405 (2002) [hereinafter Weiler, NAFTA Invesment
Arbitration].
268. Dhooge, supra note 87; Chris Tollefson, Metalclad v. United Mexican States
Revisited: Judicial Oversight of NAFTA's Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim Proc-
ess, 11 Minn. J. Global Trade 183 (2002); Lauren E. Godshall, Note, In the Cold
Shadow of Metalclad: The Potential for Change to NAFTA's Chapter 11, 11 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 264 (2002); Jesse Williams, Comment, Regulating Multinational Polluters in
a Post-NA FTA Trade Regime: The Lessons of Metalclad v. Mexico and the Case for a
"Takings" Standard, 8 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 473 (2003).
269. Metalclad Award, supra note 138, 74.
270. Id. T 30-36.
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priate permits and prohibited Metalclad's operations.27 Noting the
detrimental reliance on the representations of the Mexican officials
and the lack of a transparent regulatory procedure, the Metalclad tri-
bunal held this created a breach of the obligation to guarantee fair
and equitable treatment.272
The tribunal analyzed article 1105 through the lens of the Vienna
Convention on the law of treaties, which sets out standards for inter-
preting treaties, including adherence to the plain meaning of a treaty's
text.273 While the tribunal considered certain textual aspects of
NAFTA, such as the stated purpose to provide transparency,27 4 it
quickly moved to an interpretation focused upon the overall object
and purpose of NAFTA,275 which obviously is subject to more subjec-
tive interpretation once analysis becomes more divorced from text.276
271. Id. 52-59.
272. Id. $J1 87-89, 99.
273. The Vienna Convention specifically provides that a "treaty shall be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Con-
vention on Treaties, supra note 232, art. 31(1), 1115 U.N.T.S. at 340.
274. In particular, the tribunal considered that NAFTA article 102(1), which sets
out NAFTA's objectives, and focused on the need for transparency. Metalclad
Award, supra note 138, $ 76. NAFTA provides that
the objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its
principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation
treatment and transparency, are to: a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and fa-
cilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between the terri-
tories of the Parties; b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free
trade area; c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territo-
ries of the Parties; d) provide adequate and effective protection and en-
forcement of intellectual property rights in each Party's territory; e) create
effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agree-
ment, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and f) es-
tablish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral coopera-
tion to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102(1), 32 I.L.M. at 297. The tribunal also briefly con-
sidered article 1802(1), but never went on to explain how this provision impacted its
ultimate conclusion. Metalclad Award, supra note 138, '1 71. Article 1802(1) provides
that each country "shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures and administra-
tive rulings of general application respecting any matter covered by this Agreement
are promptly published or otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable
interested persons and Parties to become acquainted with them." NAFTA, supra note
1, art. 1802(1), 32 I.L.M. at 681.
275. Metalclad Award, supra note 138, $ 70-71, 74-75.
276. Subject to the caveats of the Vienna Convention, there is a great deal that the
discipline of legislative interpretation could usefully share with the interpretation of
treaties. For example, such an examination can remind decision makers that, at its
most fundamental level, "interpretation" is the textual analysis of words and concepts
used by sovereign nations. Concepts of intent and purpose can be useful interpretive
aids at later stages or when dealing with ambiguous concepts and language. See Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reason-
ing, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat:
The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn L. Rev. 241 (1992); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 626, 690 (1990)
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The tribunal ignored other textual provisions of NAFTA - such as
those describing how NAFTA would provide transparency 277 -when it
jumped, with minimal justification,28 to the conclusion that the failure
to ensure regulatory transparency was a violation of article 1105.279
Noting the failure to provide a transparent and predictable framework
for the investor's business planning and investment, the tribunal found
that Mexico's conduct "demonstrates a lack of orderly process and
timely disposition in relation to an investor of a Party acting in expec-
tation that it would be treated fairly and justly in accordance with the
NAFTA,'"280 and this led to the conclusion that Metalclad "was not
treated fairly or equitably under NAFTA."
281
By failing to consider the plain meaning of the words in article 1105,
the Metalclad tribunal apparently considered that "fair and equitable"
(suggesting that statutory text is important and may be the best evidence of legislative
intent or purpose).
277. In focusing on the "transparency" allegedly required by article 1105, the tri-
bunal ignored other provisions of NAFTA, particularly chapter 18, which are dedi-
cated to ensuring a transparent investment environment. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra
note 1, ch. 18, 32 I.L.M. at 681-83 (providing generally for mechanisms related to the
publication, notification and administration of laws, i.e., areas generally related to the
establishment of transparent investment regimes); see also id. arts. 509-10, 32 I.L.M. at
360-62 (discussing transparency-enhancing provisions for customs administration); id.
arts. 718-19, 32 I.L.M. at 380-81 (permitting notice and comment for sanitary and phy-
tosanitary measures); id. arts. 909-10, 32 I.L.M. at 389-90 (requiring notice and com-
ment for technical barriers to trade); id. art. 1306, 32 I.L.M. at 655-56 (providing for
transparency in the telecommunications sector); id. arts. 1008-16, 32 I.L.M. at 614-19
(describing government procurement obligations); id. art. 1411, 32 I.L.M. at 659-60
(providing for transparency in the financial services sector).
278. If, however, the Metalclad tribunal had analyzed the standard differently, they
might well have come to the same result. There is authority, for example, that the ob-
ligation to provide a transparent regulatory environment is part of international law.
See, e.g., VTO Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R $ 180-84 (Oct. 12, 1998) (holding that a regu-
latory system lacked transparency and involved "arbitrary discrimination" because
individual applications were denied without notice, an opportunity to be heard, or the
provision of reasoned, written decisions), available at
http://www.worldlii.org/int/caseslWTOAB/1998/6.html; Owners of the Tattler v.
Great Britain, 6 R.I.A.A. 48, 49-51 (1920) (imposing liability due to a lack of clarity in
licensing laws applicable to foreigners). Note that although the result may have been
the same, the reasoning would have been different had the tribunal stayed true to the
text of NAFTA. An analysis more faithful to NAFTA and the member-states' expec-
tations and intentions might have focused on how the failure to provide transparency
was a violation of the treatment obligations under customary international law.
279. The tribunal initially explained that the
absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal construc-
tion permit, as well as the absence of any established practice or procedure
as to the manner of handling applications for a municipal construction per-
mit, amounts to a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency
required by NAFTA.
See Metalclad Award, supra note 138, 88. The tribunal referred to questionable
situations such as the failure to provide Metalclad notice of the meeting and the op-




is a positive right that was independent from customary international
law. While the tribunal's reasoning has been subject to different in-
terpretations, z8 2 the most reasonable conclusion is that the Metalclad
tribunal thought the words "including fair and equitable treatment"
should mean "plus [or perhaps and] fair and equitable treatment. 283
These flaws and the over-reliance on transparency came back to haunt
the Metalclad tribunal. The fallout of the award was set by a review-
ing court in Canada,284 but other tribunals followed and expanded the
Metalclad approach 285 until NAFTA's Free Trade Commission issued
an interpretive statement to minimize confusion.
3. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada
Pope & Talbot involved claims related to the verification process
related to the United States-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement. 86
The tribunal took a broader approach to the interpretation of
NAFTA's article 1105 than Metalclad and concluded the regulatory
conduct of the Canadian government violated its obligation to provide
fair and equitable treatment. Noting that the Canadian government
made various, unexplained demands during an antidumping verifica-
tion,287 the tribunal explained that Canada's "imperious insistence on
having its way" could not be explained by rational legal reasoning. 8
Although this emphasis suggests that article 1105 would be limited to
issues of procedural fairness, the breadth of the tribunal's reasoning
indicates otherwise. Put simply, Pope & Talbot concluded that the
"fair and equitable treatment" standard in article 1105 was not a con-
cept subsumed within a Sovereign's obligations to provide minimum
standards of treatment under international law; rather, it was an "ad-
ditive" standard in addition to minimum guarantees under interna-
tional law.289 The tribunal came to this conclusion after an analysis of
282. Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration, supra note 267, at 411-12.
283. See id. (noting that the tribunal never fully explained how it understood the
"fair and equitable" treatment standard, suggesting that there are a variety of inter-
pretations to the tribunal's award, but arguing that the tribunal concluded that treat-
ment in accordance with international law includes fair and equitable treatment). The
difficulty with Mr. Weiler's analysis is that, if the tribunal had meant to suggest this, it
could have done so. See infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text (describing the ba-
sis for finding that transparency is part of customary international law).
284. See generally Metalclad Judgment, supra note 139.
285. See infra Part IV.C.3 and accompanying text (describing the even more expan-
sive reasoning of the Pope & Talbot tribunal).
286. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, TT 6-7 (2001) (UNCITRAL) [hereinafter Pope
& Talbot Award], at http://www.naftalaw.org.
287. Id. 9 195.
288. Id. T1 173. At least one commentator has summarized this course of conduct as
actions by a Canadian official that "the tribunal appeared to surmise.., possibly con-
stituted a form of retaliation or punishment for the investor having brought its case."
See Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration, supra note 267, at 416.
289. Pope & Talbot Award, supra note 286, TT 105-18. The tribunal came to this
conclusion even though neither of the parties argued that "fair and equitable treat-
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various BITs, which typically require fair and equitable treatment in
addition to whatever treatment is required by international law, 29° but
it ignored the text of other BITs that were textually distinct from
NAFTA. 291 Even though its approach deprives other words in article
1105 of meaning,292 the tribunal suggested that NAFTA's text actually
demanded finding an "additive" right.293 The tribunal explained that
NAFTA parties could not possibly have intended to agree to a mini-
mum standard of treatment that would provide investors in BITs with
better treatment than in BITs in which NAFTA parties were mem-
bers.294 By focusing on more nebulous concepts of purpose and intent
and remedying perceived absurdities,295 Pope & Talbot ran afoul of
NAFTA's text and failed to provide interpretive determinacy to
NAFTA. Moreover, in its rejection of the approach of S.D. Myers, it
created incoherence within the jurisprudence and did little to stabilize
the legitimate expectations of investors and Sovereigns.
4. The Interpretive Note
In light of these divergent approaches, some coherence was re-
quired for the system to retain its integrity. As a result, the three
NAFTA countries used their powers under NAFTA to issue an Inter-
pretive Note to declare that article 1105 only encompassed the mini-
mum standard of treatment in customary international law.296 Al-
ment" was additive. Although the parties differed as to the implications, they both
agreed that, for the purposes of article 1105, the concept of fair and equitable treat-
ment is subsumed within the concept of international law. Id. $$ 106-08.
290. Id. $$ 110-16.
291. NAFTA requires treatment in accordance with international law "including
fair and equitable treatment." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639-40.
Other investment treaties, including those cited by the Pope & Talbot tribunal, do not
define the right in that manner. Rather, they have a free standing right, which is not
linked to international law. See Pope & Talbot Award, supra note 286, 91 111 (quoting
the U.S. model bilateral investment treaty from 1987, which requires that "invest-
ments shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment").
292. Specifically, this approach negates the word "including." NAFTA, supra note
1, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639-40.
293. Pope & Talbot Award, supra note 286, 91 113. The Pope & Talbot tribunal was
bold enough even to suggest that the S.D. Myers tribunal had not conducted a textu-
ally faithful analysis of NAFTA and for this reason declined to be bound by that deci-
sion's reasoning. Id. T 113 n.108.
294. Id. 1 110-11, 115-18.
295. Id. 91 115-16, 118 (focusing on NAFTA's "object and purpose," NAFTA's
"aim," and the desire to avoid "egregiously unfair" and a "patently absurd result").
296. NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, at § B (July 31, 2001), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-
Interpr-en.asp. The notes specifically state that:
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum stan-
dard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be af-
forded to investments of investors of another Party.
2. The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and se-
curity' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is re-
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though some commentators 297 and jurists29s have expressed concern
about the legitimacy of the Interpretive Notes, later NAFTA tribunals
have applied article 1105 (albeit sometimes reluctantly) in a more uni-
form fashion.2 99 This is an unusual remedy permitted by NAFTA's
text; Sovereigns do not typically step in and rectify areas of inconsis-
tency.
V. RECONSIDERING INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
As a result of the increased number of cases generally, and the in-
creasing number of inconsistent decisions, there is a rising concern
about whether the current ad hoc arbitration framework is the appro-
priate manner of resolving treaty disputes.3" In the past, duplicate ar-
bitrations were rarely encountered and were not a principal point of
interest to commentators.3"1 This is no longer the case. The Secretary
General of ICSID has noted that the "scope for inconsistent decisions
in regard to essentially the same issues is obvious"3 2 and the SGS
awards demonstrate that new waves of inconsistent decisions are alive
and well-not just for NAFTA, °3 but also for other investment trea-
quired by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
of aliens.
Id.
297. Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 48-49, 78-79; Weiler, Coming Along, su-
pra note 42, at 259-60; Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitrations, supra note 267, at
417,434.
298. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on Damages, 1$ 8-24 (2002) (criticizing the
choices made by the Free Trade Commission in the Interpretive Note and questioning
the binding nature of the statements), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
299. See ADF Group Inc. v. United States, Award of the Tribunal, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ADF-award.pdf; Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United
States, Final Award (2002), at http://www.naftalaw.org. For a thorough discussion of
an analysis of the application of article 1105 before and after the Interpretive Note in
the context of Pope & Talbot, please refer to David A. Gantz's article on this subject.
David A. Gantz, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration Tribunal, 2000-2002, 97 Am. J. Int'l
L. 937 (2003).
300. See, e.g., Dhooge, supra note 87, at 282-89.
301. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Annulment of ICSID Awards in Contract and
Treaty Arbitrations: Are There Differences?, in Annulment of ICSID Awards 189, 219
(Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds., 2004) (noting that inconsistent decisions
are a "new scenario" and that "[s]uch inconsistencies run counter to the uniform de-
velopment of the law [and that t]here is a risk that inconsistent decisions discredit the
system" and Sovereigns, investors, and the public may lose confidence in the dispute
resolution mechanism); Stanislaw Soltysinski & Marcin Olechowshi, Observations on
the Svea Court of Appeal Judgment, in Stockholm Arb. Rep., 2003, at 230, at
http://www.sccinstitute.com/upload/shared-files/artiklar/tjeckiska-republiken.pdf;.
302. Parra, Provisions, supra note 21, at 352.
303. See Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 49 (suggesting that there are a variety
of allegations regarding the legitimacy of certain NAFTA decisions); see also Fredrick
M. Abbott, The Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the
Law and the Boundaries of North American Integration, 23 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L.
Rev. 303, 308 (2000) (describing NAFTA's potential legitimacy problem); Afilalo, su-
pra note 1, at 52 (stating that NAFTA "suffers from a crisis of legitimacy"); Ari
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ties.3°4 As lawyers continue to advise clients to structure investments
in a manner where they can simultaneously use multiple investment
treaties for the same dispute, this issue will increase in prominence. In
the future, there may not just be "twin" inconsistent decisions-there
might well be triplets and quadruplets. °5
Prominent practitioners have noted that "[a]ny system where dia-
metrically opposed decisions can legally coexist cannot last long. It
shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness. '36 Given that issues of le-
gitimacy cut to the heart of the utility of using arbitration, the litera-
ture must address the concerns underlying the legitimacy crisis in a
meaningful way. Otherwise, conflicting awards based upon identical
facts and/or identically worded investment treaty provisions will be a
threat to the international legal order and the continued existence of
investment treaties.37 This Article therefore considers factors affect-
ing legitimacy and provides a framework for analyzing previous sug-
gestions for reforms and evaluates how to improve the current system
and promote the just administration of the law.
Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter
11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 27 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 51, 53-54
(2004) (suggesting NAFTA suffers from a lack of legitimacy); Stephen Clarkson, Sys-
temic or Surgical?: Possible Cures for NAFTA's Investor-State Dispute Process, 36
Can. Bus. L.J. 368, 369 (2002) (describing NAFTA's "low legitimacy and high poten-
tial for continuing controversy"); Shapren, supra note 16, at 325 (describing how
NAFTA has "fail[edl to provide a reliable framework"); Ferguson, supra note 87, at
505 (noting the absence of precedent in NAFTA and suggesting this "lack of certainty
for future regulators" is inappropriate). But see Godshall, supra note 268 (stating that
NAFTA is "on the brink of losing its legitimacy").
304. See Beauvais, supra note 8, at 263 (suggesting that, as the opportunity to re-
view investment treaty awards is limited, "there is little prospect of reviewing arbi-
trary, erroneous or inconsistent decisions").
305. Charles N. Brower, Charles N. Brower Delivers Keynote Address at Premier
Arbitration Conference, 13 World Arb. & Mediation Rep. 270 (2002); Charles N.
Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacy, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at B9 [hereinafter Judge
Brower]. In May 2004, there was also a recent DC Bar Conference entitled, Why
Your Arbitration Agreement Matters: Anticipating Disputes in International Transac-
tions, which discussed arbitration issues that must be considered by transactional law-
yers. See E-mail from Mark Kantor, to Robert Pritchard (July 6, 2004) (on file with
author).
306. See Goldhaber, Wanted, supra note 5 (quoting Nigel Blackaby of Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer's Paris office).
307. This may be a reason for Sovereigns to issue a notice of termination and end
an investment treaty pursuant to a sunset provision. See supra note 31 and accompa-
nying text (explaining that most investment treaties are only initially valid for ten
years but can be extended); see also Juliette Kerr, Ecuador's Procurator-General Says
Most Oil Companies Violated Contracts, World Markets Analysis, Sept. 22, 2004 (not-
ing that the Republic of Ecuador has considered suspending or nullifying its invest-
ment treaties in response to unfavorable decisions).
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A. The Indicators of Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration
The rule of law is essential to those participating in the global econ-
omy." 8 Without the clarity and consistency of both the rules of law
and their application, there is a detrimental impact upon those gov-
erned by the rules and their willingness and ability to adhere to such
rules, which can lead to a crisis of legitimacy.3 9 Legitimacy depends
in large part upon factors such as determinacy and coherence, which
can in turn beget predictability and reliability.3"" Related concepts
such as justice, fairness, accountability, representation, correct use of
procedure, and opportunities for review also impact conceptions of
legitimacy.31' When these factors are absent individuals, companies
and governments cannot anticipate how to comply with the law and
plan their conduct accordingly, thereby undermining legitimacy.
Determinacy involves using rules to convey clear and transparent
expectations.312 In the context of investment arbitration, this means
that investors' rights and Sovereigns' obligations are expressly spelled
out. Many rules, however, are inevitably indeterminate as they cannot
feasibly predict, in advance, all the situations to which the rule might
possibly apply. Investment treaties, like other types of rules, often
enumerate a vague standard in an effort to use discretion to promote
fairness or facilitate agreement. There are costs to this approach,
however, as indeterminate rules obscure the boundaries of appropri-
ate conduct and also facilitate the creation of justifications for non-
308. Ren6 Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Jus-
tice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 229, 231.
309. See James Willard Hurst, Problems of Legitimacy in the Contemporary Legal
Order, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 224, 224 (1971) (suggesting that "[l]egitimacy means simply
the grounds on which at any given time most of the people accept, or are willing to
use, the legal order as they find it" and that it is premised upon the idea that "law
should be good for, and justly serve, the people who live within it"); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and
Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 819, 830-31 (2002) (explaining that le-
gitimacy justifies the moral authority of the existing order and any substantial chal-
lenge to legitimacy threatens the capacity to govern).
310. See Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 49 (1990)
[hereinafter Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy] (explaining that the indicators
of rule legitimacy in international law are determinacy, symbolic validation, coher-
ence, and adherence); see also Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 52-86 (describing
Professor Franck's approach to legitimacy and using it as a useful prism for analyzing
shortcomings in the NAFTA context). Professor Thomas Franck is unrelated to the
author of this Article.
311. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security
Council, 87 Am. J. Int'l L. 552, 560-61 (1993); G.C.A. Junne, International Organiza-
tions in a Period of Globalization: New (Problems of) Legitimacy, in The Legitimacy
of International Organisations 189, 191, 195 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskannen
eds., 2001).
312. Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 30 (1995)
[hereinafter Thomas Franck, Fairness]. Determinacy has the same qualities of trans-
parency and is synonymous with clarity. Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy,
supra note 310, at 52.
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compliance.313 Such a difficulty raises concerns about the effective-
ness and correctness of the rules and undermines the legitimacy of the
standard.
Even if standards in investment treaties have low textual clarity,
3 14
they are not per se illegitimate. By having an "authority recognized as
legitimate" to provide clarification on the meaning and application of
rules, interpretation can rectify textual indeterminacy. The success of
such "interpretive determinacy," however, depends upon who does
the interpretation, their authority to interpret, and the coherence of
the decisions they reach.315 The issue facing investment arbitration is
whether a neutral arbitral tribunal composed of private individuals,
such as public international law experts who may be chosen by the
parties, can and actually does apply investment rights in a correct and
coherent manner.
Coherence is another key element of legitimacy; it requires consis-
tency of interpretation and application of rules in order to promote
perceptions of fairness and justice.3 16 As aptly explained by Professor
Thomas Franck, "[a] rule is coherent when its application treats like
cases alike when the rule relates in a principled fashion to other rules
in the same system. Consistency requires that a rule, whatever its con-
tent, be applied uniformly in every 'similar' or 'applicable' in-
stance." '317 Even the different application of the same rule does not
necessarily undermine legitimacy "as long as the inconsistencies can
be explained to the satisfaction of the community by a justifiable (i.e.
principled) distinction."3 ' This means that incoherence can be clari-
fied on a case-by-case basis or by rationally connecting meaning with
other rules."9 In this manner, facially inconsistent decisions can be-
come coherent and minimize perceived injustice and unfairness.
Establishing such a coherent jurisprudence is difficult, however,
with new and relatively untested standards. When there are a mini-
mal number of cases and it is a challenge to find other appropriate ar-
eas of developed jurisprudence from which to draw, decisions are of-
ten seen as more "lawless.""32 This challenge is relevant in investment
313. Thomas Franck, Fairness, supra note 312, at 31; Thomas Franck, The Power of
Legitimacy, supra note 310, at 53-54.
314. For example, one might suggest that the standard of "fair and equitable treat-
ment" lacks textual clarity. See infra note 430 and accompanying text (describing
Vandevelde's comments about the need to interpret the standard of fair and equitable
treatment). But see Singapore FTA, supra note 6, art. 15.5 (defining the term "fair and
equitable" more precisely); Amended U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, art. 5 (same).
315. Thomas Franck, Fairness, supra note 312, at 33-34Thomas Franck, The Power
of Legitimacy, supra note 310, at 61, 82.
316. Thomas Franck, Fairness, supra note 312, at 33, 38-41.
317. Id. at 38.
318. Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy, supra note 310, at 163.
319. Id. at 163, 167, 180.
320. Id. at 50-66; Thomas Franck, Fairness, supra note 312, at 30-34; see also
Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 63-66; Dodge, supra note 252, at 572.
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treaty arbitration where new standards are being applied for the first
time, clever investors are testing the boundaries of their rights, and
arbitrators do not have the luxury of drawing upon a mature jurispru-
dence.321 Perhaps this explains why Charlie Brower, a former judge
on the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, has expressed the need for "a hier-
archy of decisional instances" and "comparative uniformity of deci-
sions" in investment arbitration."' Once investment arbitration juris-
prudence has an opportunity to develop, and cases define parameters
regularly and consistently, indeterminate rules can move past the ini-
tial "growing pains" to gain greater coherence.3 23 The resulting trans-
parency of rules and fairness of application can then minimize the ten-
sions related to perceived unfairness between investors, who have
reasonable expectations of investment stability, and Sovereigns, who
have obligations to their nationals and expectations about the extent
of their bargained-for treaty obligations.324 Such transparency will
also promote legitimacy by enhancing the perception that tribunals
render decisions according to the correct procedures and thereby
promote just and honest decision making. 2 1
Thus far, however, the lack of determinacy and coherence in treaty
arbitration has raised the specter of a legitimacy crisis. There are a
variety of institutions that complain about particular aspects of the in-
vestment treaty process, including stated concerns about the transpar-
ency and privacy of the decision-making process, which lead to a lack
of representation,326 the "chilling effect" upon important local regula-
tion127 and subsequent impact on sovereignty,3 28 and the supposed bias
321. Tribunals have, however, been able to draw on case law from the World Trade
Organization and the International Court of Justice in analyzing certain international
law standards. This has the benefit of "adherence" to established international and
institutional norms and can enhance the legitimacy of investment arbitration. Thomas
Franck, Fairness, supra note 312, at 41-46.
322. See Judge Brower, supra note 305.
323. See Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy, supra note 310, at 62.
324. Thomas Franck Fairness supra note 312, at 440-41.
325. Caron, supra note 311, at 561; Junne, supra note 311, at 191.
326. Lerner, supra note 308, at 285; see also Gantz, Potential Conflicts, supra note
11.
327. Stuart G. Gross, Note, Inordinate Chill: Bits, Non-NAFTA MITS, and Host-
State Regulatory Freedom-An Indonesian Case Study, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 893, 899
(2003); see also Dhooge, supra note 87, at 281; Mann, supra note 74, at 34.
328. As a result of certain NAFTA cases, some commentators have articulated
concerns about U.S. sovereignty. In particular, there have been concerns that foreign
corporations can challenge domestic legislation and executive orders can be "second
guessed" by arbitrators thus "depriving domestic governments of the right to govern
in the way that they see fit." Dhooge, supra note 87, at 273-78, 283; Shapren, supra
note 16, at 347; see also Jones, supra note 9, at 545 (suggesting that powerful foreign
investors "may have the opportunity to hold governments hostage" by threatening
litigation with an intent to influence government decision making); Shapren, supra
note 16, at 327 (noting the concern that foreign investors are granted rights above
domestic citizens and that some aspects of NAFTA may cause countries to give up
their sovereignty). But see Price, NAFTA, supra note 55, at 113 (explaining that al-
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of arbitrators.329 Many of these concerns are symptoms of a larger
problem: the ability to determine with certainty the respective rights
and obligations of investors and Sovereigns in a given situation. As
suggested by certain aspects of the Lauder, SGS, and NAFTA cases,
there is not yet a simple formula for immediately distinguishing be-
tween compensable and non-compensable regulatory activities.3" So
given this steep learning curve, why bother to invest in investment ar-
bitration?
Despite the "growing pains," the literature acknowledges that using
arbitral tribunals to resolve investment disputes has been an impor-
tant factor in fostering foreign investment, encouraging transfers of
capital and know-how exchanges, and providing a basis for the long-
term benefits of investors and sovereigns alike.3 But even champions
of investment arbitration suggest that improvements could usefully be
made.332 This Article therefore turns to the various suggestions which
have been made by commentators, politicians, and academics who
have previously considered mechanisms to address concerns about le-
gitimacy in the current system.
B. Previous Suggestions for Reform
In the past, the academic literature has considered mechanisms for
reform on an ad hoc basis. This Article, however, synthesizes a
framework for analyzing those previous suggestions for reforming in-
vestment treaty arbitration. Previous suggestions tend to fall into four
different categories. "Legislators" recommend changes to the text of
investment treaties to create more specifically defined rights in hopes
of capping arbitral discretion and providing greater clarity. "Barrier
Builders" wish to impose pre-conditions to arbitration and minimize
though treaties such as NAFTA restrict sovereignty, they also check excessive unilat-
eral exercises of sovereignty, and thus prevent violations of public international law
standards); Laird, supra note 72, at 225-26 (explaining that NAFTA, in reality, has
had very little impact on national sovereignty although it remains "a relatively lim-
ited, although powerful in the correct circumstances, legal remedy").
329. See Lerner, supra note 308, at 282-83; see also Beauvais, supra note 8, at 262-
63 (arguing that arbitrators are neither independent nor accountable and thus judicial
legitimacy is sacrificed). Despite Professor Lerner's concerns regarding arbitrator
bias, in practice, this has minimal impact upon the outcome. Investment treaty arbi-
trators are obligated to be independent and impartial. See infra notes 361, 365-76 and
accompanying text. Should arbitrator bias prove to be a problem, there are mecha-
nisms in place to correct this error, including annulment proceedings, vacatur at the
seat of arbitration, enforcement proceedings, and a direct suit against the arbitrator
for damages. See generally Franck, supra note 49.
330. Dhooge, supra note 87, at 282.
331. See Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 394, 396; Coe, Taking Stock, supra note
1, at 1385-86; Price, NAFTA, supra note 55, at 114.
332. See Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 366 (suggesting the system could benefit
from "minor tinkering"); Coe I, supra note 1, at 1385-86 (explaining that dispute reso-




investors' access. "Arbitration Rejecters" believe that arbitration is
simply the incorrect forum for the resolution of investment treaty dis-
putes and advocate the use of alternative public institutions to resolve
investment disputes. Finally, "Safeguard Builders" suggest structural
modifications to the arbitration mechanism to promote legitimacy.
This Article will address each one of these categories in turn.
1. The Legislative Approach
"Legislative" reformers advocate reducing inconsistency and pro-
moting legitimacy by providing textual certainty in investment trea-
ties. While some commentators suggest more specific enumeration of
investors' substantive rights is required,333 others recommend com-
pletely deleting certain unclear terms.334 These commentators accept
that arbitration is an appropriate forum for interpreting investment
rights, but they prefer to give arbitrators specific guidance about the
meaning and scope of governmental obligations. Both categories of
suggestions are based upon the premise that the lack of textual deter-
minacy in investment treaties is a mischief that makes the application
of the rule in arbitration illegitimate.335
Legislative reformers are correct that Sovereigns could more pre-
cisely define substantive rights if they wished to further enhance tex-
tual determinacy. To some extent, this is already happening when
Sovereigns negotiate investment treaties. For example, many invest-
ment treaties prohibit "discrimination," but then go on to define "dis-
crimination" so as to give guidance about the type of governmental
distinctions that are offensive as a matter of public international
law.336 Likewise, given the confusions thus far about the interpreta-
333. See Wiltse, supra note 16, at 1184-87 (suggesting that the best way to deal with
the ambiguities arising from broadly defined or ill defined terms is to amend
NAFTA's substantive rights and definitions); Gross, supra note 327, at 956 (arguing
that (1) governments should "seek to clarify provisions in each treaty concerning ex-
propriation, fair and equitable treatment, and investment definitions ... through ne-
gotiated amendment" and (2) there should be an amendment of "the definition of a
qualified investment ... to include only those investments which are valid as matter of
host-country law" and that BITs "should be clarified so as to make provision of pro-
tection ... explicitly subject to both parties' consent"); see also Mann & von Moltke,
NAFTA's Chapter 11, supra note 87, at 7 (expressing concern about the "expansive
definitions" in NAFTA).
334. See Godshall, supra note 268, at 300 (suggesting elimination of NAFTA's
"tantamount to expropriation" standard because of its lack of determinacy).
335. Julie A. Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11: The Challenge of Private Party Par-
ticipation, J. Int'l Arb., June 1999, at 3 (explaining that the "lack of clarity in Chapter
11 prevents the establishment of a secure and stable framework for investments"); see
also Ferguson, supra note 87, at 503 (explaining that the "vague language" of NAFTA
allows investors to "abuse" the dispute resolution process). But see Beauvais, supra
note 8, at 287-88 (suggesting that modification of NAFTA's substantive legal stan-
dards is inappropriate, particularly as NAFTA parties are unlikely to pursue
changes).
336. U.S.-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 153, arts. 1(1)(f), 2(2)(b) (prohibiting
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tion of phrases such as "fair and equitable treatment," in the latest
U.S. Model BIT, the United States has taken the bold step of defining
standards more precisely.337 The renegotiation of thousands of in-
vestment treaties would obviously be a mammoth undertaking and,
therefore, is an impractical solution at present.338 The more realistic
option is, in the future, to provide particularized guidance about the
meaning of ambiguous rights, such as "fair and equitable treatment"
and the so-called "umbrella clause," which have resulted in inconsis-
tent arbitral awards.
Further definition of substantive rights in investment treaties is only
a partial solution, however.339 Overly specific definitions will sacrifice
the flexibility and equity that exists in the present system and may also
prematurely stunt the development of new areas of law. Perhaps
more importantly, in an attempt to cover every possible scenario,
over-definition can create absurd results; instead of being a "cure" to
a legitimacy crisis, this can defeat the purpose and intent of the rule
and create further difficulties. Even if the provisions of investment
treaties are "broad," "vague," or "uncertain,""34 this does not make
the standards illegitimate. Coherent interpretation of the rights pro-
motes justice and legitimacy. While it may be useful to provide fur-
ther textual definition to investment rights, if treaty arbitration is al-
lowed to continue its evolution, interpretive determinacy ultimately
will have a greater impact on the scope of rights and will infuse poten-
tially ambiguous textual standards with enhanced clarity.
2. The Barrier Building Approach
A second set of commentators appear to accept arbitration as a le-
gitimate dispute resolution mechanism, but dislike how investors use
it. These commentators generally advocate the creation of precondi-
tions to arbitration, which impose de facto barriers to bringing
discriminatory treatment and providing a definition of "nondiscriminatory"). But see
Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Feb. 18,
2000, Thail.-Zimb., art. 2(2) (prohibiting only the impairment of investment by "un-
reasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory measures" but failing to define these terms
further), at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/thailand-zimbabwe.pdf.
337. Amended U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, art. 5.
338. When investment treaties come up for renewal, however, this may be an ap-
propriate junction for Sovereigns to consider revising the scope and language of the
substantive rights provided to investors.
339. This approach also does not address the legitimacy of the arbitration mecha-
nism itself.
340. For instance, in the context of NAFTA, various commentators have noted that
provisions of Chapter 11 leave abundant room for interpretation. See Afilalo, supra
note 1, at 4; Dhooge, supra note 87, at 283; Price, NAFTA, supra note 55, at 109; So-
loway, supra note 335, at 13; see also Bernardo M. Cremades & David J.A. Cairns,
The Brave New World of Global Arbitration, 3 J. World Invest. 173, 194-95 (2002)
(looking at the standard for expropriation and noting how the breadth of the standard
creates uncertainty).
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claims-particularly claims with public health or environmental impli-
cations.34 The "barrier building" reforms run across a broad gamut
but usually require investors to obtain some kind of governmental ap-
proval. At the more flexible end of the spectrum, investors would be
required to submit their dispute to preliminary governmental exami-
nation and request for approval to an investor's own government.
This approach seems to have found some champions in Congress, no-
tably former presidential candidate John Kerry.342 A tougher ap-
proach is to have government ministers serve as "gatekeepers." This
approach gives more than one government an opportunity to reject an
investor's claim, even if it might otherwise be colorable as a matter of
law.343 An even more rigorous approach involves the wholesale rejec-
tion of investor-Sovereign dispute resolution,3" and a return to the old
mechanism where investment disputes were brought on a Govern-
ment-to-Government ("G2G") basis.345 These recommendations are
341. See Wiltse, supra note 16, at 1188 (describing proposed procedural barriers to
block unmeritorious claims); Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute
Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 113, 166 (1999) (suggesting, for claims involving a government's right to
legislate public health issues, the creation of a governmental or non-governmental
mechanism capable of preventing unmeritorious claims); see also Mann & von
Moltke, NAFTA's Chapter 11, supra note 87, at 7 (expressing concern at investors'
"unfettered ability" to initiate claims under investment treaties).
342. Some politicians have suggested to the Bush Administration that the govern-
ment screen requests for arbitration, while others have urged that the government re-
ject such a screening procedure. Letter from Max Baucus (D-Mont.), Senate Finance
Committee Chairman, to Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative (Mar. 26, 2002),
reprinted in Baucus Welcomes Options Administration Is Considering on Investor-
State Disputes, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 529 (Jan. 2, 2003). But see 148 Cong.
Rec. S4298-02 (daily ed. May 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (stating that
"[c]ritics of the investment provisions insist that the investor-State dispute settlement
process has somehow run amok. Not true"); Grassley Urges Zoellick to Reject Gov-
ernment Screening for Investor Suits, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Apr. 1, 2002, available
at http://www.bna.com. Senator John Kerry proposed amendments to the Andean
Trade Preferences Act which would require investors to seek governmental approval
to bring arbitrations and give Sovereigns the right to prohibit arbitration where claims
lack "legal merit." S.A. 3430, 107th Cong., 148 Cong. Rec. S4505-93 (2002) (Kerry
Amendment to H.R. 3009).
343. This might mean, for example, that government officials from the two Sover-
eigns would first be given an opportunity to consider an investment dispute and, if
both parties determine there is no violation, the investor is prevented from bringing a
claim. Beauvais, supra note 8, at 294; Ferguson, supra note 87, at 518-19; Godshall,
supra note 268, at 296-97.
344. At first blush, this might actually appear to be an "arbitration rejecter" posi-
tion that would prefer a return to a public forum. As a practical matter, however,
G2G dispute resolution creates barriers to an investor's pursuit of its claim for dam-
ages. The political approvals necessary for a Sovereign to advocate on its investor's
behalf involve a cumbersome process and are rarely obtained. See supra notes 54-57
and accompanying text (describing the old ICJ process of dispute resolution).
345. See Lerner, supra note 308, at 289-90 (suggesting that, in denial of justice cases
brought under NAFTA, disputes be resolved under chapter 20, which permits the
resolution of G2G disputes). Some commentators recommend a wholesale return to
G2G dispute resolution, while others suggest that perhaps only categories of claims
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designed to redress concerns about the mischief caused by investors
bringing unmeritorious claims, which arguably have a detrimental im-
pact on sovereignty and a Sovereign's ability to pass legislation affect-
ing their citizen's health, safety, and public morals.346 This concern is
driven, in part, by concerns about determinacy and coherency-
namely, a Sovereign having advance notice of the potential scope of
their legitimate regulatory authority.
The "cure" for this supposed "ill," however, neither stands up to
scrutiny nor addresses the core problem it wishes to solve. Investment
treaties do not trespass unnecessarily on sovereignty. Sovereigns
choose to enter into investment treaties.347 In order to obtain the
benefits arising from investment treaties, Sovereigns negotiate treaties
and determine what rights they will cede and the responsibilities they
will undertake. If Sovereigns wish to cede less sovereignty, Sover-
eigns should do so during negotiation. Moreover, investment treaties
need not apply wholesale, and sensitive legislative areas are often
carved out from the substantive protections provided by BITs.34 s In-
vestment treaties do not prevent Sovereigns from passing legislation
should be subject to G2G dispute resolution. Compare Daniel R. Loritz, Corporate
Predators Attack Environmental Regulations: It's Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed Un-
der NAFTA's Chapter 11, 22 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 533, 548 (2000) (sug-
gesting the wholesale abandonment of investor-to-state arbitration and a return to
G2G arbitration), with Beauvais, supra note 8, at 294 (arguing for the "radical" solu-
tion of only permitting "certain classes of claims, such as those raising serious public
policy issues" to be resolved in a G2G setting).
346. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 87, at 519 (suggesting that the procedural
changes would decrease investor's strategic use and abuse of NAFTA where public
policy is concerned).
347. See Lawrence L. Herman, Settlement of International Trade Disputes-
Challenges to Sovereignty-A Canadian Perspective, 24 Can.-U.S. L.J. 121, 122 (1998)
(stating that "there is no doubt that, as treaty parties, the contracting States have ac-
cepted international obligations that bind them contractually and thus affect their tra-
ditional freedom of action"); see also S.S. Wimbledon (U.K., Fr., Italy & Japan v.
Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 (June 28) (concluding a treaty is not an aban-
donment of sovereignty, rather "the right of entering into international engagements
is an attribute of State sovereignty").
348. For example, certain sensitive sectors can be carved out from the substantive
protections granted in treaties. See U.S.-Czech Republic BIT, supra note 153, at an-
nex I (permitting the U.S. to carve out insurance, energy and power production, bank-
ing, and telecommunications from the national treatment guarantees); U.S.-Poland
BIT, supra note 77, at annex I (same); OECD, supra note 12, at 4 (describing the
methods for making exceptions and exemptions in investment treaties); Saamir Elshi-
habi, The Difficulty Behind Securing Sector-Specific Investment Establishment Rights:
The Case of the Energy Charter Treaty, 35 Int'l Law. 137, 137 (2001) (explaining that
many investment treaties outline specific exceptions to national treatment and typi-
cally fall within strategic sectors such as defense, energy, or telecommunications). But
see Gustavo Vega C. & Gilbert R. Winham, The Role of NAFTA Dispute Settlement
in the Management of Canadian, Mexican and U.S. Trade and Investment Relations, 28
Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 651, 682-83 (2002) (noting that even though Mexico exempted ar-
eas from NAFTA, it has nevertheless opened for investment in industries related to
railroads, telecommunications, satellite transmission, as well as banking and petro-
chemicals).
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related to health, safety, and welfare. 349 Rather, these treaties provide
incentives for Sovereigns to act in a manner that does not violate pub-
lic international law and is free from inappropriate expropriation, dis-
crimination, and the like. Should they violate the obligations they
have undertaken, Sovereigns pay compensation for the resulting
harm.
If the real goal of the barrier builders is to discourage frivolous law-
suits, 35° there are other methods to address this concern. International
arbitration tribunals are not shy about making costs orders.3 11 Cost
sanctions can be applied either during a case or after an award to dis-
courage vexatious litigation. 2 As litigation can easily cost more than
U.S. $1 million a year,353 having to pay for two sets of lawyers is a sig-
nificant deterrent to bringing or defending unmeritorious claims.
More importantly, addressing this concern does not require modifica-
tion to the current investment arbitration regime. It requires parties
to investment arbitration to be stalwart in their requests for costs and
for tribunals to become more active in shifting the costs of the arbitra-
tion to those bringing frivolous claims.354
349. In any event, governments often do not even realize that their regulatory con-
duct could contribute to a claim under an investment treaty-thus suggesting that
there is minimal "chilling" impact upon a government's ability and desire to govern.
See Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 18, 2004, at A20 (noting that Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Judge Margaret Marshall was surprised and shocked to learn of the possibility that a
NAFTA tribunal could "review" a state court decision, notwithstanding the fact that
the Mondev case, which challenged a decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, had been decided during the previous year).
350. See Ferguson, supra note 87, at 519; Loritz, supra note 345, at 548.
351. See John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees in International
Commercial Arbitrations, 21 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1 (1999) (describing the various national
laws and institutional rules that permit cost shifting, noting that arbitral tribunals shift
cost but suggesting that clearer rules on cost shifting would permit more effective cost
awards).
352. See ICSID Rules, supra note 83, ch. 5, R. 28 (giving the tribunal wide latitude
on the allocation of costs); ICC Rules, supra note 81, art. 31 (giving the tribunal dis-
cretion to fix the proportion of the costs to be borne by the parties); SCC Rules, supra
note 81, art. 40 (giving tribunals the discretion to allocate costs); UNCITRAL Rules,
supra note 81, art. 40, 15 I.L.M. at 716 (giving tribunals the discretion to allocate costs
between the parties).
353. This is a figure based upon the author's personal experience, but the exact
amount will obviously involve the nature of the dispute, the arguments raised by the
parties, and the adversarial nature of the litigation, for example. See also Peterson, All
Paths, supra note 69, at 18 (noting that ICSID has estimated that the average cost for
arbitrators' fees alone is in the order of U.S. $220,000, reporting that the Czech Re-
public has reported spending U.S. $10 million in legal fees); Blanch Interview, supra
note 66 (explaining that the average minimum yearly cost (including expert and tri-
bunal fees) can be in the order of GBP 700,000 (approximately U.S. $1,280,000) per
year but that costs could go as high as GBP 2,250,000 (approximately U.S. $4,117,000)
per year); Reed Interview, supra note 66 (noting that a case can cost "a minimum of
$1 million to develop" and indicating that they typically cost much more).
354. See infra notes 393-96 and accompanying text (suggesting that the modifica-
tion of institutional rules might also be helpful in this respect to provide additional
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By adding extra limitations upon an investor's right to seek arbitra-
tion,3 55 barrier builders go beyond their specific concerns about sover-
eignty for public health and environmental issues. It is likely that the
vast majority of investment arbitration cases would potentially fall
within the ambit of "public policy 3 56 and be subjected to the political
whims of governmental decision makers-even commercial disputes,
such as the SGS cases-because there are no determinate standards
for establishing what falls within the nebulous construction of "public
policy." Indeed, any definition would be subject to varying interpreta-
tions by recalcitrant Sovereigns looking for opportunities to minimize
their arbitration risk and investors looking to minimize their commer-
cial damage. In practice, the recommendations of barrier builders
turn back the clock fifty years and inhibit investors' direct access to
Sovereigns who have allegedly misbehaved. Prohibitive access barri-
ers are what the investor-state mechanism was designed to avoid, and
suggestions for modification must be tempered with the recollection
of why it was created in the first place. From an economic perspec-
tive, a legal solution that relies upon the screening of a claim's legal,
social, or political merits risks damaging the fabric of cross-border
economic cooperation and wealth creation.3 57 Evolution has occurred
precisely because Sovereigns want to promote foreign investment and
recognize that investors need guarantees of a "fair shake" and other
mechanisms that will stabilize the investment environment and mini-
mize investment risk. If, for example, there was a return to the G2G
mechanism at the ICJ that so many Sovereigns have rejected as an in-
appropriate hurdle, the prosecution of meritorious claims will be in-
guidance). In the context of commercial arbitration, Knull and Rubins suggest certain
mechanisms would minimize abuse of procedure and foster use of arbitration. These
suggestions include: (1) cost shifting and other sanctions to prevent non-meritorious
claims and post-award conduct, (2) security for costs, (3) placing monetary limitations
that would set a minimal amount to trigger the right to appeal, (4) minimizing the
scope of review based upon the issue in dispute, and (5) waiver of judicial remedies to
request vacatur or oppose enforcement. William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins,
Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?,
11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 531, 559-63 (2000). While the first two may well prevent the
bringing of non-meritorious claims, the last three will not necessarily remedy the
harm caused by inconsistent arbitration awards. Generally, they promote finality and
do not provide an opportunity to correct "wrong" decisions or provide explanations
to reconcile inconsistent decisions.
355. Limitations on investors' rights to initiate investment arbitration exist already.
For example, almost all investment treaties require investors to wait through a "cool-
ing off" period, which is designed to promote negotiation and settlement, before they
can initiate arbitration. Further, many treaties have "fork in the road" provisions
which prevent investors from bringing an arbitration claim if they have already initi-
ated a claim before the Sovereign's administrative tribunals and national courts. Reed
et al., supra note 31, at 56-59.
356. See Dhooge, supra note 87, at 284-85 (suggesting that public policy issues
should be "immunized" from investor-state dispute resolution but noting that the
definition of "public policy" would be difficult).
357. Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 400.
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hibited and Sovereigns will be permitted to get away with otherwise
inappropriate conduct. The result is that the law would develop
slowly-if at all-and there would be even fewer opportunities to se-
cure interpretive determinacy and a coherent jurisprudence. Thus,
the solution advocated by barrier creators paradoxically reduces le-
gitimacy and increases perceptions of unfairness.
In any event, investment arbitration is governed by rules and appli-
cable law; when functioning properly, the substantial likelihood is that
the process will not be abused and legitimate regulatory activity will
not be undercut.358 While investors and Sovereigns may wish the sys-
tem to become more determinate and coherent, there are better
methods for achieving these worthwhile goals than by prescribing the
wrong antidote for investment arbitration's present malady.
3. The Rejection of Arbitration and a Return to a Public Forum
Some commentators reject the idea that arbitration is an appropri-
ate way to resolve investment disputes and instead advocate returning
these disputes to a public forum. These suggestions vary across a
broad spectrum. At one end are those who would permit investors to
bring claims-but only before national courts-perhaps similar to the
manner in which issues are resolved in the European Union.359 At the
other end of the spectrum are those who would replace investor-
Sovereign arbitration with a mechanism that would require such
claims to be brought before a permanent judicial body, perhaps akin
to the International Court of Justice.36°
358. Price, Some Observations, supra note 60, at 427-28.
359. See Afilalo, supra note 1, at 9, 45, 51 (arguing that NAFTA involves "a deli-
cate exercise in supranational constitutionalization" and therefore recommending
that original jurisdiction over NAFTA disputes be transferred to national courts,
which operate in conjunction with a permanent NAFTA appellate tribunal); see also
Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora's Box?: Private Remedies for Foreign Investors
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 Willamette J. Int'l L. & Disp. Re-
sol. 77, 122-23 (2000) (suggesting that access to domestic courts could be linked to a
transnational court of appeal).
360. A standing court might resemble the European Court of Justice or the U.S.-
Iran Claims Tribunal. Professor Michael Reisman, focusing primarily upon a perma-
nent bi-national tribunal similar to the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, imagined a court
with a limited and stable membership, capable of promoting the development of a
consistent doctrine, and ensuring transparency of the decision-making process. W.
Michael Reisman, Control Mechanisms in International Dispute Resolution, 2 U.S.-
Mex. L.J. 129 (1994). Reisman suggests a single international arrangement, and notes
that even where there is a complex free trade regime between multiple political
economies, such a tribunal might "provide a degree of consistency to decisions." Id.
However, Professor Reisman also suggests that where there is a complex free trade
regime between multiple political economies, the need for such a tribunal might be
even more greatly enhanced as it would "provide a degree of consistency to deci-
sions." Id. at 136-37; see also Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty
Arbitration, in International Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary
Questions (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2002) (advocating for a permanent judicial
body to decide investment disputes, which should be composed of eminent practitio-
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The critiques from "arbitration rejecters" are twofold. First, they
reject the use of arbitrators as decision makers because they believe
arbitrators are biased,361 unaccountable,362 lack pedigrees that promote
legitimacy363 and, therefore, have little incentive to come to reasoned
decisions. Second, they express concern about the lack of public par-
ticipation in a mechanism that decides public rights. As a result, the
arbitrators and their process cannot be trusted and are, therefore, un-
able to provide a legitimate dispute resolution mechanism. While
ners with an equal balance from capital-importing and capital-exporting states); Lo-
ritz, supra note 345, at 548-59 (suggesting that NAFTA should be re-drafted to pro-
vide for a supranational court to adjudicate all investment disputes); Joint
ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute Settlement et al., Report on Dispute Set-
tlement Procedures in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 Int'l Law. 831,
832-33 (1993) (advocating the creation of a North American Trade Tribunal to adju-
dicate NAFTA disputes but in the context "NAFTA's Terms" and not antidumping
and countervailing duty disputes). The difficulty with these suggestions is that they
place individual agreements in a vacuum and fail to promote interpretive determinacy
and coherence for the same or similar standards in different investment treaties.
361. Ganguly, supra note 341, at 123-24 (suggesting that arbitrators are subject to
influence, which may be the result of a shared nationality, political or economic phi-
losophy, or legal culture, and suggesting that arbitrators in practice are pressured to
advocate for a nominating party). But see ICC Rules supra note 81, arts. 7, 9, 11 (re-
quiring arbitrators to be "independent," permitting the ICC Court to consider arbitra-
tors' "nationality, residence and other relationships with the countries of the parties
or the other arbitrators" before confirming an arbitrator's appointment, and setting
up a mechanism for removing arbitrators for a lack of independence); SCC Rules, su-
pra note 81, arts. 17-19 (requiring arbitrators to be impartial and independent and set-
ting out the framework for disqualifying arbitrators who fail to adhere to this stan-
dard); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 81, arts. 9-12, 15 I.L.M. at 706-07 (providing
that arbitrators must disclose "any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his impartiality or independence" and setting up procedures for challeng-
ing arbitrators who act improperly). ICSID is particularly exacting about the qualifi-
cations and independence of its arbitrators. See ICSID Convention, supra note 88,
arts. 14, 39, 4 I.L.M. at 534, 539 (placing limitations upon arbitrators' nationality, re-
quiring arbitrators to be "of high moral character and recognized competence in the
fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise in-
dependent judgment"); ICSID Rules, supra note 83, ch. 1, art. 9 (permitting disquali-
fication of arbitrators who fail to comply with the requisite standards in the ICSID
Convention).
362. Professor Brower suggests that he is "reliably informed that most arbitrators
expect to receive only a single appointment to serve in Chapter 11 disputes." Brower,
Structure, supra note 128, at 65. However, his comment is confined only to those dis-
putes under NAFTA-and he has not considered the broad number of appointments
that arbitrators can have to resolve under investment treaties more generally (such as
BIT disputes and other MIT disputes). Professor Brower acknowledges that the Hon-
orable Benjamin Civiletti has sat in at least three NAFTA arbitrations. Id. at 65 n.156;
see also infra notes 372-74 and accompanying texts (providing a small excerpt of those
cases involving the repeat appointment of respected international arbitrators).
363. See Abbott, supra note 303, at 308 (describing problems with "private arbitra-
tors ruling on critical questions of public health," but noting that on at least one case
involving an issue of access to justice, one of the arbitrators was Judge Abner Mikva,
characterized as a distinguished jurist by Professor Abbott). The appointment of
someone of Judge Mikva's stature is not an isolated incident, however. See infra notes
371-75 and accompanying text.
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these are important considerations, they do not withstand scrutiny and
also create legitimacy issues with their "cure" to investment arbitra-
tion's ills.
In order to ensure the legitimacy of investment arbitration, decision
makers who will be safeguarding interpretive determinacy must them-
selves be recognized as legitimate.3" There is little merit, however, to
the suggestion that arbitrators should not decide investment disputes
because they are biased and unaccountable decision makers."' There
are specific mechanisms to address difficulties related to arbitrator
bias. In particular, there are rules that allow arbitrators to be chal-
lenged and removed when they are not independent or impartial.366
Arbitrator bias and misconduct are also grounds for challenging arbi-
tration awards.3 67 Further, there are mechanisms that already address
the purported unaccountability of investment arbitrators. First and
foremost, arbitration awards are subject to scrutiny on a variety of
levels by institutions3 68 and courts.3 69 Equally as important is the im-
364. See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text (describing how decision mak-
ers must have an authority recognized as legitimate in order to promote interpretive
determinacy).
365. See Aldo Berlinguer, Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators in Interna-
tional Practice, 6 Am. Rev. Int'l. Arb. 339, 340-41, 373 (1995) (describing the obliga-
tions of neutrality in arbitration); M. Scott Donahey, The Independence and Neutrality
of Arbitrators, J. Int'l Arb., Dec. 1992, at 41 (explaining that in "international arbitra-
tion, a party [appointed] arbitrator may be predisposed to his appointing party's posi-
tion, but must conduct himself and render his decision in good faith and [in] an inde-
pendent manner"); Lord David Hacking, Well, Did You Get the Right Arbitrator, 15
Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. 32, 35 (2000) (explaining that at the forefront of appoint-
ments by international arbitration institutions "is a concentration upon the appoint-
ment of arbitrators who are, and can be seen to be 'neutral' and 'independent' of the
parties"); J.D. Wangelin, Buttressing the Pillars of Arbitration, 19 Mealey's Int'l Arb.
Rep. 27, 28 (2004) (noting that one of the pillars of international arbitration is that
"an impartial, and expert, tribunal or arbitrator will decide the case").
366. Generally, before accepting appointments, arbitrators are required to sign
statements of independence and impartiality. There are also mechanisms in place for
challenging arbitrators should they appear to lack this independence or impartiality.
See supra note 361 (describing the institutional rules requiring independence and im-
partiality and mechanisms for challenge).
367. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that corruption is a base for
annulling awards under the ICSID Convention and that bias may be a ground for va-
catur of an award); see also Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in
an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 449, 464-65
(2004) (explaining that arbitrator bias is a basis for vacating awards in the United
States).
368. When an award is issued by the ICC, including awards under investment trea-
ties, the ICC is required to review awards and can-and often does-subject it to a set
of criticisms that can change aspects of the award. ICC Rules, supra note 81, art. 27;
Eric A. Schwartz, The Resolution of International Commercial Disputes Under the
Auspices of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, 18 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L.
Rev. 719, 723-24 (1995); see also W. Laurence Craig et al., International Chamber of
Commercial Arbitration 377-80, 379 n.4 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the ICC review
process and noting that some have suggested that the ICC court's review powers
could be very broad); Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals
Process, 51 SMU L. Rev. 469, 501 n.142 (1998) (quoting Gary B. Born, International
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pact of the "arbitrator marketplace" where professional credibility
and word-of-mouth recommendations play a role in both the ap-
pointment and re-appointment of arbitrators.3 70 In multi-million and
multi-billion dollar disputes, parties will not accept an arbitrator who
is likely to be challenged for bias, who cannot fully consider the facts
and laws at issue, and who may be incapable of rendering an enforce-
able award. As a result, many of the arbitrators in investment treaty
cases are of the highest international order371 and are distinguished
former judges,17' respected scholars373 and practitioners 37' as well as
Commercial Arbitration in the United States 13 & n. 57 (1994)) (noting the ICC
"[clourt's review is in theory non-substantive, but has sometimes been viewed as
touching on the merits of the decision").
369. As described above, there are a variety of options to requesting annulment,
seeking vacatur, or challenging enforcement. See supra Part III.
370. See Coe, Taking Stock,, supra note 1, at 1437 (describing the hope that arbitra-
tors have of future appointments and the "word-of-mouth" process in the "arbitrator
marketplace"); Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, J. Int'l Arb., Dec. 1997, at 14
(noting that "[w]hatever their motivation, arbitrators tend to want to be reappointed"
and that "It]here is simply no international cabal working to protect mediocre cro-
nies" (emphasis in original)). The world of investment treaty arbitration arbitrators is
quite small, however, and in the context of a larger group of arbitrators (i.e., con-
sumer arbitration in the United States), the same degree of self-regulation may not be
present.
371. See Paulsson, supra note 370, at 19-20 (noting that distinguished individuals
who have left judicial, diplomatic, and other careers have become highly sought after
and well respected arbitrators).
372. For example, Sir Anthony Mason, A.C., K.B.E., is the Former Chief Justice of
the High Court of Australia, has served as an arbitrator in various ICSID and invest-
ment treaty cases. See List of Pending Cases, supra note 108 (noting that Sir Anthony
is the President of the Loewen v. United States tribunal and is sole arbitrator in CDC
plc v. Republic of the Seychelles). Likewise, Judge Stephen Schwebel, former U.S.
Judge of the International Court of Justice, has served on various cases related to in-
vestment treaties. See id. (noting that Judge Schwebel is an arbitrator in the Soufraki
case); see also Stockholm Award, supra note 155; naftalaw.org, Homepage, at
http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) (noting that Judge Schwebel was an
arbitrator in the Mondev case). Another example of an experienced and desired arbi-
trator is Charles N. Brower, a former Judge from the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, who
has been an arbitrator in a variety of cases. See List of Pending Cases, supra note 108
(noting that Judge Brower has been appointed as an arbitrator in the Telef6nica S.A.
case, the ADC Affiliate Limited case, and the Siemens A.G. case); see also nafta-
law.org, Homepage, at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) (noting that
Judge Brower was an arbitrator in the Ethyl case).
373. Professor Prosper Weil is a distinguished French academic at Universit6 de
Droit, d'Economie et de Sciences Sociales de Paris and has served on various invest-
ment treaty cases. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) [here-
inafter List of Concluded Cases] (noting that Professor Weil was on the AES case, the
Goetz case, and the Tokios Tokels case). Likewise, Professor James Richard Craw-
ford is an International Law Chair at Cambridge and has served on various ICSID
tribunals. See id. (noting that Professor Crawford was an arbitrator in the SGS v. Phil-
ippines case, and the JacobsGibb case); see also naftalaw.org, Homepage, at
http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) (noting that Professor Crawford
was an arbitrator in the Mondev case). Professor Andreas Loewenfeld, a professor of
international law at New York University, has also been appointed in several invest-
ment cases. See List of Pending Cases, supra note 108 (describing Professor
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former government officials or others who have worked with interna-
tional organizations.3 75  There is also the possibility that arbitrators
might be liable for inappropriate conduct.3 76 These significant checks
minimize the risk of bias and unaccountability and weigh heavily in
favor of a conclusion that international arbitrators are legitimate deci-
sion makers who can promote justice through the proper application
of law.3 77 Moreover, the unique core benefits of arbitrators such as
flexibility,378 expert decision making,379 speed,38° and enforceability'
would be lost by rejecting arbitration out of hand.
Loewenfeld's appointment in the Corn Products International case, the Fireman's
Fund Insurance case, the Ridgepointe Overseas Developments case, and his role as
President in the Gas Natural SDG, S.A. case).
374. Albert van den Berg is a Dutch arbitration practitioner, who has written ex-
tensively on the subject of international arbitration, and has served on many invest-
ment treaty cases. See List of Pending Cases, supra note 108 (noting that Mr. van den
Berg is arbitrator on the BP America Production case, the Plama Consortium case,
the ADC Affiliate Limited case, the Pan American Energy case, the Enrho St case, the
LG&E Energy case, and has served as President of the Fireman's Fund Insurance
case). Mr. Yves Fortier is a Canadian practitioner who was formerly the president of
the London Court of International Arbitration. See id. (noting Mr. Fortier serves as
an arbitrator in the OKO Osuuspankkien Keskuspankki Oyj case, the Champion
Trading Company case, and the PSEG Global Inc., case, and that he is also President
of a number of cases, including the Cemex Asia Holdings case, the Fraport A G Frank-
furt Airport Services case, and the Soufraki case); see also naftalaw.org, Homepage, at
http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) (noting Mr. Fortier was an arbitra-
tor in the UPS case). Ahmed S. El-Kosheri is a leading Egyptian arbitration practi-
tioner. See List of Pending Cases, supra note 108 (noting that EI-Kosheri was an arbi-
trator in the SGS v. Philippines case, the Goetz case, and the Enrho case); see also
List of Concluded Cases, supra note 373 (noting EI-Kosheri was the president in the
Asian Agricultural Products case).
375. Mr. Daniel M. Price is currently a partner at Sidley Austin Brown & Wood
LLP, but previously served as the USTR Principal Deputy General Counsel, where
he negotiated trade and investment agreements with the former Soviet Union, East-
ern Europe, and Latin America, and was the lead negotiator on investment issues in
the NAFTA. See List of Pending Cases, supra note 108 (noting that Mr. Price is an
arbitrator in the Tokios Tokelks case). Mr. Lloyd N. Cutler was an arbitrator in the
London Award. See supra note 71. Mr. Cutler is currently Senior Counsel at Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP; prior to that, he served as White House Coun-
sel to President Clinton and President Carter, Special Counsel to the President on
Ratification of the Salt II Treaty, the President's Special Representative for Maritime
Resource and Boundary Negotiations with Canada, and was the Senior Consultant,
President's Commission on Strategic Forces.
376. See Franck, supra note 49.
377. In addition, there is a long tradition of decision making in international com-
mercial arbitration. This historical tie and "pedigree" also helps promote legitimacy
as it signals arbitration's overall importance in the current social order. See Thomas
Franck, Fairness, supra note 312, at 34 (explaining that legitimacy is enhanced by
"symbolic validation" which communicates authority and demonstrates that the sym-
bol has a "significant part in the overall system of social order" and therefore continu-
ity of a signal-such as the use of an arbitrator to decide international disputes-
exemplifies the stability of expectation and fairness).
378. Parties can tailor the arbitration mechanism to their particular problem. This
often increases the efficiency of the proceedings, and may yield a level of cost effec-
tiveness not found in court proceedings.
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The second criticism of arbitration rejecters-namely the nonpublic
nature of the current arbitration system-merits more attention and
does, on the surface, suggest that bringing disputes to a public forum
promotes legitimacy. Having national courts decide investment dis-
putes would, in some respects, promote transparency and interpretive
determinacy as decisions would be made in public before a publicly
accountable body.382 Indeed, it would go a long way towards provid-
ing one of the fundamental building blocks of legitimacy- namely
representation, in a fair and democratic manner, of those affected by a
decision.83
Transparency is not necessarily best served by placing disputes in a
traditional "public" forum. There are no international standards of
transparency for national courts, and levels of transparency differ.
For example, unlike the United States, in England and Wales, al-
though court hearings may be public, documents produced during dis-
covery are deemed confidential until relied on in court.3" Given this
divergence, if transparency of the decision-making process is the ulti-
mate objective, expressly defining the parameters of transparency in
an investment treaty's dispute mechanism is a more effective means of
promoting transparency than sending disputes to a variety of national
courts with different standards.385
At first blush, sending disputes to a public body seems likely to en-
hance legitimacy by promoting public scrutiny. Having to sue a Sov-
379. Parties can select arbitrators that may have a particular professional back-
ground or area of expertise that will facilitate the resolution of disputes. It is often
helpful in a technical area to have commercial expertise on a panel so as to minimize
the costs associated with "educating" the tribunal on a complex area of law.
380. Resolving investment disputes through a set of ad hoc tribunals can increase
the speed of decision making as the arbitrator's sole mandate is to resolve the single
dispute for which the ad hoc tribunal was formed. Even though arbitrators may have
busy diaries, they typically have more time to resolve disputes, whereas an entity such
as the ICJ already has a full docket of public international law disputes.
381. Compared with mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation, and ICJ determi-
nation, the ultimate award is relatively enforceable and has limited grounds for at-
tack. See Beauvais, supra note 8, at 254; Rubins, Judicial Review, supra note 92.
382. Afilalo, supra note 1, at 42-43.
383. Junne, supra note 311, at 191, 214-15.
384. Civil P. R. of England and Wales, pt. 31.22; see also Mark L. Tyler et al., Elec-
tronic Discovery Issues: Disclosure Requirements in Britain, Canada & Australia, 65
Def. Couns. J. 208, 212-13 (1998) (noting that the position is similar in Australia and
Canada). The underlying principle is that although the existence of proceedings and
the hearing of proceedings are a public matter, documentation disclosed between the
parties and not produced to the court remains private and outside of the scope of the
public interest in understanding the outcome of those proceedings. See Katsuya Uga,
Development of Concepts of "Transparency" and "Accountability" in Japanese Ad-
ministrative Law, 1 U. Tokyo J.L. & Pol'y 25, 25-26 (2004) (noting the recent devel-
opments regarding transparency in Japanese law).
385. Likewise, if one was to create a treaty that would establish a freestanding
court to decide investment disputes in the first instance, it would be important to de-
fine the scope of transparency properly. See infra Part VI.A (describing how rules
could be modified in investment arbitration to promote transparency).
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ereign in the Sovereign's national court is unlikely to promote legiti-
macy, however, as the integrity of the judges in certain national courts
may create problems with interpretive determinacy where judges are
perceived to be unfair, ineffective, or unable to conduct themselves in
accordance with the correct legal procedures. Specifically, judges may
either be perceived to be biased or may actually favor the Sovereign
over foreign investors. By putting "domestic courts on the front
line, ' investors would be exposed to the vagrancies, eccentricities,
and perceived "home field advantages" -and presumably the local in-
terests-of municipal courts.387 Even in the European Union ("EU")
model, there is a tendency for national courts to support national gov-
ernments; and this is why even the EU has found the national court
model, in isolation, does not work. 88 These perceptions of neutrality
and fairness are the precise concerns that neutral arbitral tribunals
were designed to promote.38
A free standing arbitral court affiliated with the ICJ comes closer to
creating a workable solution. The judges could be a more balanced
and neutral set of decision makers with a stable membership. This so-
lution does not necessarily overcome the difficulties related to the
perceived bias of decision makers, however. Judges, like arbitrators
and all other human beings, carry their personal experiences, cultural
background, and political preferences with them. Political factors
have, for example, been important variables in ICJ cases such as the
"notorious" split opinion concerning the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons or refusal to answer the World Health Organization's re-
quest for an advisory opinion on such weapons.39 Moreover, limiting
the first-instance decision makers to a narrow set of judges has par-
ticular consequences. It eliminates the flexibility of the process that
permits the inclusion of technical expertise,3 91 which facilitates percep-
tions of fairness and permits parties to psychologically "buy-in" to the
arbitration. It also prevents parties from choosing among the unlim-
386. See Dodge, supra note 252, at 577.
387. See Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1417-18.
388. This exemplifies why the European Union approach also requires the creation
of an appellate body. Afilalo, supra note 1, at 41-43.
389. A panel of three neutral individuals, where personal prejudices can be bal-
anced out by fellow co-arbitrators, is surely more legitimate than one national judge.
390. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 265-67 (July 8); Legality of
the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 84 (July 8);
see also Alvarez, supra note 56, at 418-19 (describing a variety of cases in which the
effect of politics contributed to decisions from the ICJ).
391. For example, if the dispute involves the interpretation of a Spanish language
document, a tribunal would benefit by having at least one member of a panel with a
Spanish language background. See Coe, Domestic Control, supra note 132, at 203
n.120 (noting that NAFTA tribunals often have unique expertise, including a consid-
erable background in international arbitration, fluency in a principal language, and
substantial familiarity with the substantive law).
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ited roster of persons, which might otherwise permit a dispute to ad-
vance quickly and could thereby delay the administration of justice.
In addition, returning cases to the suggested public forums also does
not fully address issues regarding coherence. A series of different na-
tional courts is unlikely to provide a uniform jurisprudence, particu-
larly where courts feel a need to support local interests and the judici-
ary may not be familiar with complex issues of international law. This
does little to enhance the legitimacy of the decision-making process
and ensure that disputes are decided in a correct manner. Therefore,
it would still be necessary to have a supervisory body to check discre-
tion, provide an opportunity to redress the inappropriate influence of
local interests, and minimize the appearance of unfairness. Although
having one permanent court consider issues of public international
law would help create a coherent body of investment treaty jurispru-
dence, there is still no check on the court's discretion should the court
simply "get it wrong." Where crucial international rights are at stake
and a large damage award could wreak havoc with a developing na-
tion's economy, "getting it right" is vital.
Ultimately, shifting disputes to a public forum cannot completely
"cure the ill" of a legitimacy crisis-rather, it places the unavoidable
bubble of discretion into another place. If the goals are to improve
transparency, accountability, and uniformity of interpretation-there
are methods of improving the current framework without putting the
discretion only in the hands of national judges or a single, unappeal-
able court.
4. Building Arbitration Safeguards
The final category of reformers have suggested mechanisms to im-
prove the integrity of the arbitration process so as to enhance deter-
minacy, increase jurisprudential coherence, and foster a sense of jus-
tice. At their core, these commentators believe in the utility of
arbitrating disputes in the first instance, but acknowledge the need for
further procedural safeguards. Their suggestions are a mix of preven-
tative and corrective suggestions and, as such, can be used either in
isolation or in conjunction with other measures. One set of commen-
tators makes suggestions to prevent inconsistency and promote le-
gitimacy, namely revising institutional rules. Other commentators of-
fer corrective solutions that could be used to alleviate difficulties from
inconsistent decisions. One set suggests building an internal review
mechanism in each investment treaty so that an institution, such as a
free trade commission, can issue interpretive guidance. Another
group recommends the establishment of an independent appellate
body to review the awards of arbitral tribunals.3"
392. Charlie Brower, a former judge in the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, has en-
dorsed the concept of a supranational appellate body such as the International Court
2005] 1601
1602 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
a. Reform of Arbitration Rules
A few commentators have suggested that arbitration rules be re-
vised to prevent difficulties arising from inconsistent decisions.3 93
Such revisions might relate to ensuring the transparency of the arbi-
tral process or establishing arbitral review bodies to permit review of
investment treaty awards. The theory behind these suggested reforms
is to decrease the possibility of inconsistent decisions and maximize
transparency to minimize concerns regarding fairness.
While this option has received little attention to date, its promise
lies in the practical nature of the innovation. In contrast to other op-
tions, which might require rather cumbersome amendments to in-
vestment treaties or overhaul of major international agreements, the
revision of institutional rules could be accomplished more efficiently.
Specifically, arbitration institutions might consider the utility of add-
ing a specific protocol that would be applicable to investment treaty
arbitration. Institutions could establish working groups drawn from a
broad background of arbitration practitioners, former government of-
ficials, and others to establish a uniform code of "best practices" for
investment arbitration in order to take account of the unique public
implications of investment treaty arbitration.394 These best practices
of Arbitral Awards proposed by luminaries such as the one advocated by former ICJ
Justice Stephen Schwebel. Judge Brower, supra note 305; see also Judge Howard M.
Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st Century: Creating a New International Court for Re-
solving Disputes on the Enforceability of Arbitral Awards, in The Internationalisation
of International Arbitration: The LCIA Centenary Conference 109 (Martin Hunter
et al. eds., 1995) (suggesting an appellate framework that would require creation of a
court to review enforcement of international arbitration awards); Judge Stephen M.
Schwebel, The Creation and Operation of an International Court of Arbitral Awards,
in The Internationalisation of International Arbitration, supra (agreeing with Judge
Holtzmann and setting out a more specific framework for the creation of an Interna-
tional Court of Arbitral Awards). The difficulty with such proposals is that they
would also include analysis of commercial arbitration awards under the New York
Convention. This is inappropriate as the policy concerns in investment treaty arbitra-
tion (i.e., an undeveloped body of case law, public international law rights, and trans-
parency of process on issues that impact public policy) are not as fundamental in the
private commercial setting. Resolving a contractual dispute between two private par-
ties on a commercial issue with a developed and consistent body of case law where
there may be an ongoing commercial relationship to preserve with confidentiality, is
fundamentally different than evaluating a government environmental regulation un-
der a public international law analysis that could potentially impact the economy,
health, and/or welfare of an entire country. These important differences require a
fundamentally different approach when addressing issues impacting investment treaty
arbitration.
393. E-mail from Professor Thomas Walde, to Susan Franck, Noah Rubins, and
Doak Bishop (July 7, 2004) (on file with author) (regarding lecture at British Institute
for International and Comparative Law in May 2004); see also Blackaby, supra note
360, at 362 (suggesting that modifications or supplements to various institutional rules
may be a useful option).
394. This might also help address Sovereigns' concerns about the consistency of
procedure. Legum, supra note 90, at 146-47.
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could, in turn, form the basis for revisions of, or supplements to, cur-
rent institutional rules. For example, ICSID could amend its Addi-
tional Facility Rule 53(3) to indicate that, in the case of investment
treaty arbitration, parties are deemed to consent to publication of the
award.395 Similarly, the ICC or SCC would make minor amendments
to their rules, which might, in the case of investment arbitration, per-
mit amicus participation and publication of awards. In an effort to
provide disincentives for the bringing of unmeritorious claims, institu-
tions might also consider revising cost-shifting rules to give tribunals
clearer direction regarding when cost shifting is appropriate.396
The difficulty of this approach, however, is that the rules may not
apply uniformly across the investment treaty network. Investors usu-
ally receive a choice about where to initiate arbitration; and invest-
ment treaties do not always permit investors to choose institutions
such as the ICC or SCC. If investors were limited to choosing be-
tween UNCITRAL and ICSID arbitration (which is often the case),
instituting the best practice protocols could prove more difficult. The
UNCITRAL Rules have not been modified since 1978, and it could be
a challenge to instigate the political will to revise or supplement those
rules. Further, while ICSID's Additional Facility Rules might fare
somewhat better,3 97 revision of the ICSID Rules would be constrained
by the requirements of the ICSID Convention. The need to revamp
the ICSID Convention may prove to be a real barrier to reform. Al-
though the lack of uniformity would promote choice for investors, the
potential for forum shopping creates perceptions of unfairness and is a
threat to the integrity of the process. Overall, however, it is an area
that merits further consideration and discussion-particularly for re-
395. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 81. Making a similar revision to
the ICSID Arbitration Rules may prove more difficult as it would require an amend-
ment of both the rules and the ICSID Convention. See ICSID Convention, supra note
88, art. 48(5), 4 I.L.M. at 540 (providing that ICSID shall not publish awards without
party consent); ICSID Rules, supra note 83, art. 48(4) (same). Any revision of the
ICSID Rules should distinguish between other types of arbitrations brought by inves-
tors that involved disputes under normal commercial agreements, such as concession
contracts. These cases involve commercial issues and municipal law, and they do not
involve the interpretation of investment treaties and public international law rights.
As such, those policy points which would otherwise weigh in favor of transparency are
absent and, therefore, presumptions of confidentiality should not be displaced. After
this Article was accepted for publication, ICSID published a discussion paper regard-
ing the possible improvements to the framework of ICSID arbitration, which begins
to explore opportunities for addressing issues related to change in ICSID's own rules
to open up the process and provide for greater transparency. ICSID Secretariat, Pos-
sible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 9-11 (Oct. 22, 2004)
(ICSID Discussion Paper), at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/improve-arb.pdf.
396. See Gotanda, supra note 351, at 23.
397. ICSID's Additional Facility procedure is not constrained by the provisions of
the ICSID Convention. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 81, art. 3
(stating that Additional Facility proceedings "are outside the jurisdiction of [ICSID
and] none of the provisions of the [ICSID] Convention shall be applicable to them or
to recommendations, awards, or reports which may be rendered therein").
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forms related to expanding public access and transparency for public
issues.
b. The Free Trade Commission Approach
Another option for promoting legitimacy is to initiate corrective
safeguards to minimize the impact of runaway tribunals. Commenta-
tors have recommended incorporating a built-in control mechanism in
investment treaties-a Free Trade Commission ("FTC") that will is-
sue interpretive guidance about the meaning of investment rights-to
enhance legitimacy that some commentators suggest should be incor-
porated into other investment treaties.398 NAFTA, for example, has a
Free Trade Commission, made up of trade ministers from the three
NAFTA Sovereigns, to issue binding interpretations that become part
of the applicable law.399 This guidance-giving mechanism could ar-
guably aid in the prevention of inconsistent decisions and creation of
coherent doctrine. Using a FTC approach, on a treaty-by-treaty basis,
individual FTCs could quickly4 0 issue binding interpretations to estab-
lish common meanings and a unified jurisprudence.40 1 Such a central-
ized mechanism would reduce incoherency and protect investment
expectations of investors40 2 and regulatory prerogatives of Sover-
eigns. 03 As there may be difficulty in securing the agreement of mul-
tiple Sovereigns to the exact text of an Interpretive Note, as a practi-
cal matter, this mechanism may be used infrequently and is akin to an
''emergency escape route" in areas of acute incoherence.
Despite the promise of this "elixir," commentators suggest the FTC
mechanism is inappropriate. Arguing that NAFTA parties have thus
far used Interpretive Notes in a nonpublic,4" self-serving 45 manner
398. Beauvais, supra note 8, at 287-88; Dhooge, supra note 87, at 285-86; Ferguson,
supra note 87, at 517-18; Loritz, supra note 345, at 547; see also Alvarez & Park, supra
note 14, at 400 (suggesting notes of interpretation may help reconcile the arbitral
process with the public's interest); Herman, supra note 347, at 136 (suggesting the use
of Interpretive Notes in the GATT model could help guide resolution of investment
treaty disputes).
399. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131, 32 I.L.M. at 645.
400. See Loritz, supra note 345, at 548 (explaining that one of the benefits of Inter-
pretive Notes is that they can be established quickly).
401. See Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1410.
402. Corporate investors, for example, need certainty so that they can strategically
formulate their investments on the basis of a clear and reliable regulatory framework
so as to maximize profits and justify their conduct to their shareholders.
403. Government regulators, for example, need certainty about the scope of their
obligations so that they can legislate and regulate in a manner that will not subject the
Sovereign to liability for breach of international law. A lack of coherence and consis-
tency in tribunal awards may lead to a loss of government certainty and public under-
standing of the obligations Sovereigns have undertaken. See, e.g., Mann, supra note
74, at 42.
404. Various commentators have noticed with some dismay that the process of issu-
ing the Interpretive Note was conducted entirely in private without an opportunity for
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that has exceeded their authority,4 6 they suggest that Interpretive
Notes debilitate the system rather than help achieve the desired le-
gitimacy.40 7
The FTC model is useful in the respect that it can promote interpre-
tive determinacy and a coherent body of jurisprudence. By failing to
seek the input by those who are impacted by the Interpretive Note,
however, the NAFTA parties failed to offer fair treatment and repre-
sentation to investors. The critics are correct to note that the manner
in which the mechanism has been used calls into question the legiti-
macy of the FTC's authority and application of its power. As the core
concern appears to be how the FTC exercises its authority, the solu-
tion is to place limits on unfettered discretion to promote the legiti-
mate use of power.40 8 Such limitations might be akin to the checks
and balances in administrative law under the United States Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, which was designed to promote transparency
and prevent arbitrary, capricious acts that amount to an abuse of dis-
cretion.40 9 In practice, this might mean that Sovereigns could render
Interpretive Notes after an opportunity for notice and comment so
that they can consider the impact of their decisions; alternatively, it
might mean that issuing Interpretive Notes could be subject to review
should it amount to an abuse of discretion or an excess of authority.
notice and comment by investors, third parties or international law experts. See
Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 82; Weiler, A Play, supra note 140.
405. See Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 82 (explaining that the interpreta-
tions have been used to "gratify narrow self-interests"); see also Paterson, supra note
359, at 110 (suggesting that the authority of the Free Trade Commission could be "a
route for political interference in tribunal decisions").
406. In particular, the criticism is that the Interpretive Note was an ultra vires
amendment of NAFTA rather than interpretive guidance for tribunals to follow. For
example, commentators and arbitrators have noticed that there is a difference be-
tween "international law" and "customary international law," and the Interpretive
Note's conclusion that the two phrases mean the same thing is somewhat suspect.
Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 78-79; see also Pope & Talbott v. Canada, Award
on Damages 91 21, 47 (2002) [hereinafter Pope & Talbott Damages Award], at
http://www.naftalaw.org; Methanex, Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings
(2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org; Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration, supra
note 267, at 429. While the distinction between interpretation and amendment can be
subtle, the degree of speculation regarding the Note's appropriateness suggests, at a
minimum, the appearance of impropriety. There is some concern that where the Free
Trade Commission exceeds its authority in issuing an Interpretive Note, an arbitral
tribunal has the authority to reject the note. See Pope & Talbott Damages Award, su-
pra. This issue has not yet been definitively considered by an arbitral tribunal.
407. See Shapren, supra note 16, at 349 (suggesting that the value of the Free Trade
Commission cannot be decided until the Interpretive Note's effect has been estab-
lished); see also Thomas Franck, The Powers of Legitimacy, supra note 310, at 79
(noting that "gains in a rule's legitimacy.., tend to be dissipated, in practice, when
the application of the standard ends up with unilateral, self-serving exculpatory inter-
pretations of those rules by interested parties").
408. Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 398; Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 93.
409. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-
706 (2000)).
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These mechanisms have been tried and tested in the United States as
an appropriate method for balancing legitimate regulatory needs of
Sovereigns against the commercial concerns of the governed. Should
a similar mechanism be incorporated into future investment treaties, it
could aid transparency and result in Interpretive Notes that promote
coherence and determinacy. But should Interpretive Notes continue
to be used in a problematic manner, the "quick fix" offered to restore
jurisprudential coherence may do more harm than good in the long
run.
c. Establishment of an Appellate Body
Eliminating the arbitration of investment disputes would be detri-
mental."' The beauty of arbitral tribunals is their ability to conduct
independent, expert decision making with "greater autonomy, control
[and] efficiency" than other available mechanisms. 1 As aptly put by
Professor Elihu Lauterpacht, arbitration is "an important component
of the international system and cannot be done away with. We should
contemplate the possibility that its value may be enhanced if it is
linked to a system of appeal." '412 Whereas the ICSID annulment pro-
cedures and opportunities to challenge awards after the fact provides
an opportunity to ensure the sanctity of procedures and to ensure the
dispute resolution process is occurring in a legitimate way," an appel-
late mechanism would promote correct decision making and legal rea-
soning.
Particularly in light of recent cases, 4 there has been an increased
call to create an appellate body. Politicians, in particular, have ex-
pressed the desire for an appellate process.415 Already, the United
States must consider the creation of bilateral appellate bodies for
some free trade agreements.416 The goal of an appellate body would
410. See Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 398-99 (explaining it "would be funda-
mentally unsound to call into question the use of neutral binding arbitration itself as
the preferred means for resolving cross-border investment disputes" as this would ul-
timately do "more harm than good" and could backfire on the United States' foreign
interests).
411. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1418.
412. Elihu Lauterpacht, Aspects of the Administration of International Justice 112
(1991). The author is grateful to Doak Bishop for pointing out the existence of this
quotation.
413. David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process:
Understanding the Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal, 7 ICSID Rev.-Foreign
Investment L.J. 21, 23-24 (1992); see also supra Part III (discussing opportunities for
challenging awards after they are rendered).
414. See supra Part IV.
415. Some academics have expressed concern over the lack of appellate review in
investment arbitration. See Blackaby, supra note 360, at 364; Lerner, supra note 308,
at 286-87.
416. See, e.g., Chile FTA, supra note 6, at annex 10-H; see also 19 U.S.C. §
3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2000) (requiring, in granting the President his trade promotion au-
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be to provide a public forum for the review of public disputes and cre-
ate a determinate and coherent jurisprudence. In their seminal piece
suggesting reforms for international commercial arbitration, William
H. Knull, III and Noah D. Rubins argue an appellate body is neces-
sary in "bet the company" international disputes. 4 17 The reasoning
applies with even more force in "bet the country" disputes, particu-
larly if certain arbitration users (Sovereigns) have little faith in the
dispute resolution mechanism 418 and can terminate investment trea-
ties.419
By having a small and stable membership, an appellate body could
focus on establishing a clear and coherent body of law and "correcting
legal errors in specific cases";42° meanwhile arbitral tribunals can use
their expertise and focus on their own institutional competency: de-
veloping a factual record, clarifying issues in dispute, and applying le-
gal principles. Together this means an appellate body could restore
faith in the system, promote consistency, provide predictability, and
reduce the risk of inconsistent decisions to make the system sustain-
able and legitimate in the long term.
The precise form and mandate of an appellate body leaves room for
a considerable amount of debate. The commentators suggest reforms
in a variety of different flavors but almost exclusively in the context of
thority, that future trade agreements have "an appellate body or similar mechanism to
provide coherence to the interpretation of investment provisions in trade agree-
ments").
417. Knull & Rubins, supra note 354, at 531, 559-61.
418. One of Knull and Rubin's primary critiques of commercial arbitration is that it
does not address the concerns of arbitration users, specifically corporate counsel.
Analyzing empirical evidence, they note that fewer business people are willing to use
arbitration because it is unpredictable and offers few opportunities to redress unfair
decisions. Id. at 532 n.5. However, the difficulty with the empirical evidence used lies
in the fact that a large segment of those surveyed were U.S. business people; only a
very small segment of those polled were of the international business community. See
David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, The Appropriate Resolution of Corporate Dis-
putes: A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations 7 (1998) (ex-
plaining that their study was performed on "general counsel or chief litigators for the
Fortune 1000 corporations in the United States"). Likewise, in the second study re-
ferred to by Knull & Rubins, fifty United States and European lawyers were polled,
many of whom were not corporate counsel, but themselves avid users of international
arbitration. Knull & Rubins, supra note 354, at 532. As a result, the sample is unlikely
to be a reliable indicator of the concerns of corporate counsel. See Christian Biuhring-
Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business 403-15 (1996) (describing
the results of a survey on arbitration in international business disputes). Neverthe-
less, these studies do suggest that Sovereigns are more likely to have confidence in,
and more likely to participate in, an arbitration system where they believe there is
predictability and the opportunity to redress unfair decisions. See Caron, supra note
413, at 48-49 (describing an encounter where a general counsel was distressed when
there was no opportunity to appeal in an adverse decision involving a million dollar
investment dispute).
419. See supra note 31 (describing a Sovereign's ability to end investment agree-
ments).
420. Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 92.
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NAFTA or a specific investment agreement. One commentator sug-
gests that a NAFTA Appellate Body could be composed of Chief Jus-
tices of the Mexican, Canadian, and United States Supreme Courts.42'
Another commentator has suggested that ad hoc arbitral tribunals be
used to provide appellate review of investment arbitration awards.422
Others have suggested the establishment of an appellate body affili-
ated with a recognized international institution to provide plenary re-
view for investment arbitration awards.423
While the first suggestion serves a laudable objective, it would mar-
ginally enhance legitimacy. Appointing justices of national supreme
courts is difficult for several reasons. First, national court judges are
subject to the traditional criticisms regarding bias, particularly when it
is troubling to rely upon the judgment of individuals who are account-
able to the very Sovereigns whose conduct is being evaluated. The
credibility of the system is enhanced by calling on those individuals
with the requisite legal and technical expertise who are neutral and
detached from national political considerations. Second, calling on
sitting justices is likely to create a practical problem of efficiently re-
solving disputes. Full-time supreme court justices are unlikely to have
time to take up a new position as an appellate arbitral judge. Third, in
the context of broader multinational investment treaties, such as the
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, it would be difficult to
achieve balanced representation. If an appellate body required judi-
cial representation from every country with an investment treaty, this
problem would be exacerbated. Such an overwhelming number of
judges may be unable to render a coherent body of law.
The second suggestion, to use ad hoc tribunals to provide appellate
review, only marginally enhances legitimacy. There would still only
be minimal guarantees of transparency as the decision making would
still be in private and the publication of awards would not be required.
421. Abbott, supra note 303, at 308; see also Afilalo, supra note 1, at 53 (suggesting
that a "NAFTA Court" would be arranged as follows: (1) contain at least one sitting
national judge from each of the NAFTA member states, (2) yearly appointment and
election, and (3) if NAFTA expanded to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas,
the number of judges would also shift to reflect the number of newly admitted states,
providing for one sitting judge per state).
422. Noah Rubins, Observations of Noah Rubins, in Stockholm Arb. Rep., 2003, at
202 n.25 (2003), at
http://www.sccinstitute.com/_upload/shared-files/artiklar/tjeckiska-republiken.pdf;
see also Knull & Rubins, supra note 354 (describing the creation of an appellate tri-
bunal in the context of commercial arbitration).
423. Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 91; see also Afilalo, supra note 1, at 42-
43, 52-53 (observing that (1) there is no "NAFTA court" charged with developing and
applying the law and therefore, there is only a minimal judicial framework to insure
the uniform interpretation of NAFTA and (2) recommending that a NAFTA appel-
late tribunal could render written, reasoned opinions with precedential value to con-
tribute to the development of the law); Paterson, supra note 359, at 123 (suggesting




Moreover, as a series of ad hoc appellate tribunals could come to in-
consistent decisions about an existing inconsistent decision, this exac-
erbates the challenge of creating a coherent jurisprudence. While it
does provide a further check on the discretion of arbitral tribunals,
there are more effective mechanisms for promoting the overall objec-
tive of legitimacy. 4
24
The third suggestion of establishing a permanent appellate body
merits more consideration. Some scholars recommend that the ICJ
have appellate jurisdiction over investment treaty cases.425 They
rightly note that the ICJ's unique membership and structure-with
continuity of membership, independence, and expertise in interna-
tional law-would go a long way towards improving the efficacy of an
appellate option. This option has three practical drawbacks, however.
First, the ICJ Statute only permits G2G dispute resolution and does
not allow resolution of investor-Sovereign disputes. Although an
amendment to the ICJ Statute might be possible, the scope of the
carve-out would require careful drafting, and securing the requisite
political will to revise the statute could prove challenging. Second, the
enforcement mechanism for ICJ decisions is relatively weak. In con-
trast to the ICSID, New York, and Panama Convention awards, which
have tried and tested enforcement mechanisms, enforcement of an
ICJ determination must be sought through the United Nations Secu-
rity Council. Particularly when there are other options available, it is
inappropriate to chip away at the power of the enforcement mecha-
nism. Third, the ICJ has minimal experience acting as an appellate
body,426 and may therefore find it somewhat difficult to "switch hats"
424. In its recent discussion paper, the ICSID Secretariat suggests that it might be
useful to provide for an Appeals Panel of fifteen elected individuals, but that parties
(as a default) would then have an opportunity to select a mini-appeals panel com-
prised of three members. See ICSID Secretariat, supra note 395, at annex 3-4. This is
an interesting concept, which has its foundations in the system of subsidiary chambers
familiar among international dispute settlement bodies, and while it has the benefit of
potentially creating a systematic and coherent set of decisions, it still does not address
how inconsistent outcomes rendered among different appellate bodies will be ad-
dressed.
425. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1451; see also supra note 392 and accom-
panying text (describing proposals for a permanent appellate body made by Judges
Schwebel and Holtzman and endorsed by Judge Brower).
426. The ICJ's jurisdiction is twofold: (1) to deliver judgments in contentious cases
submitted by Sovereigns and (2) to issue non-binding advisory opinions at the request
of certain U.N. organs and agencies. Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the
Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1570-72
(2003); Nancy Combs et al., International Courts and Tribunals, 37 Int'l Law. 523, 523
(2003). The ICJ does not, therefore, regularly review decisions or take appeals, even
when it has the capacity to do so. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Flights of Fancy and
Fights of Fury: Arbitration and Adjudication of Commercial and Political Disputes in
International Aviation, 32 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 231, 267-68 (2004) (explaining that
where a dispute arises under the Chicago Convention on Aviation, Sovereigns can
obtain a ruling from the Council, which can then be appealed to the ICJ); Isabella
Diederiks-Verschoor, The Settlement of Aviation Disputes, 20 Annals Air & Space L.
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from a court of first instance to one which reviews arbitral awards. As
a result, it may be more useful to establish an appellate body organ-
ized under the auspices of an independent and internationally recog-
nized but underutilized institution,42 v the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion at the Hague (the "PCA"),42 s which could oversee a separate
chamber for the review of investment treaty awards and appoint
judges with the requisite experience and background. Organization
under the PCA may be particularly useful as it already permits dis-
putes between private parties and Sovereigns.429
VI. NEW METHODS FOR ADDRESSING INCONSISTENT DECISIONS
No system of dispute resolution is perfect. There are inevitably
challenging transitions which require a re-examination of the bedrock
principles upon which the system was founded. Investment arbitra-
tion is now at this critical juncture. Part of the difficulty caused by in-
consistent decisions in investment arbitration is that it is experiencing
"growing pains." This evolution is inevitable and was even antici-
pated.43' Not unlike the initial breaking-in period for the ICSID Con-
vention, this growth process "is especially delicate because of the ab-
335, 336-38 (1995) (noting that the ICJ has played no significant role in resolving avia-
tion disputes). But see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1988 I.C.J. 99
(Apr. 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm; Jehanne E. Henry,
Overcoming Federalism in Internationalized Death Penalty Cases, 35 Tex. Int'l L.J.
459, 480 (2000) (describing how the Convention on Consular Relations has been used
to give ICJ jurisdiction and allow for the review of capital punishment decisions in the
United States); Schwebel, supra note 392, at 119-20 (noting that the ICJ's predeces-
sor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, "examined three appeals from arbi-
tral awards").
427. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1452 n.318; see Bette E. Shifman, The Re-
vitalization of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 23 Int'l J. Legal Info. 284, 285
(1994); see also Redfern & Hunter, supra note 113, at 58 (describing the expertise of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration); J. L. Bleich, A New Direction for the PCA: The
Work of the Expert Group, in The Flame Rekindled: New Hopes for International
Arbitration 17, 41-42 (Sam Muller & Wim Mijs eds., 1994) (explaining that the PCA
"needs to offer unique services" particularly in state/non-state disputes); Tjaco T. van
den Hout, Introduction, in Institutional and Procedural Aspects of Mass Claims Set-
tlement Systems, at vii (Int'l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2000)
(noting the important role of the PCA, mentioning the desire that the PCA be utilized
more fully and referring to a U.N. Assembly that "invited States to consider making
greater use of the PCA's facilities").
428. The PCA was established by the July 29, 1899 signing of the Hague Conven-
tion for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. See The Hague Conventions
and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, at 41 (James Brown Scott ed., 1915).
429. Redfern & Hunter, supra note 113, at 58.
430. It was acknowledged during treaty negotiations that certain standards were
vague, and the assumption was made that the meaning of the standard would develop
through arbitration. See Vandevelde, supra note 9, at 76 (explaining that the obliga-
tion to provide "fair and equitable treatment" is "vague and its precise content will
have to be defined over time through treaty practice, including perhaps arbitration
under the disputes provisions" (internal quotations omitted)).
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sence of any previous interpretation of [a treaty] and the lack of suffi-
ciently clear or consistent indications from prior international prac-
tice"' 431 can create significant difficulties.432 Even NAFTA, the most
litigated investment treaty, has not yet established a "mature jurispru-
dence" but after ten years, "substantive trends" are beginning to
emerge.433
Tie fact is that investment awards are not technically preceden-
tial.434 The ICJ Statute suggests that tribunals should not rely on pri-
vate arbitral decisions 435 as binding authority;436 and while arbitral tri-
bunals do consider each other's opinions, there is no guarantee that
the reasoning or conclusions will be determinative in later cases.437 As
431. See Holiday Inn v. Cameroon ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/81/2, $ 118
(1981), reprinted in 1 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Investment L.J. 90 (1986) (expressing con-
cern about the application of the ICSID Convention in one of the first ICSID annul-
ment proceedings).
432. See also Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1407 (describing the difficulties
associated with a unified approach to similar issues of law when there are issues of
first impression).
433. Id. at 1385; see also Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 301, at 189, 220 (noting the
additional lack of stare decisis in the context of ICSID annulment proceedings).
434. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136(1), 32 I.L.M. at 646 (binding only the par-
ties to a NAFTA award); see also Weiler, NAFTA Invetsment Arbitration, supra note
267, at 407 (noting there are no formal rules of precedent in investment treaty arbitra-
tion, but it is not unusual for tribunals to rely upon the reasoning and existence of an-
other).
435. In particular, the ICJ does not expressly provide that private arbitral decisions
are a recognized source of international law. The ICJ Statute provides that,
[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conven-
tions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
ICJ Statute, supra note 52, art. 38(1), 59 Stat at 1060. In contrast to private arbitral
awards, decisions from Mixed Claims Commissions and the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribu-
nal, which involved public decision making more akin to the process of making "judi-
cial decisions," are more likely to be treated as having precedential force. See Jason L.
Gudofsky, Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) Concerning Expropriations: An Environmental Case Study, 21 Nw. J.
Int'l L. & Bus. 243, 260 n.46 (2000) (suggesting that the determinations made by the
U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal are judicial decisions that "may inform the law of expro-
priation," but also referring to previous ICSID awards in the same manner); see also
Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (pt. 1), 14 Am.
U. Int'l L. Rev. 845 (1999) (discussing the de facto precedential value accorded to
GATT panels and WTO panel and appellate body decisions).
436. See Bhala, supra note 435; ICJ Statute, supra note 52, art. 59, 59 Stat. it 1062
(providing that "the decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case").
437. See Philippines Award, supra note 239, 1 97 (noting that the ICSID Conven-
tion only provides that awards are "binding on the parties" and further explaining
that "there is no doctrine of precedent in international law" and "no hierarchy of in-
ternational tribunals" and that there is "no good reason for allowing the first tribunal
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a practical matter, however, private investors, governments, and arbi-
tral tribunals rely on previous awards to interpret similar provisions in
investment treaties.438 As explained by Professor David A. Gantz, it is
a "common practice" for private investors and governments to refer
to prior investment tribunal decisions that appear to favor them, and
it is inevitable that arbitral tribunals interpreting similar provisions of
investment treaties will consider and follow those previous deci-
sions.439 Indeed, the result is sensible as-when dealing with issues of
first impression-investors and Sovereigns alike will consult a variety
of sources when evaluating their potential rights and liabilities. This
also explains, for example, why NAFTA jurisprudence has an im-
mense sphere of influence" that other tribunals are willing to con-
sider." Indeed, as long ago as 1946, Kenneth Carlston explained that
"the pronouncements of international tribunals are of equal value
from the standpoint of the development of a system of international
jurisprudence."" 2
The current system of creating ad hoc, disparate decisions on re-
lated issues of public international law must be unified. "Getting it
right" is essential to an area where there is little analogous jurispru-
in time to resolve issues for all later tribunals"); see also supra notes 431-37 and ac-
companying text (describing the lack of stare decisis in investment arbitration).
438. Philippe Pinsolle, a leading investment arbitration partner at Shearman &
Sterling LLP in Paris, states that he regularly uses investment awards particularly be-
cause the "law is not stable" in the area of investment arbitration. Pinsolle Interview,
supra note 66. Stephen Jagusch, a recognized investment arbitration specialist at Al-
len & Overy LLP in London, similarly explains that when advising clients, he pays
"close attention to the reasoning" of awards and that previous awards "whilst not
binding, are persuasive." Jagusch Interview, supra note 66; see also Blanch Interview,
supra note 66 (indicating that she uses treaty awards in "the persuasive sense in sub-
missions" and to engage in a "current analysis" of the potential rights and obligations
in an investment treaty); Reed Interview, supra note 66 (stating that Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer "definitely use[s] awards" even though the awards are not bind-
ing because they are influential for arbitrators, particularly those awards that "well
and critically" analyze treaties and the ICSID Convention and "well and critically"
apply the law to the facts).
439. See Gantz, The Evolution, supra note 12, at 689.
440. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1397.
441. See id. at 1409 (describing how arbitrators are willing to consult the "reasoning
of other NAFTA tribunals" and how, at times, this yields a more uniform result); see
also Alvarez, supra note 56, at 406-07 (describing "the rise of de facto stare decisis"
and the "impact of international precedents") (emphasis added); Mann, supra note
74, at 41 (describing the impact of previous arbitration awards and noting that "previ-
ous cases will always play an important part in practice in a Tribunal's decision-
making process, even if they are not legally binding on them"). But see Philippines
Award, supra note 239, 97. The tribunal noted that
although different tribunals constituted under the ICSID system should in
general seek to act consistently with each other, in the end it must be for
each tribunal to exercise its competence in accordance with the applicable
law, which will by definition be different for each BIT and each Respondent
State.
Id.
442. Carlston, supra note 48, at 264.
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dence and tribunals interpret public rights."3 While a minor degree of
inconsistency may be useful, as it permits a challenge to the funda-
mental principles of the system and fosters the considered evolution
of law, it is possible to have too much of a good thing. Tribunals are
doing their utmost to review previous decisions, avoid previous mis-
takes, and harmonize their decisions to create a coherent body of
law;"4 nevertheless, the stakes in investment arbitration are simply too
great to sit by idly while issues of public international law are being
decided inconsistently, in private.
The question is not whether perfection is possible-but how to
minimize errors, abuses, and ambiguities in a way that promotes le-
gitimacy. There are a variety of changes that could be made to the
present system to do this. While some of the suggested modifications
are incremental and more "preventative" (designed to prevent incon-
sistencies before they occur), other reform efforts are more substan-
tive and would require both institutional adjustments and changes to
the investor-Sovereign dispute mechanism as currently delineated in
investment treaties.
A. Preventative Solutions
There are a variety of mechanisms which would serve to minimize
the risk of inconsistent decisions. They are not aimed at trying to rec-
tify inconsistency after the fact but are aimed at preventing the incon-
sistency from arising in the future. Solutions might range from such
incremental improvements as a development of the academic litera-
ture to including provisions in investment treaties or institutional rules
to provide enhanced transparency.
A developed academic literature, with precedential value under the
ICJ Statute that could be relied upon during deliberations, would de-
crease the risk of inconsistent decisions. Given the speed with which
investors are filing cases and arbitrators are issuing awards on issues
of international significance, the law has moved ahead of the scholar-
ship. It is vital that scholars step in to bridge this gap and provide the
guidance necessary to harmonize public international law." 5 In the
case of inconsistent decisions, commentators could provide guidance
to "square the circle" and identify strains of reasoning that reconcile
443. Investment arbitration is traditionally referred to as "mixed" arbitration be-
cause it has the characteristics of both inter-state arbitration and private international
commercial arbitration. See Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1389.
444. In his seminal review of Chapter 11, Professor Coe explains that in the past
ten years, NAFTA tribunals have taken "reasoned adjudications" into account, which
can include decisions from tribunals convened under the ICSID Convention as well as
other ad hoc arbitral tribunals. Id. at 1403, 1405-06.
445. See Beauvais, supra note 8, at 285-86 (noting that certain standards under
NAFTA, namely articles 1102 and 1105 "merit much greater attention than they have
yet received in the literature").
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apparently contradictory awards.4 6 Without such direction, however,
the dispute resolution process will be subject to increasing criticism
and in danger of losing its integrity, particularly where the legitimate
expectations of investors and the international obligations of Sover-
eigns are at stake.
Arbitral tribunals have already consulted the writings of academics
and other distinguished publicists as a result of a need to find reason-
ing, authority, and legitimacy, 47 and arbitration specialists have cried
out for further academic analysis to bridge the gap between theory
and practice."' A thorough, probing, and reasoned analysis of the ju-
risprudence and the development of a coherent doctrine will spur de-
bate and help achieve a level of coherence that will promote the le-
gitimacy of investment arbitration. In particular, given the increasing
importance of the rights granted under investment treaties and the in-
consistencies in the current jurisprudence, scholarship is needed to
evaluate how concepts such as "fair and equitable treatment" and the
"observation of commitments" are applied in private arbitrations.
Commentators can then consider whether previous awards were de-
cided correctly, provide guidance to resolve contradictions within the
jurisprudence, and suggest how standards should be applied in the fu-
ture. With proper guidance and information, arbitrators may be in a
better position to resolve disputes in a more considered, uniform, and
predictable manner, and lawyers can give their clients more reliable
advice. In this manner, scholarship can establish norms of interpreta-
tion to reintroduce certainty.
446. Although there may be disagreements within the literature, these discussions
are likely to provide an informed basis for the analysis, discussion, and application of
standards in the future.
447. See Metalclad Judgment, supra note 139, 124 (referring to Professor
Schreuer's article on the ICSID Convention, which related to comments later con-
tained in his ICSID treatise); Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1403, 1403-09 (not-
ing that NAFTA tribunals are considering the comments of academic literature, in-
cluding texts, commentaries, and publications but are doing so on a relatively limited
basis); Coe, Domestic Court Control, supra note 132, at 205-06 (noting that NAFTA-
related literature is growing and has already influenced courts reviewing investment
treaty awards).
448. When asked whether academic scholarship can contribute to investment arbi-
tration, several respected investment arbitration practitioners-who have represented
both investors and Sovereigns-resoundingly supported the need for further aca-
demic commentary. See Blanch Interview, supra note 66 (noting that scholarship con-
tributes to the public dissemination of information and debate and that scholars are
uniquely situated to distill and analyze investment arbitration and provide tactical and
strategic thinking); Jagusch Interview, supra note 66 (explaining that scholarship can
contribute "a vast amount" and "provide valuable guidance" because tribunals "tend
to rely heavily on scholarly writings, particularly when the arbitrators are the first to
decide important marters of principle"); Pinsolle Interview, supra note 66 (stating that
scholarship can contribute "a lot!" to investment arbitration); Reed Interview, supra




Improving investment arbitration through scholarship is particularly
attractive as it does not require mustering the political will of Sover-
eigns, investors, and NGOs; it depends entirely on the willingness of
commentators to enter the fray, offer analysis, and provide clarity.
While some scholars have already begun this process, 4 9 others should
continue to pursue this fruitful area to prevent inconsistency before it
occurs-particularly as scholarship is a form of persuasive authority as
a matter of international law.450
This may only be half of the battle, however, as commentators need
access to awards and underlying materials to critique decisions and
reconcile inconsistent awards. Other incremental measures would
therefore be necessary to prevent inconsistent decisions. While this
Article discussed some of these options earlier in the review of the lit-
erature,451 other "legislative" amendments might also prove useful.
For example, individual investment treaties could specify a neutral
place of arbitration. This approach would minimize the perceived un-
fairness of one aspect of "forum shopping." It would also help in-
crease certainty as the courts and their national standards for vacating
awards would be identified at the outset. By minimizing the number
of venues where awards could be subject to attack, this would also de-
crease the possibility of mixed interpretations by national courts. This
approach also permits Sovereigns to identify a neutral place of arbi-
tration where the local judiciary have international law and arbitration
experience, which would also further minimize the risk of deviations
among national courts. While identifying the place of arbitration
would require a treaty-by-treaty modification,452 there would not be
one single court to review vacatur issues. Although this inevitably in-
troduces variations into the review process, overall, identification of
449. See, e.g., Stephen Vascianne, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in
International Investment Law and Practice, 70 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 99 (1999) (concerning
the concept of "fair and equitable treatment" in investment treaties and international
investment law); see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, Waiver and the Exhaustion of Local
Remedies Rule in NAFTA Jurisprudence, in NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitra-
tion: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects 253 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004)
(conducting an extensive analysis about the exhaustion of local remedies requirement,
which has been an area of inconsistency in recent arbitration awards).
450. ICJ Statute, supra note 52, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat, at 1060 (providing that the
"teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" are a "sub-
sidiary means for the determination of rules of law").
451. It could prove useful to determinacy to more specifically enumerate treaty
rights. Likewise, by increasing transparency through institutional rules, more well-
considered and well-reasoned awards may result, serving to enhance consistency and
predictability.
452. This would, in part, arise out of the need to preserve the neutrality of the place
of arbitration. Not all countries are likely to see the same venue as "neutral" and dis-




place of arbitration reduces the current level of risk and provides
greater legitimacy to the process.453
There are also measures which could enhance the transparency of
the process that could either be incorporated through the revision of
institutional rules or the provision of transparency guarantees in in-
vestment treaties. The appropriate level of transparency would be, at
a minimum, the publication of investment treaty awards and related
materials, as well as a provision which would give tribunals discretion
to admit applications from third parties to act as amici curiae and
make submissions.454
Although arbitration awards do not have precedential value and
thus, some might suggest disclosure of these awards and their underly-
ing materials45  would be harmful, this argument cannot stand. First,
as a practical matter, attorneys rely upon the existence of published
awards to provide advice to their clients, evaluate their rights and ob-
ligations, and minimize uncertainty. In particular, attorneys advising
investors on the structure of their investments will consider how the
decisions might affect an investor's potential rights and its best in-
vestment strategies; likewise, attorneys advising governments about
the feasibility and their potential exposure to liability for planned
regulatory conduct will look to published awards when considering
the best way to implement legitimate policy choices. This reliance is
understandable as the decisions are, of course, the best available evi-
dence about the future risks and obligations for investors and Sover-
eigns alike. Having a more transparent system where both groups can
make choices in a predicable context will bolster the legitimacy of in-
vestment treaties and the arbitration process. Second, further publica-
tion of awards will enhance a tribunal's ability to consider more fully
the legal issues in their own case. At present, many tribunals consider
the reasoning and analysis contained in previous awards. This is a
welcome development and should be encouraged; rational distinctions
based on reasoned decisions enhance arbitration's coherence and
promotes justice. Third, subjecting awards to public scrutiny is an-
other check on the discretion of a private body which provides an in-
453. Sovereigns are unlikely to renegotiate the 2100-plus treaties currently in ef-
fect. However, when moving forward with negotiations, there is no reason to not
identify the place of arbitration. Likewise, the parties should seek to provide clarifi-
cation on this issue when investment treaties are up for renewal.
454. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Participation of Amici Curiae in NAFTA
Chapter Eleven Cases, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/participate-en.asp
(Mar. 22, 2002).
455. It would also be necessary to provide public access to the written pleadings
and other submissions. Without such information, award analysis would occur in a
vacuum. The insights from commentators are likely to be more probing, developed,
and advanced if they are based upon the substantive documents that form the award's
foundation. Perhaps in acknowledgement of this fact, the Amended U.S. Model BIT




centive for thorough, considered, and well-reasoned awards. Tribu-
nals should also have the ability to consider submissions from amici
curiae or interested third parties. In this manner, tribunals will be
able to consider alternative arguments from interested individuals and
evaluate more fully the public implications of their decisions. Particu-
larly when dealing with public policy issues where third parties could
be adversely impacted by a tribunal's award, having greater informa-
tion and submissions which reflect the interests of an interested body
can improve the decision-making process. Further, giving those im-
pacted by the dispute a chance to be represented and participate in
the outcome enhances the fairness of the process and makes the ulti-
mate award more palatable.
Although the suggested transparency is more difficult to accomplish
than academics deciding individually to contribute to the literature,
these revisions could be accomplished in two relatively straightfor-
ward manners. First, as suggested above,45 6 arbitration rules could be
amended to provide for broader transparency in investment treaty
cases. Second, Sovereigns negotiating investment treaties could add
specific provisions to the dispute resolution mechanism that would
permit enhanced transparency. As these sections of the treaty are es-
sentially glorified arbitration agreements, there is nothing (except a
Sovereign's own policy choices and the treaty negotiation process) to
prevent the inclusion of broader public participation. Using these
simple mechanisms will go a great way to providing an incremental
improvement to investment treaty arbitration and enhancing its jus-
tice-promoting objectives.
B. Establishing an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court
Arbitrators inevitably create "new international law" founded on
the norms present in investment treaties when they apply the substan-
tive rights in investment treaties to the facts of actual disputes.457 A
single, unified, permanent body charged with developing international
law and creating consistent jurisprudence will promote legitimacy
more than disaggregated arbitrations that come to different conclu-
sions on the same issue.45 Such a body-composed of an established
456. See supra Part V.B.4.a.
457. Parra, Provisions, supra note 21, at 361.
458. See, e.g., Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1449 (noting that an appellate
body that can construe provisions common to many BITs would have benefits beyond
those in NAFTA). While concerns related to finality and (hopefully) faster and
cheaper dispute resolution feature prominently in the context of domestic arbitration,
as a functional matter, these concerns do not apply as strongly in the context of inter-
national investment arbitration. Unlike domestic commercial cases, there is an un-
derdeveloped academic case law and a limited body of precedent upon which to draw
in the context of investment treaty disputes; investment rights have implications on
the capacity of sovereign governments who need to regulate and legislate; and there
are implications upon the public as the rights do not purely impact private commercial
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group of respected decision makers that is detached from municipal
concerns and analyzing similar standards-will enhance the probabil-
ity of centralization and standardization without as readily arousing
questions about neutrality and independence.459 The important ques-
tion that remains is the following: what mandate should such a body
have and what form should it take?
An Investment Arbitration Appellate Court must be concerned
with the legitimacy of the system as a whole. Its mandate should per-
mit it to review awards promulgated under more than one investment
treaty and focus upon the overall network of investment treaties.
Thus far, the broader need for coherence has been ignored in favor of
a treaty-by-treaty approach. This is overly simplistic and stands to
have a deleterious effect on the long-term legitimacy of investment
arbitration.
A single investment treaty is part of a related network, and com-
mentators acknowledge the links between the rights in the various in-
vestment treaties.46 For example, as Professor Jose E. Alvarez color-
fully put it, NAFTA is a "bilateral investment treaty on steroids.
461
Because of the related nature of the rights in investment treaties,
NAFTA awards have "immediate relevance outside of the three
NAFTA countries. ' 462 This is to be expected because of the utility in
having consistent interpretations of similar international law stan-
dards, which happen to be contained in different investment trea-
ties.463 Retaining the legitimacy of the network as a whole is, there-
fore, of critical importance.
Considering treaties in isolation is an inappropriate method for re-
solving rights that implicate other investment treaties. The fundamen-
tal oversight in focusing on individual treaties is that the legitimacy of
transactions. While there is no question that an appellate mechanism would sacrifice
a degree of finality, the more important issue is whether the degree of finality sacri-
ficed is worth the long term gain in the increase of correct and legally defensible deci-
sions that will promote integrity and efficiency within the overall system.
459. Id. at 1447.
460. See Price, Some Observations, supra note 60, at 423 (noting that principles in
NAFTA were drawn from a large and growing network of investment agreements
and that those "principles are now incorporated into BITs and other investment
agreements of [U.S.] trading partners and are accepted by much of the developing
world"); see also Brower, Structure, supra note 128, at 44 (explaining that "observers
of international investment law will note that Chapter 11 [of NAFTA] bears a family
resemblance to bilateral investment treaties").
461. Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 303, 304 (1997).
462. Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1397.
463. See Gantz, The Evolution, supra note 12, at 687 (noting that business interests
hope to maintain broad NAFTA protections because a weakening in NAFTA lan-
guage might have implications for U.S. investor rights under a number of BITs); see
also Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1391-92 (explaining that a "crude but descrip-
tive portrayal of [NAFTA's] Chapter 11 is that it is a bilateral investment treaty (BIT)
inserted into a multi-lateral free trade agreement").
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an investment treaty network is based on the coherence of treaty ju-
risprudence as a whole. Given the overwhelming similarity of the
rights promulgated in investment treaties, it is vital to make a com-
prehensive effort to harmonize and clarify the development of these
standards. Similar provisions of related investment treaties should be
analyzed and applied in similar ways; likewise, where decisions appear
contradictory, rational bases that consider the network as a whole can
create valid bases for distinction. This process promotes clarity
throughout the network and permits the articulation of a reliable body
of international economic and public international law. Such uniform-
ity promotes the confidence of the investment arbitration system.4" If
this point is overlooked, however, the decentralization of decision
making and ad hoc adjudications will produce further variations in
approach and principle.465
If there had been an opportunity for a reviewing court to address
the inconsistencies in both the Lauder and SGS cases, the logical in-
consistencies in the cases could either be corrected or explained. This
means there is a need for an international body to provide appellate
review and legal guidance on the meaning of rights contained in in-
vestment treaties; but there is no international court at present to
meet this need. For this reason, this Article proposes that a single In-
vestment Arbitration Appellate Court be created to permit the review
of all investment arbitration awards for errors of law and legal inter-
pretation. This standard could, for example, be similar to the legal re-
view permitted by the European Court of Justice or the World Trade
Organization.466 Like domestic appellate courts in common law coun-
464. See Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration, supra note 267, at 407.
465. See Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 1, at 1407 (noting that, under NAFTA, "the
decentralization built into Chapter l's system of ad hoc adjudications has produced
variations in approach, tone and principle"); see also id. at 1408 (explaining that the
"decentralized and fragmentary nature of international law sources and the differing
backgrounds of the arbitrators and advocates have combined with many questions of
first impression to generate differing approaches to identical issues"). This decen-
tralization is the natural flaw in the treaty-by-treaty appellate mechanism suggested
by the United States Trade Promotion Authority Act. See Legum, supra note 6.
Likewise, because the appellate mechanism recommended by ICSID cannot provide
coherency of the entirety of the investment treaty network, but only those cases sub-
jected to ICSID arbitration, its framework will not address the systemic issues that
must be addressed to sustain the integrity of the entirety of the investment treaty
network.
466. The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization has a Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding, which provides that "[aln appeal shall be limited to issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel." Marra-
kech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU]. Article 168(a) of the European Community Treaty and article 51
of the Statute of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") limit ECJ appeals on points
of law. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7 1992, art. 168a(1), O.J.
(C224) 1 (1992); Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Eco-
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tries and higher courts in civil law countries, an Investment Arbitra-
tion Appellate Court would engage only in the interpretation of law to
avoid divergent applications and interpretations of law.467 This would
permit tribunals to review fundamental issues, which are common to
investment treaties, including disputed legal interpretations related to
both jurisdiction and the merits.4 6' Review at this level will enhance
certainty about what rights investors have and for what conduct Sov-
ereigns are liable.469
nomic Community as Amended by Council Decision of 24 October 1998, Establishing
a Court of First Instance, in Basic Community Laws 222-23 (Bernard Rudden & Der-
rick Wyatt QC eds., 6th ed. 1996). In contrast, ICSID's discussion paper also pro-
poses a review for "serious errors of fact." ICSID Secretariat, supra note 395, at an-
nex 4. Even if errors of fact were narrowly defined, this trespasses unnecessarily on
the fact findings of the arbitral tribunal. The tribunal is in a position to have heard
the evidence first hand and to have assessed the credibility of material witnesses. As
an appellate body, it would not have the same intimate connection with the facts, thus
giving them the power to correct "serious errors" of fact seems inappropriate. In con-
trast, giving an appellate court the authority to review errors of law fits within its par-
ticular institutional competence: the rendering of coherent legal decisions. One issue,
however, which has not been addressed is whether it may be necessary to provide a
check within the appellate system to prevent a flood of appeals. It may, for example,
be useful to make arbitration discretionary, such that the appellate court will have the
opportunity to decide whether to take an appeal, instead of wholly relying upon a dis-
satisfied party to bring a claim. Such a check might, for example, take the form of
United States Supreme Court Rule 10, which provides that appeal is not a matter of
right but will be granted for "compelling reasons" related to conflicting discussions on
an important matter. Sup. Ct. R. 10.
467. Konstantin J. Joergens, True Appellate Procedure or Only a Two-Stage Proc-
ess? A Comparative View of the Appellate Body Under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, 30 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 193, 206-07,211 (1999). Tying the standards
used by an appellate body to established institutions will promote legitimacy through
symbolic similarities (i.e., a recognition value) and adherence to recognized standards
will establish its position in the international legal order. Brower, Structure, supra
note 128; Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy, supra note 310, at 135-37, 183-86;
see also Thomas Franck, Fairness, supra note 312, at 34-38, 41-46.
468. Investment treaties generally have similar standards about who are qualifying
investors and what are qualifying investments that form the basis of a tribunal's juris-
diction. Likewise, investment treaties have similar substantive rights, which form the
basis of an award on the merits. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. There-
fore, it makes sense to permit review of a tribunal's award on jurisdiction and the
merits.
469. Some may express dissatisfaction with the approach as it takes away "grey ar-
eas" that might otherwise be used during the arbitration process. This concern should
not withstand scrutiny. Investors and Sovereigns actually benefit from review of legal
issues. As a practical matter, the enhanced certainty from legal review will permit in-
vestors to construct their investments more effectively. Particularly at the transac-
tional stage, they will know what specific provisions, for example, they will need to
negotiate into their contracts and what protections they should seek in their political
risk insurance. See Export Credit Guarantee Department ("ECGD"), Products and
Services, at
http://www.ecgd.gov.uk/index/ps-home/overseasinvestment/overseasinvestment-oii.ht
m (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (offering political risk insurance to U.K. investors); Mul-
tilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"), Overview of MIGA's Investment
Guarantee Services, at http://www.miga.org/screens/services/guarant/guarant.htm (last
visited Jan. 22, 2005) (offering political risk insurance to qualifying foreign investors);
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Such a court, however, should not review awards for issues of due
process and proper procedure. These considerations can and should
be addressed effectively through the mechanisms currently available
in the New York, Panama, and ICSID Conventions, which have a long
and established jurisprudence. 47 ' Although the precise mechanism to
clarify the scope of these conventions and their interaction with an In-
vestment Arbitration Appellate Court may require additional interna-
tional instrument(s),47" ' any such court should not disturb some of the
most successful international conventions of all time.
An appellate body requires authority to carry out its mandate.
Namely, it must have a mandate not only to decide the appeal but also
have power to effectuate its determinations. There are several powers
that an Investment Arbitration Appellate Court would need. Specifi-
cally, if the court determined that an award was sound, it should have
the power to uphold the award. Likewise, it should also have the au-
thority to affirm the award but for different reasons if the court be-
lieves the analysis is legally unsupportable. If, however, the court
holds that a tribunal has erred as a matter of law, it should have the
authority to clarify the appropriate standard, offer guidance as to the
proper scope of the rule of law, and remand the case. This could be
accomplished by remanding the dispute with instructions to the origi-
nal tribunal to render a "final amended award." This authority would
provide the appellate body with an opportunity to correct errors of
law and inconsistencies, and thereby correct legal errors and per-
ceived unfairness. There is no need to remand a decision to a differ-
ent tribunal or replace the court's decision. The original tribunal al-
ready has an intimate familiarity with the parties, the facts, and the
issues that other entities lack. In contrast, establishing a new tribunal
and initiating an entirely new set of proceedings would be a waste of
resources and would create unnecessary delay. The court's primary
objective should be to provide clarity and consistency regarding legal
Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), Insurance Department, at
http://www.opic.gov/lnsurance (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (offering political risk insur-
ance to U.S. investors). By building in these mechanisms early, it increases the likeli-
hood that investors' commercial needs will be met without having to resort to expen-
sive and risky investment arbitration. Similarly, Sovereigns gain greater clarity about
the scope of their legal rights and obligations, which permits them to plan their own
government activities more effectively. Ultimately, as long as the jurisprudence is
moving in a more coherent direction that sustains the system as a whole, this benefits
investors and Sovereigns alike who wish to create a sustainable system.
470. Having a separate court of appeal should also make individuals reviewing
awards less likely to trespass into consideration of the legal merits of the decision.
Whether it be an ad hoc committee organized under the ICSID Convention or a na-
tional court reviewing enforcement under the New York Convention, knowing that
there was an independent opportunity to review issues of law should make those enti-
ties less likely to focus on that issue, allowing them to instead focus on the specific due
process grounds enumerated in those conventions.
471. See supra notes 457-69 and accompanying text (describing the mechanisms
under which an Arbitration Appellate Court could be organized).
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rights in investment treaties, not to render final and binding awards
that apply the law to the facts. Requiring cases to be remanded to the
tribunal will allow the arbitrators to use their unique factual knowl-
edge to apply those facts to the proper legal standards. It also permits
amended awards to become enforceable in the same manner, for ex-
ample, as final awards under the New York Convention.472
An Investment Arbitration Appellate Court requires sufficient
transparency and public participation to promote justice in the con-
sideration of public rights. In order to address the potential impact on
third parties and sensitive public policy issues,473 there should be
transparency in the appeals process similar to what was proposed ear-
lier for enhanced transparency related to arbitrations. Namely, there
should be an opportunity for amici curiae and other appropriate third
parties to make submissions. Particularly at this level, where public
scrutiny should act as a check on discretion and an incentive for ac-
countable decision making, the pleadings, the hearings of the court,
and its ultimate determination should be available to the public. This
level of scrutiny should ensure the integrity of the process and pro-
mote reasoned decisions that lead to a developed jurisprudence.
Certain measures may need to be effected, however, in order to en-
sure the integrity of the process and minimize opportunities to ma-
nipulate the procedure. In particular, certain safeguards which are
available in the arbitration proceedings-such as cost shifting for the
bringing of unmeritorious appeals-should also be available in the
appellate context. Likewise, to promote efficiency, there should be
strict timetables within which parties must make their applications to
appeal or lose their right to appeal. For example, a thirty-day limita-
tion would ensure that decisions to appeal are made quickly and there
is a degree of finality. It may also be useful to indicate a time frame
within which the court should render its decision. The slight cost of
sacrificing some degree of finality to create a temporal window for the
appellate process is ultimately preferable to a dispute resolution sys-
tem that renders incoherent decisions and adversely affects the expec-
tations of investors and Sovereigns.
Aside from its mandate, the form of an Investment Arbitration Ap-
pellate Court would also be critical. It would require both the appro-
priate institutional "home" and the appropriate membership. As sug-
gested previously, organizing a court under the auspices of the
472. This should by-pass the issue of whether a decision of the Arbitration Appel-
late Court would itself need to be deemed an arbitration award for the purposes of
the New York Convention.
473. See Luke Eric Peterson, All Paths Lead out of Rome: Divergent Paths of Dis-
pute Settlement (2002), available at www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment-nautilus.pdf;
see also Charles N. Brower, NAFTA's Investment Chapter: Dynamic Laboratory,
Failed Experiments, and Lessons for the FTAA, 97 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 251, 252-




Permanent Court of International Arbitration could prove very use-
ful. In the context of suggesting the creation of a similar court, Judge
Howard M. Holtzmann suggested that a court could be located in the
Hague so as to benefit from the administrative expertise and physical
facilities of the Permanent Court of Arbitration as well as the great
library resources available at the Peace Palace.474
The membership of such an appellate body would be fundamental
as it is an indicator of the authority and legitimacy of the decision
makers. Ideally, the parameters for appointment would be debated
publicly to give interested parties-such as investors, Sovereigns and
NGOs-the opportunity to voice their concerns and ensure the ap-
pointment of the most appropriate set of individuals. The standard
for appointment for the ICJ Statute might form a starting point. The
ICJ statute requires the election of judges that represent "the main
forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world." '475
More definition would prove useful, however, to promote the percep-
tion that the appointment process is fair and the decision-makers are
appropriate. For example, it might also be worthwhile to codify the
informal "gentlemen's agreement" that ensures the membership will
broadly and transparently mirror the membership of the U.N. Security
Council47 6 or some other type of geographical mix. Specifically, to re-
tain its perceptions of legitimate authority, appellate judges should
come from a variety of backgrounds, and the mix would fairly need to
represent both developed and developing countries. The standards
for appointment should also enumerate the qualifications of judges to
ensure a mix of expertise in areas such as arbitration, economics, in-
vestment law, and public international law. In addition, to ensure the
legitimacy of the decision makers, it might also be able to require "ju-
dicial" expertise by calling for members of the court to have acted
previously as arbitrators, judges in the first instance, or appellate
judges. These agreed standards could then be articulated in the con-
vention or other agreement which establishes the appellate court.
There are other important factors related to the formation of the
court, including who is responsible for appointment, how many judges
should there be, and what the terms of appointment should be. Obvi-
ously, the best method of promoting legitimacy is to have a neutral in-
stitution with the requisite international arbitration background, such
as the Permanent Court of International Arbitration, to appoint
judges in accordance with agreed upon standards. It would also be
appropriate to have a large number of judges on the court, perhaps
474. Holtzmann, supra note 392, at 114.
475. ICJ Statute, supra note 52, art. 9, 59 Stat. at 1056; see also Merrills, supra note
53, at 137 (noting that the importance of this standard "can hardly be over-
emphasised" because it contributes to the legitimacy of the ICJ and promotes ade-
quate representation).
476. Schwebel, supra note 392, at 117.
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eleven.477 This will promote proper geographical representation, help
to balance out competing cultural backgrounds, and improve the qual-
ity of the deliberations without unduly eliminating quality arbitrators
from the pool of those who could make decisions in the first instance.
As suggested by Judge Stephen M. Schwebel in a slightly different
context, judges could be appointed for a fixed term-perhaps for ten
years-to ensure that there is some consistency of the decision makers
and foster the emergence of a coherent doctrine.478 It would also be
useful for judges at the appellate court to be bound to standards of ju-
dicial conduct in the same manner as other members of the interna-
tional judiciary.479 This promotes confidence in the neutrality, inde-
pendence, and the integrity of the judges.
There is no doubt that the implementation of such an Investment
Arbitration Appellate Court would be a challenging undertaking, par-
ticularly as Sovereigns are unlikely to renegotiate the over 2100 in-
vestment treaties currently in existence. 40 Nevertheless, the increased
legitimacy that is gained by having a supervising body cannot be over-
looked or underestimated. There are two opportunities to create such
an appellate court. First, such a mechanism could be established in
conjunction with negotiating high-level regional multilateral agree-
ments-for example, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas,
which is currently under consideration. Using this opportunity would
not create coherence with all the worldwide investment treaties, but
477. This balances the approaches of the ICJ, which has a membership of fifteen
judges, with the membership of the WTO Appellate Body, which has seven judges.
Int'l Court of Justice, General Information-The Court at a Glance, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); DSU, su-
pra note 466, art. 17, 33 I.L.M.. at 1236-37; see also Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands,
International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44
Harv. Int'l L.J. 271, 272-73 (2003) (describing the number of judges in a variety of
other international courts). At present, there is a relatively discrete group of indi-
viduals who regularly act as investment arbitrators and may have an appropriate
background to serve on an appellate court. Having too many members of an appel-
late court may deprive investment treaty arbitration of some of the best legal minds
for deciding cases of the first instance. Likewise, there would need to be an economic
incentive for arbitrators to give up lucrative practices to take on the responsibility of
becoming a judge on an appellate court. While compensation of judges is an impor-
tant practical consideration, it should be a lower priority than determining the theo-
retically correct "mix" of decision makers. Seven judges may not be able to provide a
representative balance of perspectives; likewise, fifteen judges may deprive first in-
stance tribunals of some of the keenest intellects while creating unnecessary economic
challenges. Therefore, eleven judges may provide an appropriate "balance of experi-
ences" to create a more even handed and considered result. This is also in line with
the composition of other appellate bodies, which often number eleven members. Id.
478. Schwebel, supra note 392, at 117.
479. See, e.g., Int'l Law Ass'n/Project on Int'l Courts and Tribunals, Study Group
on the Practice and Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals, Pre-final Text
on Judicial Independence: The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the
International Judiciary, at http://www.pict-pcti.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
480. Blackaby, supra note 360, at 365.
1624 [Vol. 73
LEGITIMACY CRISIS
could promote regional coherence to a much larger extent than other
treaty-by-treaty approaches.
Second, a new international convention could be adopted to create
the Investment Arbitration Appellate Court. While mustering the po-
litical will to enact and ratify such a convention might well prove tax-
ing, it is by far the most practical approach as it would permit debate
about the appropriate nature of an appellate body and rectify incon-
gruities in the present system. Indeed, it would probably be more ef-
fective than the renegotiation of a network of 2100 treaties that might
otherwise be required by a "legislative" approach. Creating an appel-
late system, for example, seems facially inconsistent with the ICSID
annulment procedures. But as a review of legal issues and legal inter-
pretation was specifically excluded from the ICSID Convention's an-
nulment grounds, creating a separate mechanism to review legal er-
rors could be squared with the system.48 It would, however, need to
be accomplished by way of a separate protocol which might, for ex-
ample, permit appeals to the Appellate Body prior to permitting ap-
plication for annulment. By implementing such an appellate body in a
manner which is consistent with international law, but does not im-
pinge on the enforcement mechanisms already in place, investment
arbitration will ensure its long-term survival by creating a forum
where diametrically opposed decisions can either be explained or cor-
rected.
CONCLUSION
If investment treaty arbitration is to fulfill its promise, mechanisms
must be implemented to promote greater sensitivity to the public in-
terest and to minimize the risk of inconsistent decisions. Otherwise
"investor/government arbitration may fall prey to public pressure aris-
ing from a backlash" '482 and suffer from crib death before it can strug-
gle through its initial growing pains. By using several incremental
mechanisms to prevent inconsistent decisions from arising, the legiti-
macy of the system can be improved. The ultimate utility of the sys-
tem, however, will not be fully realized until an appellate court is cre-
ated which permits correction of legal errors, which might otherwise
inappropriately bankrupt developing nations, stifle legitimate regula-
tory activity, or deprive investors of their legitimate expectations. By
using both preventative and corrective forces, arbitration can fulfill its
justice-promoting objective and help the law develop in a harmonized
and equitable manner.
481. By having a separate mechanism to review awards for errors of law, this may
actually increase the probability that national courts in vacatur or enforcement pro-
ceedings will be likely to inquire into the merits of disputes.
482. Alvarez & Park, supra note 14, at 399.
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